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This research investigates the determinants of both audit fees and the purchase of non-audit 
services using multi-country data. In the current globalized economy and in an environment of 
increased labour mobility, auditors play a crucial role in assuring the quality of financial 
reporting. At the same time, auditors could provide certain professional non-audit services to 
their audit clients. Understanding the factors influencing the demand for, or the provision of, 
audit and non-audit services is of interest to standard setters, corporate governance participants, 
and both individual and institutional investors, among others. Furthermore, under the current 
globalized environment, the role played by country-level institutional factors is especially 
important. This thesis is organized into three essays: (i) workforce environment, labour market 
flexibility, and audit fees; (ii) a literature review of auditor-provided tax services (APTS, one 
type of non-audit services); and, finally, (iii) book-tax conformity and the demand for APTS. 
In Essay One, using a dataset from 30 countries over the period from 2002 to 2017, I 
examine the effects of audit clients’ workforce environment on audit fees as well as the role that 
national labour market flexibility plays in this relationship. I find evidence that audit fees are 
significantly lower for firms with a good workforce environment, suggesting that auditors 
perceive such clients as less risky; as a result, auditors expend less effort and/or charge a lower 
risk premium. Furthermore, I find this effect to be stronger for firms in countries with a more 
flexible labour market. My study contributes to the international audit fee literature by 
identifying employee welfare as a distinct audit pricing factor, above and beyond the effects of 
overall corporate social responsibility practices. 
Essay Two reviews the empirical literature on the determinants and consequences of APTS 
and provide some directions for future research. I first summarize two theoretical but competing 
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perspectives on the provision of APTS, namely, the knowledge spillover effect and the impaired 
independence effect. I then review the evolution of APTS-related disclosures and regulations 
in selected jurisdictions. My review of the determinants of APTS suggests that such decisions 
are related to the cost-benefit trade-off. I then review the literature on the consequences of 
APTS. This strand of the literature in the U.S. supports the knowledge spillover effect, but the 
findings in non-U.S. settings are mixed. The market perceptions of APTS in both the U.S. and 
non-U.S. settings suggest that market participants react to APTS negatively during uncertain 
periods, whereas non-archival studies suggest that the perceptions of APTS vary between 
stakeholder groups and with the types of APTS provided. 
Finally, Essay Three examines the impact of different levels of required book-tax 
conformity on audit clients’ demand for APTS. Utilizing a sample from 11 European Union 
(EU) countries between 2013 to 2019, I find evidence that listed firms in EU countries with a 
high level of required book-tax conformity are less likely to purchase tax services from their 
incumbent auditors, and also tend to pay lower tax service fees. Furthermore, I find these effects 
to be weaker after the implementation of the APTS-related EU Regulation that became effective 
from 2016. My findings contribute to the APTS literature by identifying a country-level 
institutional characteristic, i.e., the required level of book-tax conformity, as a potential 
determinant of appointing incumbent auditors as tax service providers. I also provide 
preliminary evidence of the effect of relevant EU regulation on changes in the demand for 
APTS. 
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1.1 Motivations for the Research 
The auditor is one of the important stakeholders in a modern corporation (Ormazábal, 2018), 
and understanding the relationship between audit clients’ characteristics and auditors’ 
behaviour is an important and popular area of research in the accounting and auditing literature. 
Most of the archival auditing research has been conducted using U.S. data (Simnett et al., 2016). 
In particular, about 85% of the archival auditing studies referenced in a comprehensive review 
by DeFond and Zhang (2014) used data for the U.S. companies (Simnett et al., 2016). However, 
the number of academic articles using international (i.e., non-U.S. or cross-country) accounting 
and auditing data has rapidly increased in recent years (Ball, 2016; Eierle et al., 2021; Simnett 
et al., 2016). Sharma (2017, p. 223) highlights the importance of conducting international 
research in auditing by stating that “…the imperative for international audit research is 
heightened in an era when international CPA firms are aggressively marketing themselves as 
global networks of professional services firms in assurance, advisory, and tax… Within this 
increasing internationalization of auditing and assurance practices, our role as researchers to 
provide rigorous evidence is invaluable to inform practice, policy formulation, and future 
research and education.” Therefore, the main theme of this thesis is exploring various facets of 
‘International Auditing’ in three essays. 
In this thesis, an ‘international’ auditing study refers to a paper using multi-country data 
to investigate audit-related research questions. There are two reasons that motivate this thesis. 
First, studies using cross-country data are still limited in the accounting and auditing literature. 
Simnett et al. (2016) show that only 20% (26 out of 130) of non-U.S. archival auditing and 
assurance research that examined data from multiple countries were published in leading 
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accounting journals from 1995-2014. Additionally, Eierle et al. (2021) identify 50 high-quality 
published and working papers examining cross-country auditing research questions up to 2019. 
Of those papers, 34 were published after 2010, whereas only 16 papers were published before 
2010, indicating increasing attention on cross-country auditing research in recent years. 
Furthermore, Gordon et al. (2019) show that 40% (26 out of 65) of articles published in top 
accounting journals from 2015-2018 used cross-country data. My thesis is expected to 
contribute to this growing, but still a scarce, research area.  
Second, an ‘international’ study has a set of unique benefits that cannot be achieved by 
conducting research in a single country. For instance, multi-country research could address 
some limitations of within-jurisdiction research (Ball, 2016). Firms within a given country or 
jurisdiction are facing a relatively homogeneous accounting and auditing environment, which 
makes it difficult to investigate the effects of country-level institutional features (e.g. legal 
origin) on accounting and auditing practices. However, the multi-country study has the ability 
to explore and answer questions as to why certain regulations may work better in certain 
countries than in others, given the differences in certain contextual factors, such as culture 
(Simnett et al., 2016). Thus, this thesis is not only important to academic researchers but also 
useful to international regulators and standard setters in terms of understanding whether and 
how institutional differences affect the effectiveness of auditing regulations. 
Generally, auditors could render audit services and non-audit services (hereafter NAS) to 
their audit clients in most countries/jurisdictions. Since the seminal audit pricing model 
developed by Simunic (1980), the determinants of audit fees have become one of the 
extensively investigated areas in auditing research. Therefore, in Essay One, I focus on 
examining the determinants of audit fees using a multi-country sample of firms. Specifically, I 
examine the relationship between audit clients’ workforce environment and audit fees. 
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I incorporate workforce-related indicators as my main variable of interest in Essay One for 
the following reasons. First, in a financial statement audit, an auditor’s main objective is to be 
reasonably assured that the financial statements are free of material misstatements owing to 
fraud or error. Employees have been found to be the most effective detectors of corporate fraud 
and misconduct (Dyck et al., 2010); therefore, workforce-related information is important to 
auditors. Second, workforce-related information is important not only to the firms themselves, 
but also to their business partners. For instance, importers (e.g., Next and H&M) expressed 
concerns about recent wage disputes in Bangladesh’s garment industry, and requested their 
auditors to investigate the matter.1 I posit that firms with a favourable workforce environment 
are relatively less risky, and auditors consequently charge lower fees, as such clients require 
both a reduced audit effort and lower audit risk premiums. 
Additionally, the effects of workforce-related information may vary across jurisdictions 
with different labour market characteristics. Given that labour market flexibility is associated 
with firing and hiring costs, employee mobility, and worker behaviour (Addison & Teixeira, 
2003; Gangl, 2003; Haltiwanger et al., 2014; Ichino & Riphahn, 2005), there is an unresolved 
question as to how labour market flexibility influences the relationship between the workforce 
environment and audit fees. Essay One also addresses this research question. 
In Essay Two and Essay Three, I shift my research focus from audit services to auditor-
provided tax services (hereafter APTS), a significant component of NAS. The well-known 
agency problem between shareholders and managers demands auditing services, to provide 
independent assurance to corporate stakeholders that financial statements prepared by managers 
comply with generally accepted accounting principles (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, auditor independence is the cornerstone of both audit quality 
and the auditing profession, as acknowledged by international regulators and practitioners. For 
 
1 See https://qz.com/1540275/5000-garment-workers-in-bangladesh-were-fired-after-protesting-low-wages/amp.  
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instance, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA, 2018) requires 
“…professional accountants in public practice be independent when performing audit or review 
engagements” (Sec 400.1, p.118).2 
In the past two decades, the increased proportion of revenues derived from providing NAS 
to audit clients has raised significant concerns, since high NAS might increase economic 
bonding with clients and, hence, compromise auditor independence (e.g., Agrawal & Chadha, 
2005; DeAngelo, 1981; Hermanson, 2009). This is also echoed by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC, 2003), which points out that the joint provision of audit and NAS 
may reduce investors’ confidence in auditor independence, and in the public capital markets. 
On the other hand, the joint provision of audits and NAS may increase audit efficiency, as the 
client-specific knowledge acquired from providing NAS can be transferred to statutory audits, 
thereby, enhancing their effectiveness and efficiency in performing audits (e.g., Joe & 
Vandervelde, 2007; Simunic, 1984). 
In the meantime, the regulators noted that the beneficial versus the detrimental effects of 
NAS on audit quality depend on the types of NAS (SEC, 2003, 2014). In particular, the SEC 
(2002, 2003) describe APTS as services that “…traditionally have been viewed as closely 
related to audit services and as not being in conflict with an auditor’s independence”, thereby 
financial statements users would view APTS more favourably than other types of NAS. As a 
 
2  IESBA (2018) explains two types of auditor independence: independence of mind and independence in 
appearance. Independence of mind is defined as “the state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion 
without being affected by influences that compromise professional judgement, thereby allowing an individual to 
act with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional skepticism.” (Sec. 400.5a). Independence in 
appearance is defined as “the avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and 
informed third party would be likely to conclude that a firm's or an audit or assurance team member’s integrity, 
objectivity or professional skepticism has been compromised” (Sec. 400.5b). The former is also known as 
independent in fact, and the latter as the investors’ perceptions of auditor independence. Unfortunately, academic 
research struggles to provide direct evidence on the former and instead uses various earnings quality proxies, e.g., 
discretionary accruals, accounting restatements, and earnings conservatism to assess the presence or absence of 
such independence (e.g., Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Frankel et al., 2002). With respect to independence in 
appearance, archival research investigates the association between NAS and market valuation of accounting 
earnings (Francis & Ke, 2006; Ghosh et al., 2009; Krishnan et al., 2005). Since being ‘independent’ is necessary 
to ensure high audit quality, I use “impaired independence” and “low audit quality” as interchangeable terms for 
the remainder of this thesis. 
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result, in the aftermath of some regulatory reforms, the regulators in several jurisdictions, e.g., 
the U.S. and the European Union (hereafter EU), decided to prohibit certain types of NAS, but 
continued to allow auditors to provide APTS to their audit clients (EU Directive, 2006; EU 
Regulation, 2014; SEC, 2003, 2006). Consequently, APTS became the largest source of non-
audit revenues under the current environment in several jurisdictions (e.g., Alsadoun et al., 2018; 
Beasley et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2019b; DeFond & Francis, 2005; Dobler, 2014; Francis, 2006). 
APTS could be further categorized into tax compliance and tax planning services. The former 
generally refers to preparing, signing, and filing a tax return for the tax authorities, whereas the 
latter refers to a diverse range of services that could help clients to manage tax affairs efficiently 
and find legitimate tax-saving opportunities. Therefore, firms’ investment in tax planning 
services could generate substantial benefits (Mills et al., 1998) that tax compliance services 
cannot provide (Chyz et al., 2021). In some extreme cases, firms adopt tax positions, courtesy 
of APTS-induced tax planning, that reduce their tax liabilities to zero. Naturally, tax planning 
services are more damaging than tax compliance services from the tax authority’s point of view. 
Compared with other types of NAS, APTS can affect the client’s income and cash flows 
directly through tax rate reduction (e.g., Omer et al., 2006). The expertise possessed by auditors 
in both financial reporting and tax laws helps them to design corporate tax planning activities 
that reduce the actual taxes paid (the cash flow effect) and simultaneously reduce tax expense 
(the earnings effect) in the financial statements (Maydew & Shackelford, 2007). Also, APTS 
could be more closely related to audit work than other NAS (Francis, 2006; SEC, 2002, 2003), 
thereby, generating knowledge spillover benefits. For example, when auditors perform financial 
statement audits, they need to review the clients’ tax returns and reserves, a process that requires 
substantial knowledge about the audit clients (Sage & Sage, 2005). Auditors’ tax expertise can 
enable them to understand clients’ tax positions easily, thereby, spilling the benefits over to 
financial statement audits.    
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However, ongoing debates on public firms’ aggressive tax strategies and tax sheltering 
activities have attracted regulators’ attention to the appropriateness of APTS (e.g., Harris, 2014). 
For instance, PwC was investigated by the U.S. audit regulator because of advising its audit 
client, Caterpillar Inc., to avoid U.S. $2.4 billion in taxes (Rapoport, 2014). Moreover, 
according to Klassen et al. (2016), more than 80% of audit clients purchased tax services 
unrelated to tax compliance from their incumbent auditors. In recent years, financial statement 
restatement issues related to “tax expense, benefit, deferral and other” have surged in the U.S. 
(Audit Analytics, 2016; Sheridan, 2017) and income tax related issues are one of the most cited 
deficiencies in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter PCAOB) 
inspection reports (Acito et al., 2018). Such findings raised significant concerns among 
regulators, practitioners, and researchers as to whether the incumbent auditors can maintain 
their independence in an environment where APTS constitutes a significant source of audit firm 
revenues. 
Although there remain several literature reviews and meta-analyses on NAS in general (e.g., 
Habib, 2012; Schneider et al., 2006; Sharma, 2014), no detailed review of studies relating to 
APTS exists. Therefore, in Essay Two, I provide a systematic review on the determinants and 
consequences of APTS. Surprisingly, I find that only a small number of prior studies examined 
the determinants of APTS, and none of them used an international sample. The possible reason 
is that regulations related to the provision of NAS (including APTS) vary widely across 
countries or jurisdictions. In Essay Three, I address this concern by using APTS information in 
the EU where the auditing regulation in each member country is based on an EU-wide 
regulation, leading to smaller variations across the EU. 
Audit Analytics (2020) analyses the audit markets in the EU and reports that the ratio of 
average NAS fees to total fees paid to statutory auditors varies significantly among the EU 
countries (from a low of about 0% in Latvia to a high of 34% in Denmark) during the period 
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2014 to 2019. My hand-collected data show that only 4% of Latvian firms purchase APTS from 
their incumbent auditors, whereas the corresponding figure is more than 88% for Danish firms. 
Thus, I conjecture that, apart from firm-level characteristics, country-level characteristics also 
affect the demand for APTS. In Essay Three, I examine whether the required level of book-tax 
conformity (hereafter BTC) is one such potential country-level determinant of APTS in the EU. 
BTC represents the degree of alignment between accounting (book) income and taxable income, 
which is expected to affect the demand for APTS from several perspectives (i.e., tax compliance, 
tax planning, and audit risk). In addition, during recent years, the EU audit and NAS markets 
have experienced significant reforms, owing to the enactment and implementation of EU 
Regulation (2014). I believe that this provides me an opportunity to compare the effects of the 
levels of BTC and the demand for APTS in both pre- and post-regulation periods, thereby, 
enabling me to better understand the consequences of the relevant regulation. 
 
1.2 Findings of the Research 
Using data from publicly listed companies in 30 countries during a sample period from 2002 to 
2017 in Essay One, I find that firms with a favourable workforce environment pay significantly 
lower audit fees than their counterparts with a relatively poor workforce environment. The 
reported coefficient in the baseline model suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
workforce environment index is associated with a 2.57% decrease in audit fees. Furthermore, I 
find that the negative relationship between the workforce environment and audit fees is strongest 
in countries with a high level of labour market flexibility. Moreover, I find that media coverage 
of workforce controversies mediates this relationship. Employing a battery of sensitivity tests,  
my results remain robust when I use alternative measurements for the workforce environment, 
remove clients with multinational operations, control for NAS, and remove countries with an 
atypical sample composition. In addition, I use a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regression 
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model to alleviate endogeneity concerns stemming from, for example, omitted variables that 
could influence both the workforce environment and audit fees. 
In Essay Two, I review the APTS studies published between 1983 and April 2021 following 
two widely used theoretical frameworks, namely, (1) the knowledge spillover and (2) the 
impaired independence theories. I also review the APTS regulations for the U.S. and EU in 
detail and summarize regulations in some other jurisdictions, regarding the provision of APTS 
by the incumbent auditors and related disclosure requirements. Four types of APTS-related 
decisions are reviewed, namely, decisions involving: (1) voluntary APTS information 
disclosure; (2) choice of incumbent auditors as tax service providers; (3) retention or dismissal 
of incumbent auditors as tax service providers; and (4) the magnitude of APTS fees. Firms 
trade-off the expected benefits against potential costs in assessing whether to disclose APTS 
information, purchase or retain APTS, and pay more fees for APTS. With respect to the 
implications of APTS, my review shows that studies have used both output-based and input-
based measures of earnings quality in examining the consequences of APTS. I find that the bulk 
of such papers support ‘knowledge spillover benefits’ emanating from simultaneous provision 
of audit and tax services. Notwithstanding, some papers also provide mixed evidence for similar 
research questions. 
Finally in Essay Three, using hand-collected data from listed firms in 11 EU countries 
spanning the period 2013 to 2019, I find that firms listed in countries with a higher level of 
BTC have a lower likelihood of purchasing APTS from the incumbent auditors, and also pay 
less APTS fees. The reported coefficient in my probit regression suggests that a one-unit change 
in the level of BTC (i.e., from no conformity to perfect conformity) decreases the likelihood of 
purchasing APTS by 8.79% to 22.10% depending on the BTC measures. Some plausible 
explanations for this finding might be related to a high level of BTC constraining audit clients’ 
tax avoidance activities, thereby, reducing the demand for APTS. Also, audit clients in countries 
9 
 
with a high level of BTC are less likely to exhibit tax noncompliance behaviour because they 
have less discretion in tax reporting. Finally, a high level of BTC simplifies the auditing of 
complex tax accounts, thereby reducing the knowledge spillover benefits. All these plausible 
explanations suggest that the net benefits of purchasing APTS are relatively lower in countries 
with high levels of BTC compared with such benefits in countries with low levels of BTC. 
Regarding the moderating effect of the EU Regulation (2014), I find that the negative 
association between the purchase of APTS and the levels of BTC is mitigated in the post-
regulation period. 
 
1.3 Contributions and Implications of the Research 
By using international data, this thesis contributes to both audit service and NAS research, 
especially APTS research. Essay One adds to the existing literature in several ways. For 
instance, although Huang et al. (2017) document a similar relationship in the U.S.3, I extend 
this relationship between the client’s workforce environment and audit behaviour (i.e., audit 
fees) to an international context, thereby responding to the call for additional, international-
level research to exploit the moderating role of variations in institutional factors on existing 
findings (e.g., Ball, 2016). 
In addition, Essay One explores issues affecting firms’ operations and performance, rather 
than employee-related issues associated with earnings management (e.g., Chen et al., 2017). 
Chen et al. (2017) suggest that firms sponsoring defined benefit pension plans for their 
employees need more complex accounting estimates, thus providing unique opportunities for 
managers to manipulate earnings that, in turn, give rise to increased audit fees. Moreover, my 
 
3 My study also differs from Huang et al. (2017) in two other important ways. First, I examine whether auditors 
price employer efforts to improve employees’ working environment, while they rely on employees’ satisfaction 
with the workforce environment. Second, Huang et al. (2017) do not explore the possible channel through which 
employee ratings of their workforce environment might affect audit risk. I address this void by showing that audit 
clients with a good workforce environment have fewer workforce-related controversies covered by the media (an 
outcome that decreases audit fees) relative to their counterparts with a poor workforce environment. 
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study focuses on the supply side rather than the demand side of audit services. For example, 
Duellman et al. (2015) find that firms with overconfident managers are less likely to demand a 
high-quality audit, leading to lower audit fees. I, on the other hand, explore the relationship 
between the workforce environment and audit fees from the supply-side perspective.  
Essay Two contributes to an understanding of the research findings in APTS, and adds 
value to the series of PCAOB auditing synthesis papers (e.g., Carson et al., 2013; Knechel et 
al., 2013). In addition, Tepalagul and Lin (2015) suggest conducting more research related to 
NAS (including APTS) in non-U.S. settings, because of institutional differences that might lead 
to differences in incentives, perceptions, and behaviours of the multiple stakeholders regarding 
the demand for, and supply of, APTS. Thus, the research findings generated from the U.S. may 
not be generalized to non-U.S. settings. Although bulk of the reviewed papers used data from 
the U.S., there are some recent publications in other non-U.S. settings, including Germany, 
Malaysia, South Korea, and Spain, among others. Not surprisingly, I observe different findings 
across countries (or jurisdictions) for similar research questions. I hope that my systematic 
review will help stakeholders understand whether further regulations restricting APTS would 
be beneficial or not. I also hope that this review will be useful for researchers willing to conduct 
additional research on the determinants and consequences of APTS in the U.S. as well as in 
non-U.S. settings.  
Essay Three contributes to the scarce literature examining the determinants of APTS. Only 
a few prior studies investigate the firm-level determinants of APTS and these find mixed results 
(Finley & Stekelberg, 2016; Halperin & Lai, 2015), probably because the cost-benefit trade-
offs are based on the joint effects of several firm-specific characteristics. I, on the other hand, 
report that variation in a country-specific feature, i.e., BTC, affects firms’ decision to purchase 
APTS. The reduced demand for APTS in high BTC countries might at least partially explain 
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the reasons why prior U.S. studies normally support the tax-saving benefits emanating from 
APTS, but other studies using data from the EU countries find inconclusive results.4 
Also, Essay Three responds to the call for more research about the consequences of BTC 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p.136) document that “…The 
evidence suggests there will be a substantial cost in terms of the information loss in accounting 
earnings should book-tax conformity be adopted. We have little evidence about anything else… 
Further evidence on a broader set of costs and benefits would be valuable to inform this debate.” 
I provide a possible consequence of adopting a high level of BTC, which is the reduced demand 
for APTS: a finding that should be of interest to multiple stakeholders including the regulators 
and equity market participants. The low demand for APTS in high BTC countries could 
partially alleviate concerns over auditor independence and, hence, assure stakeholders about 
audit integrity. On the flip side, lower demand for APTS in high BTC countries will lead to 
fewer consulting revenues for audit firms and may also affect audit clients adversely, since they 
will lose out on some knowledge spillover benefits, especially for non-tax accounts.    
Finally, I provide some preliminary results of the effect of implementing the EU Regulation 
(2014) on the European APTS market in Essay Three. My results show that both the likelihood 
of purchasing APTS and the amount paid for APTS declined significantly in the post-regulation 
period. Importantly, I find that the negative association between the demand for APTS and the 
levels of BTC is mitigated in the post-regulation regime. This might be attributable to 
favourable market perceptions about the APTS-related regulatory changes (Horton et al., 2018) 




4 For example, Cook et al. (2008, 2020), Hogan and Noga (2015), Maydew and Shackelford (2007), and Omer et 
al. (2006) suggest that the purchase of APTS, or the magnitude of APTS fees, are both positively associated with 
tax avoidance in the U.S., whereas Garcia-Blandon et al. (2021) fail to find an association in Spain, and Watrin et 
al. (2019) find a negative association in Germany. 
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1.4 Organization of the Research 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two (Essay One) is titled “Workforce 
environment and audit fees: International Evidence”, Chapter three (Essay Two) is titled 
“Determinants and consequences of auditor-provided tax services: A systematic review of the 
international literature”, Chapter four (Essay Three) is titled “Book-tax conformity and the 






WORKFORCE ENVIRONMENT AND AUDIT FEES: 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE (ESSAY ONE)5 
 
2.1 Introduction 
When making pricing decisions, auditors evaluate the costs of conducting an audit, the litigation 
risk inherent therein, and non-litigation risk brought about by a client’s potential failure 
(Houston et al., 2005; Pratt & Stice, 1994; Simunic, 1980). Audit processes and audit efforts 
are adjusted to reduce any potential costs stemming from client-specific risks. For risks that are 
costly to reduce and that cannot be decreased by increasing audit efforts, auditors charge a 
compensatory premium. Therefore, any factors related to client-specific risks could influence 
auditors’ pricing decisions. As employees could be a source of sustained competitive advantage 
inasmuch as they facilitate a firm’s success in the market (e.g., Fulmer et al., 2003), employee- 
or workforce-related information could be of interest to auditors concerned about clients’ 
performance and risk. Auditors have previously voiced their interest in workforce environment. 
For example, Rebecca Dabbs, a partner of Ernst & Young, claims that firms can improve 
workplace productivity by “…better managing environment, health and safety risks.”6 In this 
essay, I examine whether auditors price information related to a client’s workforce environment. 
Recent studies suggest that a family-friendly workforce environment could not only help 
firms attract and keep talented employees (Hom et al., 2017; Turban & Cable, 2003), but also 
 
5  This chapter has been published in the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2020.100182). I acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions received 
from Jeffrey Ng (editor) and an anonymous reviewer. I am grateful to Andrew Jackson and David Lont for their 
constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier version. I also thank Michael Bradbury, Steven Cahan, Charl 
de Villiers, Noor Houqe, Tom Scott, Roger Simnett, Jin Zhang, Yuyu Zhang (AFAANZ discussant), the 2019 
Eleventh Annual Quantitative Accounting Research Symposium and Consortium participants at the University of 
Auckland, participants at the 2019 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand annual 
conference, and seminar participants at Massey University for their useful comments. 
6 See https://www.ey.com/en_gl/assurance/how-to-support-better-environment-health-and-safety-outcomes.  
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motivate employees to be more cooperative and productive (Bloom et al., 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 
2000). In addition, empirical studies show that relative to peers with a less favourable 
environment, firms with a favourable workforce environment have high performance and 
valuation levels, high levels of innovation performance, few internal control inefficiencies, and 
a low cost of debt capital, among other advantages (e.g., Chen et al., 2016, 2019a; Edmans, 2011; 
Guo et al., 2016; Lee & Kim, 2016). For instance, Guo et al. (2016) find that the probability of 
experiencing an employee-related material internal control weakness is relatively low when 
employees work in a workforce-friendly environment. In addition, Ji et al. (2018) find that 
auditors charge higher fees for firms that disclose material internal control weaknesses that are 
non-financial in nature. Therefore, the favourable workforce environment, a key ingredient of 
non-financial information, could be interpreted as a signal of both a low level of client internal 
control risk and highly credible client financial statements. Such positive signals would 
decrease audit fees accordingly. 
Moreover, a good workforce environment could decrease the incidence of workforce-
related controversies. Employees are less prone to report managerial wrongdoing when they 
work in a satisfactory environment (e.g., Ben-Nasr & Ghouma, 2018; Rothschild & Miethe, 
1999). From an audit risk perspective, less media coverage of workforce controversies is likely 
to decrease audit fees, because less public attention on clients will reduce auditors’ litigation 
risk (e.g., Gong et al., 2018; Redmayne et al., 2010). Building on these studies, I posit that firms 
with a favourable workforce environment are relatively less risky, and auditors consequently 
charge lower fees, as such clients require both a reduced audit effort and lower audit risk 
premiums. 
I also investigate whether country-level labour market flexibility moderates this 
relationship. In more flexible labour markets, firms with a better workforce environment can 
easily replace low-productive employees with more productive ones, as they will have fewer 
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adjustment costs than their peers in less flexible labour markets. At the same time, in more 
flexible labour markets, low-productive employees risk losing their job if they shirk their 
responsibilities, which will force them to improve their performance. As a result, firms that 
operate in a flexible labour market and that have a favourable workforce environment may have 
stable or even improved employee productivity and, consequently, firm performance, thereby 
reducing audit risk even further. The benefits of investing in the workforce environment are 
thus likely to be higher in countries with high labour market flexibility, where firms can easily 
and quickly adjust their workforce as needed. Thus, I posit that auditors will further decrease 
audit fees for firms that have a favourable workforce environment and that are domiciled in 
countries with a more flexible labour market. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I present the extant literature on the 
determinants of audit fees and employee-related studies, as well as develop my hypotheses. I 
then describe my research methodology and sample selection procedure in Section 2.3. In 
Section 2.4, I present descriptive statistics, my main test results, and my mediation test results. 
In Section 2.5, I provide my robustness and endogeneity test results, and I summarize this 
chapter in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Academic studies suggest that the costs of conducting an audit (i.e., audit fees) consist of a 
“resource cost factor” and an “expected loss factor” (e.g., Pratt & Stice, 1994; Simunic, 1980). 
The resource cost factor is a quantitative measurement of how many audit efforts the auditor 
performed, while the expected loss factor is the present value of future losses for which the 
auditor will be liable, which is related to client-specific risks. Furthermore, auditors will expend 
their audit efforts to reduce future expected losses to the point at which the overall cost of 
conducting an audit is expected to be the lowest. Auditors charge a litigation risk premium to 
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compensate for the remaining expected loss factors (Simunic & Stein, 1996). Moreover, 
Houston et al. (2005) introduce a non-litigation risk premium into the audit fee model. In sum, 
audit efforts, litigation risk, and non-litigation risk premiums collectively comprise the audit 
fees that auditors charge.  
According to Hay et al. (2006), most of the determinants of audit fees can be categorized 
into client attributes, auditor attributes, and engagement attributes. I consider audit clients’ 
workforce-related information as a client attribute that will affect an auditor’s pricing behaviour. 
The role of employees in modern corporations has been debated for several years. Instead of 
considering employees as a common input factor in the production process, modern 
management theory suggests that employees are a resource crucial to a firm’s success. 
According to the resource-based view, firms’ resources are classified into three categories: 
physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital resources 
(Barney, 1991). Human capital resources consist of training, experience, judgment, intelligence, 
relationships, and the insights of individual managers and workers in a firm. Human capital 
resources meet the criteria for sustained competitive advantage because of their VRIN 
characteristics (i.e., valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable), which distinguish human 
capital resources from other types and help firms to pursue competitive success (Pfeffer & 
Villeneuve, 1994; Wright et al., 1994).  
Therefore, corporations must necessarily improve and maintain their employees’ 
effectiveness and efficiency to remain competitive. In addition to giving normal monetary 
incentives, employers can motivate employees by also providing non-monetary, welfare-related 
benefits. These non-monetary benefits include opportunities to be involved in the firm’s 
decision-making process, a flexible working schedule, a safer workplace environment, and more 
training and career development opportunities, among others. Employees make more effort and 
perform better in their tasks when they work in a good workforce environment, which leads to 
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higher productivity and performance (Akerlof, 1982; Bloom et al., 2011; Dalal et al., 2012; 
Levine, 1992). Meanwhile, employees are also more cooperative and less likely to become 
involved in sabotaging activities when they are treated well (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Many 
other studies, both in single country and international settings, present evidence that firms with 
satisfied employees are more likely to outperform counterparts with dissatisfied employees (e.g., 
Chen et al., 2016; Edmans, 2011, 2012; Faleye & Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018; Filbeck & 
Preece, 2003; Gupta & Krishnamurti, 2020; Huselid, 1995; Lee & Kim, 2016). Firms with a 
high employee-friendly rating tend to maintain low leverage ratios (Bae et al., 2011), and 
debtholders require lower returns (Chen et al., 2019a). Note that these benefits may be limited 
to treating employees well within an appropriate range, and that excess employee welfare 
treatment could have detrimental effects on shareholder value (Ben-Nasr & Ghouma, 2018).  
On the other hand, Hom and Kinicki (2001) suggest that in response to an unsatisfactory 
workforce environment, employees may choose to either leave a firm or to perform in a 
detrimental way. Therefore, poor employee treatment policies significantly increase the 
likelihood of an employee-related material internal control weakness and the probability of a 
misstatement caused by an unintentional error (Guo et al., 2016). Firms with a poor workforce 
environment are more likely to have employee disputes (e.g., strikes and litigation) that lead to 
significant financial and reputational losses (e.g., Karpoff & Lott, 1999). Thus, auditors will 
increase their professional skepticism toward client-specific risks when a client has a poor 
workforce environment, a proposition that has been empirically confirmed in U.S. contexts by 
Huang et al. (2017). 
Given these studies, the client’s workforce environment may affect audit fees in multiple 
ways. First, a better workforce environment may lead to a lower likelihood of a financial 
statement misstatement, thereby reducing audit efforts and hence audit fees. Employees who 
work in a favourable environment are more likely to properly perform internal tasks and hence 
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significantly reduce the propensity for having material internal control weaknesses. Second, the 
litigation risk premiums that auditors charge may also be lower when clients have a favourable 
workforce environment, because auditors are less likely to be sued for material misstatements. 
Relatedly, such firms tend to have fewer workforce-related disputes and controversies reported 
in the media, leading to less public attention on both the firms and their auditors, as well as 
decreased litigation risks for the auditor. Overall, firms with a good workforce environment are 
highly likely to be seen to have relatively few audit risks; therefore, auditors will expend less 
effort on such clients and charge them lower risk premiums. I therefore state my first hypothesis 
as follows: 
H1: A good (poor) audit client’s workforce environment decreases (increases) audit fees, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
H1 focuses on the firm-specific workforce environment determinants of audit fees. 
However, prior studies document that institutional factors (e.g., the broader legal environment) 
also play a vital role in determining audit fees (e.g., Choi et al., 2008; Kuo & Lee, 2016; Taylor 
& Simon, 1999). My second hypothesis considers country-level labour market flexibility, 
referring to the speed with which labour adapts to fluctuations and changes in market conditions, 
as a possible moderator between the client’s workforce environment and audit fees. Labour 
market flexibility has been found to be negatively associated with the restrictiveness of 
employment protection regulations (e.g., Addison & Teixeira, 2003; Gangl, 2003; Haltiwanger 
et al., 2014). Employment protection regulations influence firms’ employee-related costs 
including per worker employment costs and employment adjustment costs (Addison & Teixeira, 
2003). The former reflects the costs of hiring and providing benefits to employees, and the latter 
reflects costs that accompany gross changes, especially those that occur when employers 
dismiss employees. Both costs will be higher in countries/markets with more protective 
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employment regulations and, consequently, lower labour market flexibility. In such countries, 
firms are less likely to hire and fire employees, which decreases both employees’ labour 
mobility and their external opportunities (Gangl, 2003). In countries with a more flexible labour 
market, high external job availability allows employees to switch firms more easily.   
Moreover, when more outside options are available, firms need to pay higher compensation 
to retain key skilled employees. According to the theoretical discussion from Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984), the total demand for labour declines when all firms raise their wages. Thus, 
employees who shirk their responsibilities are under the threat of job loss, which encourages 
them to make more firm-specific investments. Ichino and Riphahn (2005) use data from a large 
Italian bank and document that the number of days of absence per week, on average, increases 
significantly after employees are protected by the employment regulation. Bjuggren (2018) uses 
a natural experiment method in Sweden to explore the causal relationship between labour 
market flexibility and labour productivity. He finds that after a reform of Swedish last-in-first-
out (LIFO) labour rules7, labour productivity increased by 2% to 3% in small treated firms 
compared to large firms that were not affected by the reform. The author suggests that the 
increased threat of job loss may induce employees to exert greater effort in their jobs. Edmans et 
al. (2017) and Gupta and Krishnamurti (2020) provide further evidence on the benefits of 
undertaking employee-friendly practices in countries with high labour market flexibility.   
Building on this discussion, I conjecture that in flexible labour markets, firms with a 
favourable workforce environment are more likely to retain productive employees and to lay 
off low-productivity employees, thus creating for incumbent employees a job termination threat 
that forces them to work diligently. Therefore, firms with a good workforce environment should 
maintain or increase their employees’ performance easily, because of the low hiring and firing 
 
7 Before 2001, regulations mandated that if the firm wished to lay off staff, the employee who last joined the firm 
should be the first fired. After the 2001 reform, firms with fewer than 11 employees were granted the option to 
choose which of the three shortest-tenure employees should be let go. 
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costs in flexible labour markets. Therefore, the benefits brought about by a good workforce 
environment will be enhanced in countries with a more flexible labour market. As a result, 
auditors’ concerns about such firms’ specific risk will further diminish with increased labour 
market flexibility. Accordingly, I state my second hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The impact of the workforce environment on audit fees will be reinforced in countries with 
high labour market flexibility. 
 
2.3 Research Methodology 
2.3.1 Model specification 
To test H1, I develop the following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model: 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏𝑾𝑬𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐴𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽22𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽25𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽26𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽27𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽28𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽29𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽30𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                (2.1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit and audit-related fees (LNAF) 
(see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed construction). My variable of primary interest is the Workforce 
Environment Index (hereafter WEI), which provides a comprehensive rating of a company’s 
workforce environment (see Section 2.3.3 for a detailed discussion). In H1, I argue that firms 
with a good workforce environment pay significantly lower audit fees. Therefore, I predict a 
negative 𝛽1. 
I include several control variables that are likely to determine audit fees. Firm size (SIZE), 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, is found to be an extremely critical explanatory 
variable for audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). In addition, I use five variables to control for firm 
complexity, including INVREC (the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets), 
NBS (the natural logarithm of the number of business segments), NGS (the natural logarithm of 
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the number of geographic segments), TURN (net sales divided by total assets), and INTS (coded 
as 1 for firms that have at least 10% international sales to total sales, and zero otherwise). Since 
operational or geographical diversification and internationalization often signal greater 
complexity in a firm’s operations, such firms require more audit efforts and procedures, 
resulting in higher audit fees (e.g., Choi et al., 2008; Jaggi & Low, 2011; Kim et al., 2012). 
Thus, I expect positive associations between audit fees and firm size and the complexity 
measures. 
I control for several client-specific risk factors because auditors will either make greater 
auditing efforts or charge fee premiums to high-risk clients, leading to increased audit fees (e.g., 
Pratt & Stice, 1994). Consistent with Choi et al. (2008), proxies for the client-specific risks are 
LEV, ROA, LOSS, SPECIAL, MTB, and CURRENT. I measure LEV as the sum of short- and 
long-term debt divided by total assets, ROA as net income divided by total assets, and LOSS as 
a dummy variable that is coded as 1 for firms reporting negative income before extraordinary 
items for the current year, and zero otherwise. Firms that report special items (SPECIAL) are 
coded as 1, and zero otherwise. The market to book ratio (MTB) is measured as the ratio of 
firm market capitalization to common shareholder equity, and the liquidity ratio (CURRENT) 
is measured as total current assets divided by total current liabilities. I predict positive 
coefficients on LEV, LOSS, and SPECIAL, and negative coefficients on ROA, MTB, and 
CURRENT. I use cross-listing on the U.S. markets (CROSS) as an additional variable for client-
specific litigation risk, because auditors face increased legal liability when client firms are 
cross-listed in countries with stronger legal regimes than those in their home country (Choi et 
al., 2009a). Similar to Kuo and Lee (2016), I include firms’ financing activities (ISSUE) as a 
control variable that is coded as 1 when a firm obtains either equity or debt capital in the current 
year, and zero otherwise; I include this particular control variable since both the demand for 
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audit quality and audit risk are higher when firms are involved in such activities. I also include 
CSR as an additional control variable.  
I also include a set of auditor and engagement attributes likely to affect audit fees, including 
BIGN auditor (a dummy variable coded as 1 for firms audited by a Big N audit firm, 0 otherwise), 
audit opinion (AO; a dummy variable coded as 1 for firms receiving qualified opinions, 0 
otherwise), and busy season (BUSY; a dummy variable coded as 1 for firms for which the fiscal 
year-end comes during an auditor busy season, 0 otherwise).8 All these audit-related variables 
are expected to have a positive relationship with audit fees. Carcello et al. (2002), Hay et al. 
(2008), and Zaman et al. (2011) find that firms with a good corporate governance structure are 
more likely to demand high-quality audits, whereas other studies suggest the opposite (e.g., 
Griffin et al., 2008). As proxies for a client’s corporate governance structure, I include board 
size (BSIZE; the number of board members), board independence (BIND; the proportion of 
independent board members), CEO duality (CEODUAL; a dummy variable coded as 1 for firms 
in which the CEO and chair of the board are the same person, 0 otherwise), the presence of an 
audit committee (ACM; a dummy variable coded as 1 for firms with an audit committee, 0 
otherwise), audit committee independence (ACMIND; the proportion of independent audit 
committee members), and audit committee  expertise (ACMEXP; a dummy variable coded as 1 
for firms that have an audit committee with at least three members and at least one financial 
expert, 0 otherwise). 
Similar to Choi et al. (2009a) and Kuo and Lee (2016), I include five country-level control 
variables that may affect cross-country variations in audit fees. LAW is a dummy variable for 
legal origin that is coded as 1 for common law countries and 0 for code law countries, which 
represents a country’s legal origin and the level of investor protection; FDI is the level of 
 
8 Prior studies use a single month (e.g., December or January) to proxy the auditor busy season effect for all 
countries. In this essay, however, for each country in my initial sample, I designate the month when the largest 
number of firms have their fiscal year-end as the auditor busy month.  
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foreign direct investment as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP); LNGDP is the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita; DISCL measures a country’s required disclosure level; 
and CORRUP is the perceived corruption index. I expect all the country-level variables to be 
positively related to audit fees. I further include year- and industry-fixed effects in my Equation 
(2.1).  
In H2, I hypothesize that the negative relationship between the workforce environment and 
audit fees is stronger in countries with high labour market flexibility. I develop the following 
Equation (2.2) to test H2: 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑀𝐹𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑴𝑭𝒋,𝒕 ∗ 𝑾𝑬𝑰𝒊,𝒕 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                              (2.2) 
 
where LMF refers to the country-level labour market flexibility (for a detailed construction of 
LMF, see Section 2.3.4). In Equation (2.2), my main variable of interest is the interaction term 
between LMF and WEI (i.e., 𝑳𝑴𝑭∗𝑾𝑬𝑰), and I expect a negative association between LNAF 
and this interaction term (𝛽3<0.) Such a negative association would indicate that auditors tend 
to further decrease fees for client firms with a favourable workforce environment, as the 
country-level labour market flexibility increases. 
 
2.3.2 Measurement of audit fees 
I use the natural logarithm of the sum of audit fees and audit-related fees (LNAF) as my proxy 
for audit pricing, as is consistent with U.S. audit fees research. The most common measure of 
audit fees in international audit fees research (e.g., Bronson et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2008) is 
“fees paid to auditor” and includes (1) audit and audit-related fees and (2) other NAS fees. I did 
not include the fees paid for other NAS because regulations permitting or prohibiting the 
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provision of such services vary widely across jurisdictions. Consequently, I use audit and audit-
related fees, rather than the total fees paid to the auditor, as my proxy for audit pricing.9 
 
2.3.3 Measure of workforce environment index 
I retrieve firm-level workforce environment data from the Thomson Reuters ESG database, 
which covers information related to ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) and 
significant ESG controversies.10 The Thomson Reuters ESG database provides over 400 ESG 
measures and both enhances and replaces the ASSET4 database used in prior studies (e.g., Gupta 
& Krishnamurti, 2020; Thomson Reuters, 2018). Following Gupta and Krishnamurti (2020), I 
identify a list of 20 indicators that are available consistently across the sample period to construct 
the Workforce Environment Index (WEI).11 These indicators combine both qualitative (19) 
and quantitative (1) attributes. I provide the details of each measure and the scoring approach 
I use in Appendix A. I add all of a firm’s scores to construct a WEI that ranges from 0 to 20. A 
high value for WEI indicates that a firm has a favourable workforce environment. 
 
2.3.4 Measurement of labour market flexibility 
I use two measures of labour market flexibility. The first is the Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) Index for OECD countries and some emerging countries. This index 
measures “the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers 
 
9 Audit-related fees include fees paid for external services that are reasonably associated with performing the audit 
or reviewing financial statements. I find similar results when I use only audit fees as the dependent variable. 
10 The Thomson Reuters ESG database provides ESG data for 7,000+ companies globally, which gives me a 
platform for comparing ESG performance globally. The ESG database collects ESG information from multiple 
sources, including annual reports, NGO websites, CSR reports, company websites, stock exchange fillings, and 
news sources, among others.  
11 Gupta and Krishnamurti (2020) identify 35 workforce-related performance indicators to construct their own 
employee treatment index. Because the Thomson Reuters ESG database is an updated version of the ASSET4 
database and it classifies some indicators that are better related to the workforce, I identify 20 measures among 
those indicators to capture the overall workforce environment. However, I acknowledge that my WEI based on the 
selected indicators may not capture the entire workforce environment. Therefore, in Section 2.5.1, I confirm the 
validity of WEI using alternative independent variables gathered from the ESG and the ASSET4 databases. 
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and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency 
contracts.”12 It consists of three category scores: individual dismissals of regular workers (EPR), 
additional costs of collective dismissals (EPC), and the regulation of temporary contracts (EPT). 
Consistent with prior studies (Banker et al., 2013; Pagano & Volpin, 2005), I measure EPL as 
the equally weighted EPR, EPC, and EPT. Furthermore, I multiply EPL by -1 for ease of 
interpretation. Following Edmans et al. (2017), I use the labour market regulations index (EFW) 
from the Economic Freedom of the World database as my second measure of labour market 
flexibility to represent the “de facto strictness of labo[u]r regulation” (Feldmann, 2009, p. 77). 
There are six components of EFW: hiring regulations and minimum wage (5Bi), hiring and 
firing regulations (5Bii), centralized collective bargaining (5Biii), working-hours regulations 
(5Biv), mandated cost of worker dismissal (5Bv), and conscription (5Bvi). I use the average of 
these six components to construct the EFW index. High values for both EPL and EFW indicate 
greater labour market flexibility.13 
 
2.3.5 Sample and industry distribution 
I extract audit and audit-related fees data, all of which required firm-specific financial 
information from the Thomson Reuters Fundamentals (via Thomson Reuters Eikon) and 
WorldScope databases. I retrieve workforce-related information from the Thomson Reuters ESG 
database, as I discussed in Section 2.3.3. Auditor classification information is gathered from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, which provides time-series auditor information. I source firm-level 
governance data from the Thomson Reuters ESG database, and country-level variables mainly 
from World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and prior literature (e.g., La Porta 
et al., 2008). The country-level required disclosure index is developed by the Center for 
 
12 This definition is retrieved from the OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsof 
employmentprotection.htm. 
13 The current form of the EPL data is available annually until 2013, and the EFW data is available annually until 
2016. To maximize my sample size in Equation (2.2), I replace the missing EPL and EFW using their latest values.   
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International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The perceived corruption index, 
developed by Transparency International, ranges from 1-10. For ease of interpretation, I replace 
the original index with 10 minus the original value, which means that the higher the index, the 
higher the perceived corruption level. In Appendix B, I include detailed variable definitions and 
sources. The sample period is from 2002 to 2017. I choose 2002 as the beginning year, because 
workforce-related information became available beginning in that year.  
I begin with a sample of 32,666 firm-year observations with non-missing audit fees and 
WEI data from 43 countries for the 2002-2017 sample period. Consistent with previous 
literature, I eliminate firm-years from the financial (4,787) and utility industries (1,323) based 
on the 2-digit Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS), as the audit fee determinants 
for such industries are distinct. After further applying the data requirements for computing firm-
specific financial variables, I delete 3,876 observations. Similar to Jaggi and Low (2011), I drop 
some countries (Brazil, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Philippines, 
Portugal, and Thailand) with fewer than 30 firm-year observations. My baseline regression, 
therefore, includes 22,573 firm-year observations from 30 countries. I then delete 2,454 firm-
year observations with missing corporate governance variables. Finally, I exclude 315 
observations with missing country-level data, resulting in 19,804 firm-year observations that I 
use for the most comprehensive regression specification.14 To mitigate the impact of outliers, 
I winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective 
distributions. In Table 2.1, I present my industry-based sample distributions. My sample is well 
distributed, as no single industry covers more than 15% of the total sample. A total of 14.89% of 
the sample comes from Capital Goods (GICS 2010), followed by 13.34% from Materials (GICS 
1510) and 7.93% from Energy (GICS 1010).
 
14 My sample is comparable to Fauver et al. (2018) who use 21,103 observations to investigate the impact of 
employee-friendly culture on firm value.  
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Table 2.1 Industry distribution 
Industry group Name N % of N 
1010 Energy 1,791 7.93 
1510 Materials 3,011 13.34 
2010 Capital Goods 3,361 14.89 
2020 Commercial & Professional Services 828 3.67 
2030 Transportation 1,110 4.92 
2510 Automobiles & Components 656 2.91 
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 877 3.89 
2530 Consumer Services 828 3.67 
2540 Media 736 3.26 
2550 Retailing 1,234 5.47 
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 375 1.66 
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 982 4.35 
3030 Household & Personal Products 277 1.23 
3510 Health Care Equipment & Services 906 4.01 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 1,001 4.43 
4510 Software & Services 1,206 5.34 
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 1,044 4.62 
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 548 2.43 
5010 Telecommunication Services 568 2.52 
6010 Real Estate 1,234 5.46 
Total  22,573 100.00 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2.2, I report the detailed descriptive statistics of the variables used in this essay. As 
shown in Panel A, the mean of LNAF is 7.44, corresponding to 3.91 million $US, which is 
similar to the result found by LópezPuertas-Lamy et al. (2017).15 The average workforce 
environment index is 10.37, exhibiting a large standard deviation. The mean SIZE of the sample 
firms is 15.23 (i.e., 12,362 million $US), while about 14% of firms report negative incomes for 
the current year, and the majority of them (INTS statistic of 0.70) have substantial international 
operations. The ratio of receivables and inventory over total assets is 23%, while current assets 
are, on average, two times larger than current liabilities. The mean leverage ratio is 55%, while 
8% of sample firms are cross-listed in the U.S. markets. With respect to the firm-level governance 
variables, I note that the mean size of the board of directors is 10. Most of the firms (93%) have 
an audit committee, which shows that most countries follow a best practice code that suggests 
 
15 The average amount of audit fees is calculated using unlogged audit fees, which, for my comprehensive sample 
observations, is $US 3.98 million. 
28 
 
the formation of an audit committee. The percentages of independent directors on the board of 
directors and the audit committee are 57% and 80%, respectively. Moreover, about 75% of 
audit committees have at least three members and at least one financial expert. Big N audit 
firms audit most of the sample firms (94%), and only a few firms (0.2%) received qualified 
audit opinions. In addition, about 74% of firms have their fiscal year-end during the auditor’s 
busy season.  
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Firm-level variables 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
LNAF 22573 7.44 1.32 6.53 7.44 8.34 
WEI 22573 10.37 4.00 7.00 11.00 14.00 
SIZE 22573 15.23 1.52 14.30 15.22 16.18 
LEV 22573 0.55 0.22 0.41 0.55 0.68 
INVREC 22573 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.34 
ROA 22573 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.09 
LOSS 22573 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NBS 22573 1.02 0.71 0.00 1.10 1.61 
NGS 22573 1.19 0.70 0.69 1.39 1.79 
SPECIAL 22573 0.88 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CROSS 22573 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MTB 22573 3.01 3.47 1.18 2.05 3.66 
CURRENT 22573 1.92 1.47 1.09 1.52 2.24 
INTS 22573 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TURN 22573 0.86 0.59 0.45 0.76 1.13 
ISSUE 22573 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CSR 22573 51.62 17.40 38.17 51.59 65.05 
BIGN 20119 0.94 0.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AO 20119 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BUSY 20119 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BSIZE 20119 9.73 3.10 8.00 9.00 11.00 
BIND 20119 0.57 0.28 0.38 0.62 0.80 
ACM 20119 0.93 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ACMIND 20119 0.80 0.34 0.67 1.00 1.00 
ACMEXP 20119 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEODUAL 20119 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LAW 19804 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LNGDP 19804 10.64 0.55 10.61 10.76 10.89 
FDI 19804 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 
DISCL 19804 76.14 5.42 74.00 76.00 80.00 
CORRUP 19804 2.49 1.03 2.40 1.90 2.70 
EPL 18366 -1.60 0.52 -1.83 -1.50 -1.13 
EFW 19804 8.06 1.19 7.70 8.33 9.10 
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
In Table 2.2, Panel B, I provide country distribution and descriptive statistics for my main 
variables (i.e., LNAF and WEI) and the country-level variables. About 31% of the sample comes 
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from the United States (6,960 observations), while around 24% is from Japan (2,932 
observations) and the United Kingdom (2,495 observations). Russia (30 observations) has the 
lowest representation followed by Israel (39 observations) and Ireland (71 observations). The 
mean LNAF and WEI reveal significant variation across countries. For example, firms are more 
likely to have a better workforce environment when they are from certain European countries 
(e.g., France, Germany, Spain, Sweden). Regarding the country-level variables shown in Table 
2.2, over 71% of firms come from common law countries; the average disclosure requirement is 
over 76, and the mean perceived corruption index is about 2.49, suggesting that the countries 
covered in my sample provide high levels of protection and financial information to investors 
in general. Also, labour markets are more flexible in Hong Kong (mean EFW is 9.33), the 
United States (mean EFW is 9.12), and New Zealand (mean EFW is 8.72), and they are less 
flexible in South Korea (mean EFW is 4.70) and Norway (mean EFW is 4.77).
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Country distribution (N=22,573) 
Country N % of N LNAF WEI LAW LNGDP FDI% DISCL CORRUP EPL EFW 
Australia 1,849 8.19 6.31 9.98 1 10.93 0.46 80 1.82 -1.79 7.64 
Austria 100 0.44 6.87 12.06 0 10.78 1.88 62 2.48 -2.31 5.94 
Belgium 116 0.51 7.14 12.01 0 10.70 6.31 68 2.53 -3.14 7.27 
Canada 1,336 5.92 7.00 9.24 1 10.75 3.90 75 1.61 -1.38 8.31 
China 353 1.56 6.84 9.18 0 8.88 1.01 - 6.11 -2.42 5.55 
Denmark 198 0.88 7.40 11.80 0 10.97 2.64 75 0.85 -2.14 7.40 
Finland 218 0.97 7.34 12.42 0 10.77 2.69 83 0.97 -1.79 5.33 
France 642 2.84 8.70 13.88 0 10.62 2.63 78 3.01 -3.13 5.70 
Germany 679 3.01 7.99 13.78 0 10.69 3.15 67 2.03 -2.46 6.18 
Hong Kong 709 3.14 7.12 9.40 1 10.54 32.20 73 2.17 - 9.33 
India 259 1.15 5.86 11.81 1 7.37 0.44 61 6.28 -1.85 6.83 
Ireland 71 0.31 7.40 9.78 1 10.93 23.10 81 2.56 -1.81 7.79 
Israel 39 0.17 7.76 8.64 1 10.44 2.30 74 3.92 -1.60 5.29 
Italy 168 0.74 8.04 13.14 0 10.45 1.23 66 5.56 -2.88 6.68 
Japan 2,932 12.99 7.57 10.64 0 10.61 2.57 71 2.49 -1.83 8.21 
Malaysia 245 1.09 6.28 12.13 1 9.21 4.13 79 5.17 - 7.95 
Netherlands 257 1.14 8.39 12.62 0 10.82 34.40 74 1.43 -2.29 7.01 
New Zealand 135 0.60 5.77 8.95 1 10.57 0.03 80 0.91 -0.81 8.72 
Norway 135 0.60 7.59 11.57 0 11.37 4.16 75 1.41 -2.61 4.77 
Poland 99 0.44 5.90 9.36 0 9.49 1.02 - 4.14 -2.29 7.47 
Russia 30 0.13 9.01 9.53 0 9.35 2.82 - 7.41 -1.90 5.84 
Singapore 325 1.44 6.57 9.61 1 10.79 12.10 79 1.16 - 7.65 
South Africa 503 2.23 7.01 13.07 1 8.77 1.42 79 5.65 -1.51 6.21 
South Korea 454 2.01 6.15 10.80 0 10.15 2.10 68 4.58 -2.12 4.70 
Spain 253 1.12 7.54 13.42 0 10.30 3.35 72 3.89 -2.83 5.54 
Sweden 395 1.75 7.60 12.25 0 10.90 4.36 83 1.06 -1.99 6.39 
Switzerland 303 1.34 7.84 11.93 0 11.29 7.62 80 1.32 -2.12 8.01 
Taiwan 315 1.40 5.51 10.97 0 9.99 0.02 58 3.91 - 5.90 
United Kingdom 2,495 11.05 7.04 11.53 1 10.65 2.80 85 2.04 -1.45 8.26 
United States 6,960 30.83 8.13 8.78 1 10.86 2.09 76 2.61 -1.13 9.12 
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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2.4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 2.3 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables included in my baseline 
regression. The test variable WEI is significantly and negatively correlated with LNAF 
(correlation coefficient of -0.20, p<0.01), indicating that a good workforce environment 
decreases audit fees in the absence of relevant controls. This univariate result supports my 
prediction. Consistent with the existing auditing literature, I find that audit fees (LNAF) are 
positively and significantly correlated with SIZE (correlation coefficient of 0.73), LEV 
(coefficient of 0.32), complexity (e.g., coefficients of 0.41 and 0.35 for NBS and INTS, 
respectively), and BIGN (coefficient of 0.22, untabulated). The positive correlations between 
firm-level governance variables (i.e., BSIZE, BIND, ACM, ACMIND, and ACMEXP) and LNAF 
indicate that well-governed firms are likely to demand more audit services (untabulated). 
Regarding country-level variables, audit fees are higher in countries with good economic 




Table 2.3 Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
LNAF (1) -                
WEI (2) -0.20 -               
SIZE (3) 0.73 0.40 -              
LEV (4) 0.32 0.16 0.27 -             
INVREC (5) 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.14 -            
ROA (6) 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.13 -           
LOSS (7) -0.07 -0.08 -0.15 0.04 -0.13 -0.64 -          
NBS (8) 0.41 0.20 0.39 0.12 0.12 0.07 -0.11 -         
NGS (9) 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.03 0.16 -        
SPECIAL (10) 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 -       
CROSS (11) -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -      
MTB (12) 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.09 0.03 0.23 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -     
CURRENT (13) -0.21 -0.20 -0.29 -0.52 -0.00 -0.06 0.10 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 -    
INTS (14) 0.35 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.04 0.20 0.41 0.09 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -   
TURN (15) 0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.19 0.57 0.21 -0.15 0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.12 0.15 -0.16 -0.00 -  
ISSUE (16) -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 - 
Note: Sample size: 22,573. Boldface indicates significance at the 1% level. Variables are defined in Appendix B. This table reports the correlations between the variables 
used in the baseline regression. Other untabulated correlations are generally as expected, except for the insignificant correlation between AO and FDI.   
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2.4.3 Workforce environment and audit fees: Baseline regression results for H1 
In Table 2.4, I report the OLS regression results for H1. Throughout this essay, I compute all 
reported t-statistics in parentheses using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. In Column (1), I report the association between audit fees (LNAF) and the workforce 
environment index (WEI), controlling for financial statement-based control variables. In 
Column (2), I include firm-level corporate governance variables, and Column (3) introduces 
country-level control variables. In addition, I control for firms’ CSR performance in Column 
(4) to test whether workforce-related performance impacts audit fees after controlling for 
overall CSR practice performance. The coefficients on WEI are consistently negative and 
statistically significant for all the specifications mentioned above. These results support H1, 
suggesting that auditors may expend less effort, and charge lower risk premiums, in response 
to a better audit client’s workforce environment. In terms of economic significance, the reported 
coefficient in Column (4) suggests a decrease of US$ 102,292 in audit fees for a one-standard-
deviation increase in WEI.16 Given that the unlogged mean value of audit fees is US$ 3.98 
million, a one-standard-deviation increase in WEI would decrease the mean audit fees by 2.57%. 
Therefore, the effects of the workforce environment on audit fees are both statistically and 
economically significant.  
With respect to the sign and significance of the control variables, I find that large and 
complex firms (e.g., SIZE, NBS, NGS, TURN, INTS) and high audit risk firms (e.g., high LEV) 
are more likely to pay relatively high audit fees. The coefficients on BIGN and AO are positive 
and significant, indicating that there is a Big N premium and a risk premium for high audit risk 
firms. Consistently, I find that BSIZE, BIND, ACM, and ACMEXP are positive and significant, 
 
16 Following Kuo and Lee (2016), I first multiply the coefficients (excluding year and industry) from Table 2.4, 
Column (4) with the mean values of the corresponding variables as reported in Table 2.2. The sum of these numbers 
equals the logged audit fees (LNAF) of 6.98, which implies: 𝑒6.98 ∗ $1000 = US$ 1,074,918. Then, I recalculate 
the sum by replacing the mean value of WEI, 10.37, with 14.37, where 14.37 equals a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the mean value of WEI, all else being the same. Thus, the revised LNAF is 6.88, while the unlogged 
audit fees are US$ 972,626. The differences are $972,626-$1,074,918=US$ -102,292. 
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suggesting that good corporate governance structures are more likely to demand a high-quality 
audit. Also, the coefficients for LAW, LNGDP, DISCL, and CORRUP are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, as expected. Taken together, my findings suggest that the client’s 
workforce environment plays an important role in the audit pricing process.   
I conduct a diagnostic test to mitigate possible concerns about multicollinearity. My 
untabulated result shows that all the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below 10 
(Marquaridt, 1970) (the highest value is 4.14 for ACMIND). Therefore, multicollinearity should 
not be a concern in this essay. 
 
Table 2.4 Baseline regression: Workforce environment and audit fees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF 
WEI -0.009** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.023*** 
 (-2.38) (-3.14) (-3.66) (-5.17) 
SIZE 0.587*** 0.548*** 0.567*** 0.558*** 
 (56.24) (51.77) (52.79) (51.32) 
LEV 0.813*** 0.589*** 0.495*** 0.501*** 
 (11.06) (9.97) (8.68) (8.73) 
INVREC -0.899*** -0.349*** -0.030 -0.015 
 (-8.12) (-3.08) (-0.24) (-0.12) 
ROA -0.807*** -0.925*** -0.795*** -0.787*** 
 (-7.88) (-9.82) (-8.75) (-8.69) 
LOSS 0.085*** 0.029 0.025 0.021 
 (3.25) (1.19) (1.05) (0.91) 
NBS 0.196*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 
 (8.97) (8.92) (9.16) (8.88) 
NGS 0.148*** 0.108*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
 (8.54) (6.77) (6.03) (5.98) 
SPECIAL -0.092*** 0.004 0.041 0.044 
 (-3.12) (0.14) (1.52) (1.64) 
CROSS 0.106** 0.126*** 0.065 0.056 
 (2.37) (2.96) (1.49) (1.29) 
MTB 0.016*** 0.005* 0.007** 0.006** 
 (5.04) (1.94) (2.46) (2.24) 
CURRENT 0.058*** 0.034*** 0.015* 0.014* 
 (6.22) (4.28) (1.95) (1.88) 
INTS 0.391*** 0.370*** 0.386*** 0.385*** 
 (13.89) (13.83) (14.11) (14.05) 
TURN 0.430*** 0.312*** 0.250*** 0.247*** 
 (13.74) (10.49) (8.07) (8.00) 
ISSUE 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.010 
 (0.73) (0.91) (0.71) (0.77) 
CSR - - - 0.003*** 
    (3.50) 
BIGN - 0.411*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 
  (7.69) (4.40) (4.38) 
AO - 0.338*** 0.261** 0.264** 
  (2.59) (2.18) (2.18) 
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BUSY - 0.033 0.078*** 0.080*** 
  (1.27) (2.98) (3.08) 
BSIZE - 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (6.72) (7.91) (7.92) 
BIND - 0.821*** 0.638*** 0.603*** 
  (13.67) (10.32) (9.73) 
ACM - 0.137** 0.223*** 0.222*** 
  (2.29) (4.01) (4.02) 
ACMIND - -0.078 -0.356*** -0.363*** 
  (-1.22) (-5.75) (-5.86) 
ACMEXP - 0.180*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 
  (6.39) (3.96) (3.88) 
CEODUAL - 0.165*** 0.131*** 0.136*** 
  (7.44) (5.93) (6.12) 
LAW - - 0.171*** 0.187*** 
   (3.82) (4.18) 
LNGDP - - 0.469*** 0.470*** 
   (11.33) (11.37) 
FDI - - -0.335* -0.290 
   (-1.87) (-1.62) 
DISCL - - 0.023*** 0.023*** 
   (6.71) (6.76) 
CORRUP - - 0.138*** 0.140*** 
   (6.18) (6.29) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -3.189*** -3.864*** -10.779*** -10.744*** 
 (-19.71) (-22.86) (-20.08) (-20.01) 
N 22573 20119 19804 19804 
Adj.R-Square 0.64 0.71 0.74 0.74 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
2.4.4 Workforce environment and audit fees: Moderation results for H2 
In this section, I test whether audit fees are related to the interactive effects of a country’s labour 
market flexibility and WEI. H2 predicts that the effect of the workforce environment on audit 
fees will be stronger in countries with a more flexible labour market. I report my results in 
Table 2.5, Columns (1) (EPL*WEI) and (2) (EFW∗WEI). In both columns, my variable of 
interest (i.e., WEI) is still negatively and significantly associated with audit fees, supporting 
my main results (coefficients of -0.010 (p<0.05) and -0.011 (p<0.01) on WEI, respectively). 
Furthermore, the coefficients of EPL∗WEI and EFW∗WEI are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in Columns (1) and (2), respectively.17 Thus, my results suggest that 
 
17 In my main test, I replace missing EPL and EFW with their latest values. If I use only the available EPL and 
EFW data, then my sample sizes decrease to 9,994 for EPL and 18,406 for EFW, respectively. My results remain 
the same if I use smaller samples. Moreover, to mitigate the multicollinearity problem resulting from the 
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the impact of WEI on audit fees is stronger in countries with a more flexible labour market, 
where employees have more outside opportunities and higher productivity. The findings of my 
empirical tests support H2. 
 
Table 2.5 Interactive effects of the workforce environment and labour market flexibility on audit fees 
(Moderation effects) 
 (1) (2) 
 LNAF LNAF 
WEI -0.010** -0.011*** 
 (-2.39) (-2.70) 
EPL 0.165*** - 
 (3.71)  
EPL∗WEI -0.041*** - 
 (-7.29)  
EFW - 0.208*** 
  (12.41) 
EFW∗WEI - -0.016*** 
  (-6.91) 
Other control variables SIZE; LEV; INVREC; ROA; LOSS; NBS; NGS; SPECIAL, CROSS, 
MTB, CURRENT, INTS, TURN, ISSUE, CSR, BIGN, AO, BUSY, BSIZE, 
BIND, ACM, ACMIND, ACMEXP, CEODUAL, LAW, LNGDP, FDI, 
DISCL, CORRUP 
Industry Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
_cons -8.576*** -11.065*** 
 (-15.65) (-21.10) 
N 18366 19804 
Adj.R-Square 0.77 0.75 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
2.4.5 Mediation test results 
The mediation effect refers to “the presence of an intervening variable or mechanism that 
transmits the effect of an antecedent variable on an outcome” (Aguinis et al., 2017, p. 666). My 
results thus far do not identify the specific channel(s) through which the workforce environment 
reduces audit fees. I propose the financial reporting quality (FRQ) and media coverage of 
workforce controversies (CONTRO) as two such possible channels. I choose FRQ because Guo 
et al. (2016) provide evidence that firms with an employee-friendly environment are less likely 
 
introduction of interactive terms and to ease interpretation, I apply a mean-centering approach to both the WEI and 
EPL (EFW) variables before constructing the interaction terms. 
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to have employee-related material internal control weaknesses and financial restatements. Poor 
FRQ has been found to increase audit fees (e.g., Cho et al., 2017; Ji et al., 2018). I use a number 
of FRQ measures to conduct my mediation test.18 I choose CONTRO as another mediating 
variable because employees are less prone to report managerial wrongdoing when they work in 
a satisfactory environment. Therefore, a negative association is expected between the client 
firm’s workforce environment and the frequencies of CONTRO. CONTRO may increase audit 
fees because either the negative media coverage provides more information related to client 
firms’ risks to auditors (i.e., the information role), or media coverage places more public 
attention on clients, which will increase an auditor’s litigation risks (i.e., the disciplining role) 
(e.g., Gong et al., 2018; Redmayne et al., 2010).  
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), I use the following four steps to establish these 
mediation channels (Equation 2.3A-2.3C). First, I show that variations in the independent 
variable (i.e., WEI, in this essay) are correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., audit fees, 
LNAF; Equation 2.3A; 𝛼1), to confirm the possibility that a mediation effect is present. Second, 
I show how variations in the independent variable (i.e., WEI) account for variations in the 
mediator (i.e., M; Equation 2.3B; 𝛽1). Third, I show that the mediator (i.e., M) has a significant 
effect on the dependent variable (i.e., LNAF; Equation 2.3C; 𝛾2). Finally, I show that the 
significant relationship between WEI and LNAF (Equation 2.3A) either becomes insignificant 
after controlling for M (full mediation) or that the significance level shrinks after doing so 
(partial mediation). To conduct my mediation test, I develop the following set of equations: 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑊𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 , (2.3A) 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 , (2.3B) 
 
18 Owing to data unavailability at the international level for clients’ material internal control weaknesses and 
financial restatements, I am unable to perform a mediation test using these two variables. Instead, in this section, I 
employ several FRQ measures suggested by the prior literature, such as discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995; 
Kothari et al., 2005), real earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006), and earnings smoothness (Dechow et al., 
2010). I find consistent results for all these FRQ measures. For brevity’s sake, I report only results for the 
discretionary accruals test.   
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𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 (2.3C) 
 
The mediators (i.e., M) are |DAC| and CONTRO. |DAC| is measured as the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals generated from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), while 
CONTRO is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of controversies published 
in the media related to workforce plus one.19 The total effect of WEI on LNAF (i.e., 𝛼1 from 
Equation 2.3A) can be decomposed into a direct effect and an indirect effect (i.e., through the 
mediator). The direct effect is 𝛾1 from Equation (2.3C), whereas the indirect effect is 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2 for 
the proposed mediator. The core of the mediation effect rests in testing the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 
𝛽1 ∗ 𝛾2 = 0. For the estimation I provide, I first use the OLS regressions to perform Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) causal step regression. However, I acknowledge that Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
causal step regression has come under criticism in recent years (Hayes, 2009; Zhao et al., 2010). 
Zhao et al. (2010) suggest a superior test approach (i.e., the “bootstrap” approach proposed by 
Preacher & Hayes, 2004) for the mediation test. Therefore, I report the results of both Baron 
and Kenny’s (1986) causal step regression and the bootstrap approach.20  
I report the direct and indirect effects of the workforce environment on audit fees for the 
pooled sample in Table 2.6, Panels A and B. In Columns (1) and (4) of Panel A, I document 
negative and significant coefficients on WEI when I run the regressions without mediators (i.e., 
|DAC| and CONTRO; Equation 2.3A), which is in line with my H1 that a good audit client’s 
 
19 The Thomson Reuters ESG database provides the following controversy indicators for the workforce: (1) the 
number of controversies published in the media linked to workforce diversity and opportunity; (2) the number of 
controversies published in the media linked to workforce health and safety; (3) the number of controversies 
published in the media linked to the company’s relations with employees or relating to wage or wage disputes; and 
(4) whether an important executive management team member announced a voluntary departure (other than 
retirement) or had been ousted. I add up the three quantitative indicators, (1) to (3), to derive the total number of 
controversies published in the media related to workforce. In addition, the original WEI includes an indicator, “Is 
the company under the spotlight of the media because of a controversy linked to the company's employees, 
contractors or suppliers due to wage, layoff disputes or working conditions?,” which is related to my media 
coverage proxy. Thus, I exclude this indicator and re-construct my WEI for this analysis. 
20  The bootstrap approach is a non-parametric method based on resampling with replacement, which is done 
multiple times (e.g., 5,000 times in this essay). For a more detailed discussion of the use of the bootstrap approach in 
mediation tests, see Hayes (2018). 
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workforce environment decreases audit fees. I do not find a significant relationship between 
WEI and |DAC| in Column (2), indicating that a client’s workforce environment has no direct 
impact on the overall FRQ for my chosen FRQ measures.21 Therefore, I conclude that my 
chosen FRQ proxies do not mediate the relationship between the workforce environment and 
audit fees. My result in Column (3) suggests that my main result remains unchanged, even after 
controlling for the FRQ in the model. On the other hand, I find a significantly negative 
association between WEI and CONTRO in Column (5) (coefficient -0.003, p<0.05), suggesting 
that the frequency of media coverage of workforce controversies is lower for firms with a better 
workforce environment. As I show in Column (6), there is a partial mediation effect between 
WEI and LNAF through CONTRO. The results from the bootstrap approach support Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) causal step regression results by showing significant indirect effects for 
CONTRO but not for |DAC|. However, the direct effects account for the bulk of the total effects. 
In sum, my evidence suggests that media coverage of workforce controversies, a hitherto 
unexplored channel in the international audit fee literature, affects the relationship between the 
workforce environment and audit fees.  
 
21  I also find insignificant relationships between WEI and other FRQ measures from Equation (2.3B): 
performance-matched discretionary accruals (coefficient -0.001, p=0.32), real earnings management (coefficient 
-0.014, p=0.551), and earnings smoothness (coefficient -0.007, p=0.377). I caution readers that my mediation 
results are based on the chosen FRQ measures and that I could not rule out the possibility that other, unselected 




Table 2.6 Regression results of mediation tests (Mediation effects) 
Panel A: The Baron and Kenny’s (1986) causal step regression results 
Dependent 
Variable 













WEI -0.023*** -0.001 -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.003** -0.022*** 
 (-5.17) (-0.85) (-5.42) (-5.08) (-2.56) (-5.04) 
|DAC| - - 0.018* - - - 
   (1.76)    
CONTRO - - - - - 0.068** 
      (2.24) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry and year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -10.744*** -1.252*** -10.989*** -10.778*** -0.962*** -10.712*** 
 (-20.01) (-9.93) (-18.66) (-20.04) (-8.52) (-19.90) 
N 19804 17574 17574 19804 19804 19804 
Adj.R-Square 0.74 0.10 0.74 0.74 0.13 0.74 
Panel B: Bootstrap approach results 
Direct effect   -0.0247***   -0.0223*** 
Indirect effect   -0.0000   -0.0002*** 
Total effect   -0.0247***   -0.0225*** 
Indirect/Total   0.0009   0.0089 
Indirect/Direct   0.0009   0.0090 
Total/Direct   1.0009   1.0090 
Note: My primary independent variable is WEI, and my dependent variable is LNAF. I use as mediators financial 
reporting quality proxied by discretionary accruals (i.e., |DAC|) and media coverage of workforce controversies 
(CONTRO). Column (1) shows the effect of the independent variable (WEI) on the dependent variable (LNAF) 
without the mediator (|DAC|). Column (2) presents the effect of WEI on |DAC|, while Column (3) shows the 
results with both the independent variable (WEI) and the mediator (|DAC|). Columns (4) to (6) report the results 
of the mediation test using CONTRO as the mediator. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined 
in Appendix B.  
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
2.5 Additional Robustness Tests  
2.5.1 Alternative measure of workforce environment 
So far in this essay, I use the workforce-related measures from the ESG database to construct 
my workforce environment index (WEI). Although this approach is prevalent in the prior 
literature (e.g., Fauver et al., 2018; Gupta & Krishnamurti, 2020), I now examine whether I 
obtain consistent results when I employ alternative workforce environment (WEI_ALT) proxies. 
The first alternative variable is the Workforce Score (WS) calculated and provided by the ESG 
database, which measures “…a company’s effectiveness towards job satisfaction, a healthy and 
safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities, and development opportunities 
for its workforce” (Thomson Reuters, 2018, p. 15). WS is benchmarked to the Thomson Reuters 
Business Classification (TRBC) industry groups. Thus, the higher the WS, the better a firm’s 
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workforce environment is, when compared to its industry peers. Furthermore, as the WS is a 
substitute for four sub-scores that are not benchmarked to industry groups in the ASSET4 
database, 22  I use the equal weighted workforce score (WS_A4) as my second alternative 
variable by taking the average of those sub-scores. I re-estimate Equations (2.1) and (2.2) using 
WS and WS_A4 as the independent variables. My results, reported in Table 2.7, Panel A, show 
negative relationships between the workforce environment (both WS and WS_A4) and audit 
fees, and thus support H1. Moreover, such relationships are stronger in countries with a more 
flexible labour market, which support H2. Overall, as I show in Table 2.7, Panel A, my findings 
are robust to alternative proxies for the workforce environment. These consistent results also 
validate the construction of my WEI. 
 
Table 2.7 Robustness and the endogeneity test 
Panel A: Alternative independent variables 
 WS WS_A4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF 
WEI_ALT -0.297*** -0.138*** -0.175*** -0.328*** -0.206** -0.131* 
 (-5.75) (-2.79) (-3.56) (-4.68) (-2.85) (-1.98) 
EPL - 0.158*** - - 0.202*** - 
  (3.63)   (3.94)  
EPL∗WEI_ALT  - -0.529*** - - -0.631*** - 
  (-6.97)   (-6.63)  
EFW - - 0.201*** - - 0.201*** 
   (12.23)   (10.61) 
EFW∗WEI_ALT - - -0.195*** - - -0.242*** 
   (-6.24)   (-6.31) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -11.122*** -8.589*** -10.874*** -9.661*** -7.967*** -10.100*** 
 (-20.56) (-15.66) (-20.60) (-15.37) (-11.94) (-16.21) 
N 19804 18368 19804 15839 14945 15839 
Adj.R-Square 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.77 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
  
 
22 Those scores are employment quality (SOEQ), health and safety (SOHS), training and development (SOTD), 
and diversity and opportunities (SODO). 
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2.5.2 Exclusion of multinational firms 
In my main analyses, I add INTS (coded as 1 for firms that have at least 10% international sales 
to total sales, and zero otherwise) to control for the impact of internationalization on audit 
pricing. However, the internationalization of audit clients may also influence their workforce 
environment. More concretely, multinational audit clients must adopt the best standards from 
all the countries in which they operate. As a result, their workforce environment affected by all 
of these countries’ employment regulations, which may introduce noise in my main findings. 
To mitigate this issue, I partition my sample into multinational (INTS=1; 13,942 observations) 
and domestic clients (INTS=0; 5,864 observations). The results (untabulated) show that the 
mean value of WEI in my multinational clients subsample (i.e., 10.92) is significantly higher 
than that in my domestic clients subsample (i.e., 9.12), supporting the prediction that to comply 
with multiple countries’ employment regulations, multinational clients offer a relatively better 
workforce environment. I re-run my Equations (2.1) and (2.2) using the domestic clients 
subsample only, and the results (untabulated) show significantly negative coefficients on WEI 
in Equation (2.1) and on EPL∗WEI (EFW∗WEI) in Equation (2.2), which is consistent with my 
main findings.  
 
2.5.3 Control for NAS fees 
I include an additional variable (LN_NAS, the natural log of the sum of tax and other services 
fees) in my equations to control for the possible association between audit fees and NAS fees, 
based on the notion that the simultaneous provision of audit and NAS may reduce audit costs 
owing to either economies of scope or knowledge spillover (e.g., Chung & Kallapur, 2003; 
O’Keefe et al., 1994). My untabulated results show that my main variable of interest (i.e., WEI) 
is still significantly and negatively associated with LNAF across all specifications, which 
supports my main findings. In contrast to my expectations, the coefficient on LN_NAS is 
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significantly positive. A possible explanation suggested by Simunic (1984) is that knowledge 
spillover helps auditors reduce the unit costs of audit services and, in turn, the reduced price 
encourages clients to buy additional audit services. 
 
2.5.4 Additional analyses 
I also perform two additional analyses. First, as I show in Table 2.2, Panel B, about 33% of the 
observations in my sample are from the U.S., leading to a concern that U.S. firms might be 
primarily driving my findings. To mitigate this concern, I re-run my models by excluding all 
U.S. observations. My results in Table 2.7, Panel B suggest that my results do not suffer from 
sample concentration. Second, there is a concern that auditors may decide how much they will 
charge at the beginning of the year, which may lead to incorrect inferences when I use the 
workforce environment from the current year to predict audit fees for those current years. I 
mitigate this concern by repeating Equations (2.1) and (2.2) using lagged WEI and lagged 
independent variables. The coefficients on lagged WEI and on EPL∗WEI (EFW∗WEI) are also 




Table 2.7 Robustness and the endogeneity test (continued) 
Panel B: Non-US results and results with lagged independent variables 
 Non-US observations Lagged independent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF LNAF 
WEI -0.010* -0.012* -0.011* -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (-1.75) (-1.96) (-1.90) (-4.79) (-2.78) (-2.68) 
EPL - -0.302*** - - 0.137*** - 
  (-5.65)   (2.95)  
EPL∗WEI - -0.023*** - - -0.038*** - 
  (-2.89)   (-6.68)  
EFW - - 0.128*** - - 0.192*** 
   (6.85)   (11.18) 
EFW∗WEI - - -0.012*** - - -0.015*** 
   (-4.03)   (-5.86) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -7.209*** -5.749*** -8.223*** -9.830*** -7.930*** -10.263*** 
 (-11.25) (-8.83) (-12.60) (-17.24) (-13.47) (-18.26) 
N 13292 11854 13292 16576 15347 16576 
Adj.R-Square 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.74 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B. All the independent variables 
used in Panel B, Columns (4) to (6) are lagged forms.   
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
2.5.5 Endogeneity test 
I further address endogeneity concerns about omitted variables by implementing a two-stage-
least-squares (2SLS) regression. I report my results in Table 2.7, Panel C. Similar to normal 
CSR practice (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012), I argue that a firm’s workforce environment is 
determined by both country and industry characteristics. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012, 2017) 
suggest that in a given country, a firm’s CSR practice might vary over time systematically as a 
result of regulatory changes. In addition, a firm’s incentives and abilities to engage in CSR are 
influenced by its competitors in the same industry (Hawn & Kang, 2018). If a firm operates in 
an industry in which its peers have a stronger commitment to employee well-being and that firm 
cannot provide a workforce environment comparable with those of its competitors, then it risks 
losing employees. Thus, firms are more likely to provide a favourable workforce environment 
if they are headquartered in countries, as well as operate in industries, that have a stronger 
commitment to employee well-being. Following prior studies (e.g., Cheng et al., 2014; Gupta & 
Krishnamurti, 2020), I select the country-year mean WEI (COUN_WEI) and the country-
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industry mean WEI (IND_WEI) as my instruments. When calculating both COUN_WEI and 
IND_WEI, I exclude the focal firm’s workforce environment performance to eliminate the 
firm’s influence on both instrumental variables. As a result, my instruments represent the 
average workforce environment of the focal firm’s competitors within the same industry and 
across years, in a given country.23 I predict positive effects for COUN_WEI and IND_WEI on 
WEI. However, I have no a priori reason to believe that COUN_WEI and IND_WEI to have a 
direct impact on audit fees through channels other than the firm-level workforce environment. 
In the first stage, I regress WEI on COUN_WEI, IND_WEI and other control variables that I 
used in Equation (2.1). My results in Column (1) of Table 2.7, Panel B show that both the 
coefficients on COUN_WEI and IND_WEI are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
supporting my argument that a firm’s workforce environment is determined by both country 
and industry characteristics. In the second stage, I replace the original WEI with the predicted 
WEI generated from the first stage. My results in Column (2) of Table 2.7, Panel B show that 
the coefficients on WEI remain negative and significant at the 5% level, further supporting my 
main finding that a favourable workforce environment leads to lower audit fees. Similar to 
Cheng et al. (2014), I perform three tests to check the validity of my instruments in Table 2.7, 
Panel B. First, the result of the under-identification test, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, 
illustrates that my model is identified (p=0.0000). Second, I report the Kleibergen- Paap rk 
Wald F statistic (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006) for my weak identification test. The F- statistic is 
very high in my sample, suggesting that my instruments are relevant and strong. Third, I report 
the Hansen’s J statistic (Hansen, 1982) to test the over-identification concern. The p-value of the 
Hansen’s J statistic is high for this test, suggesting that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are exogenous. Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), I also regress the 
 
23 I acknowledge the limitation inherent in selecting industry-average as the instrument (Larcker & Rusticus, 
2010). Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggest that accounting researchers often use regulatory changes as a quasi- 
experiment to address endogeneity concerns. However, owing to the international nature of my study, I could not 
identify a universal regulatory shock. 
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residuals of the second stage on the exogenous variables (i.e., COUN_WEI, IND_WEI, and 
control variables) to test the over-identification concern. My untabulated results support the 
Hansen’s J statistic. Overall, my post-estimation tests confirm both the relevance and the 
exclusion restrictions of my instruments. 
 
Table 2.7 Robustness and the endogeneity test (continued) 
Panel C: 2SLS results for the endogeneity test 
 (1) (2) 
 WEI LNAF 
WEI - -0.044** 
  (-2.22) 
COUN_WEI 0.272*** - 
 (9.73)  
IND_WEI 0.374*** - 
 (16.60)  
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
_cons -9.310*** -10.840*** 
 (-7.18) (-20.26) 
N 19786 19786 
(Centered) R-Square 0.726 0.739 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics  280.989 
(under-identification test) (p=0.0000) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test) 259.312 
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test) 2.073 
 (p=0.1499) 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
2.5.6 Alternative argument on workforce environment 
My results suggest that auditors charge lower audit fees for client firms that provide a 
favourable workforce environment. However, this negative relationship may hold up only to a 
certain point, as this relationship may reverse if a client firm improves its workforce 
environment beyond that point. From the agency perspective, opportunistic managers may 
provide generous welfare to employees to increase employee satisfaction, which will reduce the 
likelihood that employees report managers’ wrongdoing. From a traditional cost efficiency 
perspective (e.g., Taylor, 1914), employers should keep the employees from being too satisfied 
by paying them no more than their reservation wages because over-satisfaction might lead to 
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complacency and shirking responsibilities. Based on both agency and efficiency perspectives, 
auditors may assess higher risks and, in turn, increase auditing efforts and audit fees, when 
client firms’ employee welfare is too generous. Therefore, a U-shaped relationship may exist 
between the workforce environment and audit fees. 
I introduce a quadratic term, WEI2, into my Equation (2.1) and report my results in Table 2.8. 
The coefficient on WEI remains negative and significant. The positive and significant 
coefficient of WEI2 confirms that the optimal level (i.e., WEI=18.98) for a workforce 
environment is very close to the maximum value of my workforce environment index (20).24 
My results suggest that auditors charge higher fees only to those clients with an extremely 
favourable workforce environment, to compensate for the extra risks related to agency or 
employee efficiency problems. However, the untabulated results find that this U-shaped 
relationship exists only in firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms, indicating that 
good corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate auditors’ concerns about the extreme 
workforce environment.  
 






= 18.98. Both 




2.6 Chapter Summary 
The objective of this essay is to investigate the relationship between an audit client’s workforce 
environment and audit fees in an international setting. Specifically, I posit and find a better 
workforce environment may encourage employees to dedicate themselves to their work, 
resulting in higher productivity and firm performance; as a result, this dedication decreases 
client-specific risks and, thus, audit fees. In addition, my results also show that the negative 
association between audit fees and the workforce environment is stronger in countries with a 
more flexible labour market, presumably because the low hiring and firing costs in such markets 
encourage employees to be diligent and to cope with both external opportunities and internal job 
loss threats, which will further decrease client-specific risks. I also posit that both firms’ 
financial reporting quality and media coverage of workforce controversies might mediate the 
effect of the workforce environment on audit fees; however, I find supportive evidence for the 
media coverage channel only. 
Table 2.8 Additional test results: Non-linear relationship between the workforce environment and audit 
fees 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LNAF LNAF LNAF 
WEI -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.049*** 
 (-2.60) (-3.00) (-3.82) 
WEI2 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 
 (1.83) (2.05) (2.14) 
Other control 
variables  
SIZE; LEV; INVREC; 
ROA; LOSS; NBS; NGS; 
SPECIAL, CROSS, MTB, 
CURRENT, INTS, TURN, 
ISSUE, BIGN, AO, BUSY, 
BSIZE, BIND, ACM, 
ACMIND, ACMEXP, 
CEODUAL  
SIZE; LEV; INVREC; 
ROA; LOSS; NBS; NGS; 
SPECIAL, CROSS, MTB, 
CURRENT, INTS, TURN, 
ISSUE, BIGN, AO, BUSY, 
BSIZE, BIND, ACM, 
ACMIND, ACMEXP, 
CEODUAL, LAW, 
LNGDP, FDI, DISCL, 
CORRUP 
SIZE; LEV; INVREC; 
ROA; LOSS; NBS; NGS; 
SPECIAL, CROSS, MTB, 
CURRENT, INTS, TURN, 
ISSUE, CSR, BIGN, AO, 
BUSY, BSIZE, BIND, 
ACM, ACMIND, 
ACMEXP, CEODUAL, 
LAW, LNGDP, FDI, 
DISCL, CORRUP 
    
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -3.754*** -10.654*** -10.613*** 
 (-21.14) (-19.73) (-19.65) 
N 20119 19804 19804 
Adj.R-Square 0.71 0.74 0.74 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix B.  
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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My research is related to the literature studying the consequences of treating employees well 
from an external stakeholder’s perspective (i.e., an auditor). My study, in particular, should be 
of interest to corporate insiders (i.e., managers and directors), as my results show that a firm’s 
efforts to improve its workforce environment will be recognized by both internal (i.e., 
employees) and external stakeholders (e.g., auditors). In addition, my study responds to the call 
for additional international-level research, so researchers may better understand how the 
variations in institutional factors influence existing findings. In particular, I extend and 
complement Huang et al.’s (2017) results by showing that country-level labour market 
flexibility moderates the negative association between audit fees and the workforce 
environment. My findings also improve the understanding of the channels through which a 







DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AUDITOR-PROVIDED 
TAX SERVICES: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE (ESSAY TWO)25 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this essay, I provide a systematic literature review on the determinants and consequences of 
auditor-provided tax services (hereafter APTS) in an international setting, critique the findings, 
and offer suggestions for future research in this area. The term ‘international literature’ in this 
essay includes both U.S. and non-U.S. studies. The extant literature generally suggests that the 
simultaneous provision of audit and APTS by the same audit firm can result in either a 
‘knowledge spillover benefit’ or a potential ‘impaired independence effect’ (e.g., Alsadoun et 
al., 2018; De Simone et al., 2015; Gleason & Mills, 2011; Kinney et al., 2004; Lisic, 2014; 
McGuire et al., 2012). The proponents argue that APTS facilitate the verification of tax-related 
accounts in financial statements by statutory auditors (e.g., Francis, 2006; McGuire et al., 2012; 
Seetharaman et al., 2011). Auditors evaluate the validity of accrued taxes payable and tax 
contingent liabilities on the balance sheet, income tax expenses on the income statement, and 
the related note disclosures, in order to provide adequate assurance to the investing public about 
the appropriateness of these items and disclosures (Barrett, 2004). Managers can use valuation 
allowances (Frank & Rego, 2006), tax contingency reserves (Gupta et al., 2016), estimates of 
accrued taxes (Dhaliwal et al., 2004), and the designation of permanently reinvested earnings 
 
25 The term APTS does not capture all services performed by the tax department of the incumbent auditors but 
includes only those tax services that are not necessary parts of the audit process. If a service is a necessary part of 
the audit process, it will be classified as “audit services.” For instance, if tax partners review the provision of tax 
accrual in clients’ financial statements, such services will be classified as “audit services” rather than “tax services”. 
Furthermore, my review excludes research that examines the determinants and consequences of tax services 
provided by auditors to non-audit clients (e.g., Lisic et al., 2019). 
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(Krull, 2004) to manage earnings. Material information about risky tax transactions tends to be 
hidden in these accounts and disclosures, thereby, making proper auditing of tax accounts very 
difficult for external auditors.  
 Since client-specific knowledge is more likely to be shared within the same audit firm 
between the audit and the tax departments (Gleason & Mills, 2011), the provision of APTS 
helps statutory auditors to better understand clients’ revenue-generating activities, revenue-
recognition policies, accounting implications of (uncertain) tax positions, and other tax-related 
activities, which could assist the auditors’ in planning strategies: especially the tax-related ones. 
Such knowledge sharing also benefits audit clients. For example, because of their better 
understanding of clients’ operations and structures, and their knowledge about the cutting-edge 
tax technologies, incumbent auditors have competitive positions over other external tax 
consultants as well as over clients’ internal tax personnel, in reducing both taxes paid and tax 
expenses for financial statements (e.g., Maydew & Shackelford, 2007).26  
Despite the potential benefits from knowledge spillover, the opponents of providing APTS 
argue that auditors may acquiesce or be perceived as having acquiesced, to clients’ aggressive 
accounting practices in order to retain lucrative tax services (e.g., Mishra et al., 2005). For 
instance, auditors might help clients to manage earnings aggressively to avoid taxes (Alsadoun 
et al., 2018; Armstrong et al., 2012; Klassen et al., 2016). The regulators, too, have expressed 
concerns about APTS threatening auditor independence, and have banned certain types of tax 
 
26 Incumbent auditors have information advantages over the external tax services providers because they obtain 
client-specific tax-related information themselves, whereas external providers must rely on material 
prepared/provided by clients. Furthermore, incumbent auditors, especially those large audit firms with extensive 
global reach, are more professional than in-house tax personnel in terms of choosing up-to-date and well-supported 
tax strategies. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) claims that “…In a world in constant flux, ruled by 
regulatory complexity and filled with economic risk, PwC’s Tax and Legal Services cuts through the noise and 
helps you stay ahead of the changes that impact your business…We design best-in-class integrated tax and legal 




services that are more likely to impair auditor independence (SEC, 2006).27 Nevertheless, some 
audit firms continued to provide some APTS that have been banned by the SEC. For example, 
KPMG was charged by the SEC (2014) for the practice of loaning tax professionals to audit 
clients, which violated the rule prohibiting auditors from acting as an employee of clients. The 
SEC (2014) affirmed that auditors must assess the independence threats of providing certain 
types of NAS carefully, rather than just consider whether the proposed services fall within one 
of the permissible categories. These mixed results make my synthesis important not only to 
regulators but also to academic researchers. 
I choose a systematic rather than a structured literature review. The advantage of systematic 
reviews lies in a ‘‘replicable, scientific, and transparent process that enables the researcher to 
provide an audit trail, justifying his/her conclusions” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 218).28 I adapt 
the Haapamäki and Sihvonen (2019) and Gepp et al. (2020) approaches to collecting papers for 
inclusion in this literature review, which combines both electronic and manual searches. First, 
I performed an extensive search via the Scopus database to identify potential studies published 
in accounting journals. Pany and Reckers (1983) report the first study that investigated the 
stakeholder’s perception of APTS. Therefore, I restrict the journal library search to papers 
published between 1983 and April 2021, with a keywords search that includes “tax* service*”, 
“auditor provided tax service”, “APTS”, “tax NAS”, “NAS”, “nonaudit service”, “non-audit 
service”, “nonaudit fee”, “non-audit fee”, “NAS fees”, “tax fee*”, “tax specialization”, and “tax 
expertise”. I include APTS studies published in non-accounting journals as well (e.g., Journal 
of Corporate Finance), to make the review comprehensive. To maintain the quality of this 
 
27 That is, SEC (2006) banned (i) APTS with contingent fee arrangements; (ii) APTS for achieving tax positions 
to avoid tax; and (iii) APTS to a person who has a financial reporting oversight role in the client firm. I discuss 
this issue further in Section 3.3.1. 
28 According to Littell et al. (2008) systematic literature reviews aim “to comprehensively locate and synthesize 
research that bears on a particular question, using organized, transparent, and replicable procedures at each step in 
the process” (p. 1). Booth et al. (2012, p. 24), however, highlight that comprehensiveness in systematic literature 
reviews does not mean to identify ‘all studies’ on a specific topic, since this goal is not realistic. Instead, researchers 
should aim to find literature that fits most appropriately with the defined topic.  
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review, I include only those journals that are listed on the 2019 Australian Business Deans 
Council (ABDC) rankings.29  
The search process generated 346 papers with proposed keywords from accounting 
journals. I then screened them manually to identify papers that examine either determinants or 
consequences of APTS by reviewing abstracts, hypotheses and empirical results sections, and 
by tracking down references in those papers. I performed the same methods to search for papers 
from non-accounting journals. This screening process resulted in 101 papers published in 
business journals. To include the most recent research related to APTS, I also included some 
high-quality working papers. Similar to Harvey et al. (2016), I selected working papers (1) that 
have been presented at top conferences; (2) that have been cited one or more times by other 
published papers; or (3) having at least one author in the author team who has published one or 
more papers on this topic; to maintain the quality of this review. This process yielded a total of 
11 working papers. 
My final sample consists of 112 papers with an overwhelming majority of the papers 
examining the consequences of APTS, and only 20 papers examining the determinants of APTS. 
Table 3.1 displays the journals’ details and publication trends. As shown in Table 3.1, five 
journals, namely: The Accounting Review; Contemporary Accounting Research; Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing, & Finance; Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory; and The Journal 
of the American Taxation Association; published more than 40% of the APTS research. 41, 45, 
and 15 papers have been published in A*, A, and B-ranked journals, respectively. I also observe 
 
29 ABDC ranks journals into four categories: A*, A, B, and C. I review papers published in journals ranked B and 
above to ensure a certain quality threshold. I found a high degree of overlap in the journal rankings in the 
accounting field in the ABDC and the Chartered Association of Business Schools (CABS) Journal rankings. 
ABDC tends to be a more inclusive list and I decided to follow the ABDC ranking. The full list of ABDC rankings 
can be retrieved from https://abdc.edu.au/research/abdc-journal-list/ (Accessed at the end of January 2020). CABS 




that there has been a significant increase in the number of publications since 2006. Such a rapid 
increase in APTS research highlights the importance of my review. 
Table 3.1. Trend of publication: APTS studies 
 Panel A: Details of journals that publish APTS studies  Rank  N  % 
The Accounting Review A*  11  9.82 
Contemporary Accounting Research A*  10  8.93 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance A  9  8.04 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory A*  8  7.14 
The Journal of the American Taxation Association A  8  7.14 
International Journal of Auditing A  6  5.36 
Advances in Accounting A  5  4.46 
Managerial Auditing Journal A  5  4.46 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy A  3  2.68 
Journal of Accounting Research A*  3  2.68 
Accounting and Business Research A  2  1.79 
European Accounting Review A*  2  1.79 
Journal of Accounting and Economics A*  2  1.79 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics A  2  1.79 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation B  2  1.79 
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting B  2  1.79 
Review of Accounting and Finance B  2  1.79 
Review of Accounting Studies A*  2  1.79 
The International Journal of Accounting A  2  1.79 
Accounting Horizons A  1  0.89 
Accounting Perspectives B  1  0.89 
Advances in Taxation B  1  0.89 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics B  1  0.89 
British Accounting Review A*  1  0.89 
International Journal of Accounting & Information Management B  1  0.89 
Journal of Applied Accounting Research B  1  0.89 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting A*  1  0.89 
Journal of Business Research A  1  0.89 
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance B  1  0.89 
Journal of Corporate Finance A*  1  0.89 
Meditari Accountancy Research A  1  0.89 
Pacific Accounting Review B  1  0.89 
Research in Accounting Regulation B  1  0.89 
Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting B  1  0.89 
Total number of published papers   101  90.17 
Working papers   11  9.83 







Panel B: Yearly distribution of APTS studies 
 N  % 
1986-2005 10  8.93 
2006-2010 14  12.5 
2011-2015 37  33.04 
2016-2020 37  33.04 
To April 2021 and In press 14  12.49 
Total 112  100.0% 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the theoretical 
framework pertinent to the APTS literature. Section 3.3 provides a review of the APTS 
regulations from selected jurisdictions. I review the literature that examines the determinants 
of APTS in Section 3.4. The consequences of APTS are reviewed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 
concludes the paper and provides some useful directions for future research. I present a 


















• Material misstatements and auditor 
communication 
• Earnings quality (tax and non-tax related) 
• Tax avoidance and tax reserves 
• Market perceptions (cost of debt, cost of equity, 
earnings response coefficients, value relevance 
of earnings, etc.) 
• Audit fees 




3.2 Theoretical Perspectives on APTS 
In this section, I introduce the main theoretical frameworks that are commonly used in APTS 
research. There are two competing views pertaining to the joint provision of audit services and 
APTS: the knowledge spillover effect and the impaired independence effect. The former 
argument contends that APTS can improve audit quality and reduce audit costs through sharing 
client-specific and industry-specific knowledge between tax and audit departments (De Simone 
et al., 2015; Gleason & Mills, 2011; Kinney et al., 2004; McGuire et al., 2012). The latter, on 
the other hand, suggests that auditors are more likely to, or be perceived to compromise audit 
quality when they provide APTS to their audit clients, owing to the increased economic bonding 
between them (e.g., Alsadoun et al., 2018; Choudhary et al., 2021; Mishra et al., 2005). 
Therefore, prior studies suggest that the net effect of APTS on audit quality depends on which 
effect dominates (e.g., Choi et al., 2009b; Fortin & Pittman, 2008; Krishnan et al., 2013; Lisic, 
2014).   
 
3.2.1 APTS and knowledge spillover arguments 
The knowledge spillover effect assumes that the knowledge is transferable between different 
departments within an audit firm, and the audit and tax services require overlapping information 
pertinent to clients.30 Such information sharing is beneficial for several reasons. First, since 
APTS normally are performed across the fiscal year, the communication between tax and audit 
partners allows the audit team to be aware of material risky transactions at an early stage, 
 
30 Auditors, at least the Big 4 firms, are aware of the benefits of sharing clients’ information across professionals 
and encourage their staff to do so. For instance, PwC states that “Leveraging all lines of service is an important 
component of providing a high-quality audit. Drawing on the knowledge of our non-audit professionals, we 
develop a deeper understanding of our audit clients’ processes and financial reporting risks…that may affect our 
audit clients’ financial statements – for example, the potential impact of complex income tax matters…” (PwC, 
2019) (italics added). One Big 4 accounting practice partner interviewed by Law (2010) states that “Taxation 
services (I agree) is value-added service to clients, as that may clear up some complex accounting entries that the 
client may not know to do it” (p. 107). Moreover, by discussing with tax and audit partners across Big 4 firms, 
Gleason and Mills (2011) confirm that the tax partners will fully inform their audit partners of the unique 
knowledge related to audit clients’ risk in tax accounts that is gathered through providing tax services.  
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thereby, enabling the audit team to detect and remedy clients’ internal control weaknesses (both 
tax and non-tax related) before the release of the financial statements (De Simone et al., 2015). 
Second, prior studies find a strong and positive association between financial and tax reporting 
aggressiveness (Frank et al., 2009). When auditors provide tax services to their audit clients, 
auditors will gain good understandings of the client’s tax strategies. Such understandings not 
only facilitate auditors attesting clients’ tax-related assertions, but also help auditors assess 
clients’ attitudes towards financial reporting aggressiveness. Therefore, compared with auditors 
who only provide audit services (i.e., less informed auditors), auditors will likely design 
significantly different and more effective audit procedures when they provide both audit 
services and APTS to their clients (Joe & Vandervelde, 2007). 
 More importantly, when the incumbent auditors also provide APTS, audit personnel can 
learn and evaluate clients’ uncertain tax positions easily: knowledge that increases audit quality. 
On the contrary, if firms purchase tax services from parties other than the incumbent auditors, 
then the latter must first detect clients’ uncertain tax positions and then obtain evidence of the 
outcomes of those positions. By using various measures of audit quality, the majority of 
empirical studies find a positive relationship between audit quality and APTS, indicating the 
existence of knowledge spillover effects (e.g., Kinney et al., 2004; Robinson, 2008). The extant 
literature also considers whether or not APTS are recurring in nature (e.g., Abdul Wahab et al., 
2014; Paterson & Valencia, 2011). Recurring APTS are defined as tax services that are 
purchased from the same auditors for two or more consecutive years: otherwise, they are non-
recurring APTS. Recurring NAS gives rise to economies of scope, which would contribute to 
auditors’ cost savings (e.g., Beck et al., 1998; Chung & Kallapur, 2003), especially for some 
categories of NAS (e.g., APTS) (Arruñada, 1999, Francis, 2006; Gleason & Mills, 2011). If 
auditors pass on part of the cost savings to their audit clients, economic bonding between the 
two parties is declined, with a consequent positive effect on audit quality.  
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Moreover, the benefits of knowledge spillover effects are generated not only from client-
specific knowledge but also from industry-specific knowledge obtained through providing tax 
services to firms in the same industry. McGuire et al. (2012) propose that auditors have superior 
knowledge of the industry-specific tax planning opportunities that are available to their clients, 
if auditors are tax industry specialists. Such specialization is also found to be helpful in 
establishing formal or informal benchmarks for reasonable accounting practices, and hence, 
auditors could detect and constrain industry-specific opportunistic earnings management 
behaviour (Christensen et al., 2015). Thus, tax industry specialization could enhance not only 
tax service effectiveness, but also audit quality. These benefits even exist when clients do not 
purchase APTS or purchase low levels of APTS from their incumbent auditors, since the 
knowledge could spill over to different engagements across the same audit firm/office. 
However, Goldman et al. (2021) argue that the improved audit quality pertinent to income tax 
accounts is due to auditors possessing more general tax task-specific knowledge, rather than to 
industry expertise, since tax issues are not necessarily industry-specific (Hux et al., 2018). 
Goldman et al. (2021) find that audit offices with more general tax task-specific knowledge 
(proxied by audit offices’ exposure to complex tax issues) decrease the incidence of tax-related 
restatements, whereas those with industry tax expertise exacerbate such restatements. 
Nevertheless, both Christensen et al. (2015) and Goldman et al. (2021) show that the benefits 
of industry tax expertise or general tax task-specific knowledge are concentrated in firms that 
procure low levels of APTS from incumbent auditors, indicating a substitution effect. 
 
3.2.2 APTS and the impairment of independence arguments  
In contrast to the possible benefits generating from the knowledge spillover effects, auditor 
independence can be, or be perceived as, negatively influenced by the joint provision of audit 
services and NAS, including APTS. The provision of APTS could create several threats to 
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auditor independence, such as self-interest and self-review threats. Such independence threats 
will affect independence of mind, independence in appearance, or both. DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) suggest that the impairment of auditor independence could be triggered by both demand- 
and supply-side factors. 
 The first independence threat stemming from APTS is economic bonding (i.e., self-interest). 
Although the economic bonds between auditors and their clients are inherent even if auditors 
do not provide any NAS (DeAngelo, 1981), the provision of NAS increases the client-specific 
current and future quasi-rents, which increase the bond with and, in turn, the fee reliance on 
audit clients (Francis, 2006; Simunic, 1984). From the demand side, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
document that it is easier for audit clients to influence their auditors by including excessive 
rents in the NAS fees, which are less regulated than audit fees. Since APTS is still permitted 
under the current environment in many jurisdictions, the purchase of APTS could be a way, or 
maybe the most important way, that audit clients can influence auditor independence. Also, 
from the supply side, owing to the pressure on auditors’ (e.g., audit offices or partners) to 
achieve performance targets, their incentives to acquiesce to, or even help clients with, the 
manipulation of earnings and/or the adoption of aggressive tax positions increases as the APTS 
fees increase (Alsadoun et al., 2018; Causholli et al., 2014; Doty, 2011; Favere-Marchsi, 2006). 
Therefore, audit clients that acquire both audit services and APTS gain more opportunities to 
conduct opportunistic behaviour than do those purchasing audit services only, or other types of 
NAS, from their auditors. Besides the self-interest threat generated from current quasi-rents, 
Causholli et al. (2014, p. 681) argue that “a client’s promise of future NAS business has 
potential to impair an auditor’s independence”. Supporting this argument, Lynch et al. (2021) 
find that auditors will receive about 17% more (5% fewer) APTS fees in the following year 
from their audit clients if they stop (start or continue) issuing tax-related key audit matters 
(KAM) to the clients in the current year. In sum, both current and future quasi-rents related to 
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APTS fees can create enhanced economic bonding between auditors and audit clients, thereby, 
threatening auditor independence. 
 The second independence threats stemming from APTS are the self-review concerns. 
Francis (2006) documents that the provision of NAS may change the auditor’s role from outside 
independent reviewer to inside adviser and decision-maker. Since the provision of APTS is 
more closely and directly related to clients’ income and cash flow (e.g., Maydew & Shackelford, 
2007; Omer et al., 2006), auditors may end up auditing their own work. In such cases, auditors 
are less (more) likely to challenge (rely on) the clients’ treatment of complicated tax issues and 
tax strategies that are advised by “auditors themselves” (i.e., the tax services team in the same 
audit firm/office). 
 
3.2.3 Section summary  
In this section, I discussed two theoretical perspectives on APTS. The knowledge spillover 
effect suggests that the provision of APTS, especially the recurring ones, helps auditors to have 
a better understanding of clients’ operations, internal control, tax strategies, and of managers’ 
attitudes towards financial reporting. Such understanding facilitates high-quality audits. The 
impaired independence effect suggests that the provision of APTS increases economic bonds 
between auditors and clients, thus, decreasing their incentives to provide high-quality audits. 
The net effects of APTS, therefore, have been subject to a substantial amount of academic 
research over the years. 
 
3.3 Overview of the APTS Regulations for Selected Jurisdictions 
In this section, I provide an overview of the APTS regulations related to both the disclosure of 
APTS and the provision of APTS by incumbent auditors. Leuz (2010) shows that the regulatory 
environment and institutional factors are different across countries, and these differences are 
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likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is important to understand differences in 
APTS regulations around the world, as they may affect both the determinants and consequences 
of APTS. The selection of jurisdictions is based on the importance of capital markets in the 
world economy.  
 
3.3.1 United States (U.S.) 
The SEC first issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 250 in June 1978, which required 
firms to disclose the specific nature of NAS and total NAS as a percentage of total audit fees in 
their proxy statements (SEC, 1978). However, the SEC rescinded this requirement in August 
1981. Parkash and Venable (1992) find that 90% of the Fortune 500 firm-year observations 
purchased APTS during the period 1978 to 1980. They also document that the demand for 
APTS varied with agency costs and auditor characteristics. Koh et al. (2013) use a similar 
dataset, but do not find any evidence that the APTS fees ratio is related to impaired auditor 
independence. Subsequently, the SEC mandated the detailed disclosure of fees paid to 
registrants’ auditors since 2001, to facilitate investors in evaluating the impact of the joint 
provision of audit and NAS on auditor independence. In particular, the SEC registrants must 
disclose their fees paid to auditors in three categories: (1) audit services fees, (2) financial 
information systems design and implementation (FISDI) services fees, and (3) all other NAS 
fees (SEC, 2000). In addition, the SEC (2000) restricts certain types of NAS that would impair 
auditor independence when being provided by registrants’ auditors, with some exceptions. 
Following some accounting scandals, Section 201(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
imposed stricter rules banning audit firms from simultaneously providing audit and FISDI 
services or some certain services classified in “other NAS”.31 However, SOX did not prohibit 
 
31  Those services include (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client; (2) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; 
(3) actuarial services; (4) internal audit outsourcing services; (5) management functions or human resources; (6) 
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the provision of APTS, a category of NAS that auditors frequently provide to their clients (SEC, 
2003). However, before acquiring APTS and other allowed NAS from their auditors, registrants 
must get pre-approval from their audit committees to assure stakeholders that providing such 
services will not impair the auditors’ independence (Section 202 of SOX).  
After SOX, the SEC (2003) amended the disclosure requirements for auditor fees. The new 
rules required registrants to disclose auditor fees in four separate categories: (1) audit fees; (2) 
audit-related fees; (3) tax fees (i.e., APTS fees); and (4) all other fees. In regard to the addition 
of a “tax fees” category, SEC states that the provision of tax services needs extensive knowledge 
about the client, and the APTS fees are considerable in relation to other NAS fees. Therefore, 
SEC believes that it is appropriate and beneficial to investors if firms distinguish APTS fees 
from all other fee categories. The SEC (2003) rules became mandatory for years ending after 
December 15, 2003 and required that registrants must provide such information for each of the 
two most recent fiscal years. As a result, registrants started to disclose the four-categories of 
auditor fees information from 2002. Moreover, the SEC reiterated that audit firms could provide 
APTS (i.e., tax compliance, tax planning, and tax advice) to their clients. However, some prior 
studies find that firms started to voluntarily dismiss, or substantially reduce, the purchase of 
APTS owing to concerns about the perception of impaired independence (e.g., Omer et al., 
2006): a perception that imposed significant costs on firms such as reduced tax savings (Cook 
et al., 2020) and low value-relevance of earnings (Krishnan et al., 2013). 
In 2005, the PCAOB further adopted three new rules prohibiting certain tax consulting 
services that are perceived to impede auditor independence. More precisely, Rule 3521 
proscribed auditors from providing APTS with contingent fee arrangements, Rule 3522 
prohibited auditors from promoting and providing clients with APTS for achieving aggressive 
tax positions to avoid tax, and Rule 3523 banned auditors from providing any APTS to a person 
 
broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; (7) legal services and expert services 
unrelated to the audit; and (8) any other service that the PCAOB determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
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who has a role in financial reporting oversight (e.g., executives) at the client’s firm, or to 
immediate family members of such persons. On April 19, 2006, SEC (2006) approved these 
three PCAOB (2005) proposed rules, effective from October 31, 2006 and onward.  
For new audit clients, PCAOB (2008) amended Rule 3523 to remove the restriction for tax 
services provided during the portion of the audit period that is completed before the beginning 
of the professional engagement period, since tax services provided in such a period are 
perceived not to impair auditor independence. The amendment of Rule 3523 would be effective 
immediately upon the SEC approval, which occurred on August 22, 2008 (SEC, 2008). 
Markelevich and Rosner (2013) find in their additional tests that APTS fees were positively 
associated with the likelihood of issuing fraudulent financial statements from 2000 to 2005. 
Also, Thornton and Shaub (2014) show that U.S. jurors perceive a significantly lower audit 
quality when auditors provide audit clients with aggressive tax-planning services, as compared 
with tax compliance services. These results support the new restrictions. Finley and Stekelberg 
(2016) illustrate that there is a significant decrease in tax avoidance for firms continuing to 
purchase APTS from Big 4 auditors from pre- to post-2005 periods. However, Lennox (2016) 
examines the effects of these three new restrictions on audit quality and fails to find an increased 
audit quality, as proposed by the U.S. regulators, after the implementation of new restrictions. 
Also, Nesbitt et al. (2020) show that despite complying with Rule 3522, audit firms have been 
advising larger clients on the use of more aggressive tax strategies increasingly over time. 
Moreover, some audit firms continued to provide some tax services that are not specifically 
mentioned in the regulation, but that do compromise auditor independence. For instance, 
KPMG was penalized 8.2 million U.S. dollars by SEC on January 24, 2014, for loaning tax 
professionals to audit clients from 2007 to 2011: a practice that violates the rule proscribing 
auditors from acting as an employee of clients. As a result, the SEC (2014) states that auditors 
must carefully assess the independence threats of providing certain types of NAS, rather than 
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just consider whether the proposed services fall within one of the permissible categories (e.g., 
tax services). 
Overall, the regulatory environment of APTS in the U.S. consists of the following: (1) all 
APTS should be pre-approved by the clients’ audit committee; (2) clients need to disclose APTS 
fees in their proxy statements separately; (3) auditors can provide only those APTS that would 
not jeopardize their independence; and (4) SOX violations are subject to expanded criminal and 
civil liabilities and penalties. 
 
3.3.2 European Union (EU) 
To make the relationships between auditors and audit clients more transparent, the EU Directive 
(2006) suggested and required disclosure of audit fees and the fees paid for NAS including 
other assurance services, tax advisory services, and other NAS in the notes of financial 
statements in all EU member states: requirements that are comparable with those of the U.S. 
SEC (2003). In regard to auditor independence, the Directive also mentioned that auditors 
should not undertake any additional NAS that compromises their independence.  
After the financial crisis around the world, regulators in the EU started to consider 
amending the audit regulations, including the prohibition of NAS, based on the presumption 
that NAS may compromise auditor independence as mentioned in the EU Directive (2006). 
According to the European Commission (EC) (2010) “Green Paper”, although there was no 
mandatory ban of NAS provision along with statutory audits in EU-wide regulations, some 
member states already implemented the EU Directive (2006), albeit in a very divergent manner. 
For instance, auditors are proscribed from providing any NAS to their audit clients in France, 
whereas the restrictions on NAS provision are relatively loose in other member states. 
In the following year, EC (2011), Article 10, proposed a specific requirement prohibiting 
auditor-provided NAS in the public interest entities (PIEs). Specifically, the EC (2011) 
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suggested to ban or restrict auditors from providing services other than statutory audit services 
and related financial audit services to PIE audit clients. The scope of “related financial audit 
services” includes (a) the audit or review of interim financial statements, (b) providing 
assurance on other statements (e.g., corporate governance, corporate social responsibility 
matters, and regulatory reporting), (c) providing certification on compliance with tax 
requirements, where such attestation is required by national law, and (d) other duty related to 
audit work imposed by the EU legislation on the statutory auditor. To enhance auditor 
independence, the EC (2010, 2011) even proposed banning auditors from providing any NAS 
to PIE clients, and suggested that such prohibition might contribute to the establishment of 
“pure audit firms”, in which auditors could provide independent opinions without any business 
interest in their audit clients.  
In 2014, the Regulation (EU) No. 537/2014 amended and approved the EC (2011) proposal 
described above. The EU Regulation (2014) introduced a “blacklist” of prohibited NAS across 
all EU member states. The first banned NAS in EU Regulation (2014), Article 5, is the APTS 
related to (i) preparation of tax forms; (ii) payroll tax; (iii) customs duties; (iv) identification of 
public subsidies and tax incentives; (v) support regarding tax inspections by tax authorities; (vi) 
calculation of direct and indirect tax and deferred tax; and (vii) provision of tax advice. Other 
NAS included in the “blacklist” are similar to those services that are banned in the U.S. (see 
Section 3.3.1 above). In addition, member states may further prohibit any NAS that they 
consider as representing a threat to auditor independence. The EU Regulation (2014) also 
required a pre-approval from clients’ audit committees if incumbent auditors want to provide 
some permissible NAS that is not part of the “blacklist”.  
In addition, a fee cap is introduced on the total amount of fees to be charged for allowable 
NAS, assuming that the provision of NAS negatively affects auditor independence only when 
a certain threshold is exceeded. In particular, the total fees for those allowable NAS shall not 
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exceed 70% of the average of the statutory audit fees in the last three consecutive fiscal years. 
Also, member states’ regulators could opt to set stricter rules on the NAS fee cap. These new 
regulations were effective from 17 June 2016 onwards, and regulators expected to observe 
increased auditor independence after implementing those restrictions. Ratzinger-Sakel and 
Schönberger (2015) demonstrate that, although the EU Regulation has different impacts on the 
provision of NAS in different member states, the EU-wide regulation is an extension of existing 
restrictions in each member state. However, the new regulation seems unnecessary, considering 
the empirical findings in the EU, which show little impairment of independence due to APTS, 
using data from the pre-2016 regime (Castillo-Merino et al., 2020; Eilifsen et al., 2018; Garcia-
Blandon et al., 2017, 2021; Watrin et al., 2019). 
Notably, the EU Regulation (2014) gives a derogation option to member states when 
implementing these NAS regulations in their local legislations. That is, member states could 
opt to allow auditors to provide some valuation and certain tax services (i, iv, v, vi, and vii 
contained in Article 5) that are included in the “blacklist” if certain criteria are met.32 Therefore, 
EU regulators view some categories of APTS as less harmful to auditor independence compared 
with other categories of NAS. According to the Audit Analytics (2020, December), most 
member states opt to allow the aforementioned tax services, and only eight member states 
decide not to use this option. In other words, the APTS are totally banned in these eight member 
states (i.e., Croatia, Greece, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia). 
Regarding the fee cap on NAS, all member states have opted for the 70% except for Portugal 
where a 30% cap has opted. It is worth noting that there is no specific fee cap for APTS. 
Moreover, recent studies show that the mean or median APTS fees ratios are well below 20% 
 
32 Three such criteria are, (a) they have no direct or have immaterial effect, separately or in the aggregate on the 
audited financial statements; (b) the estimation of the effect on the audited financial statements is comprehensively 
documented and explained in the additional report to the audit committee referred to in Article 11; and (c) the 




or 30% in some EU countries, such as Spain (Castillo-Merino et al., 2020) and Germany 
(Eilifsen et al., 2018; Watrin et al., 2019). Although there are some firms with very high APTS 
fees, this fee cap regulation may have less or no influence on the purchase or provision of APTS 
for most of the listed firms in the EU.  
The EU Regulation (2014) specifies some tax services that should be banned without 
exemption, namely (ii) and (iii) contained in Article 5, which seems to be different from the 
U.S. regulation. However, although these services fall within the tax services category, 
provision of these services would make auditors play either an accounting role or a management 
function role for the audit clients, posing serious threats to auditor independence. Therefore, 
this rule is, in general, consistent with the U.S. SEC (2014) argument that auditors should assess 
both the nature and the manner of delivering some types of services to make sure auditor 
independence is not compromised, although EU Regulation (2014) is less ambiguous than the 
U.S. regulation.  
 
3.3.3 Other jurisdictions 
Besides the regulatory environments in the U.S. and EU, which have received much attention 
in the previous literature, I also provide a brief review of regulations related to APTS in some 
other jurisdictions, based on the importance of their capital markets in the world economy. As 
the second-largest capital market, China mandated the disclosure of NAS fees in 2001, but there 
is no specific regulation related to APTS thus far. This seems reasonable, because the Chinese 
NAS market is small and most firms do not purchase NAS from their incumbent auditors (Chen 
et al., 2010; Fang et al., 2014). Thus, the provision of NAS, including APTS, is not considered 
to threaten auditor independence. Hong Kong has not mandated the disclosure of NAS fees yet 
and, therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the provision of such services is valued 
favourably by the stakeholders or not. However, Law (2010), using a survey among some Hong 
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Kong auditors and financial analysts, finds that APTS are perceived as a value-added service 
by their clients by comparison with other types of NAS such as, corporate finance services and 
internal audit services. Japanese auditors are banned from providing certain types of NAS, 
including any type of APTS. The Companies Act of 2013 in India prohibits certain types of 
NAS, but does not prohibit APTS. If Indian listed firms purchase APTS from their incumbent 
auditors, they need to disclose the fees paid under “Payments to the auditors for taxation matters” 
in their financial statements. 
Although Canadian prohibitions of NAS are very similar to the U.S. ones, there are some 
differences. The CPA Canada Independence Working Group (IWG) initiated a discussion in 
2012 about whether to further prohibit certain types of APTS as the U.S. SEC did in 2006 (IWG, 
2012). In the following year, IWG (2013) concluded that it would support additional 
prohibitions of APTS with respect to personal tax services for individuals who hold financial 
reporting oversight roles (similar to U.S. Rule 3523), and aggressive and confidential tax 
transactions (similar to U.S. Rule 3522). IWG (2013) called for more studies on the impacts of 
the provision of APTS on a contingent basis (similar to U.S. Rule 3521). So far, these 
suggestions have not been enforced in Canada. Moreover, CPA Canada (2016) clearly states 
that if auditors are already providing services related to “Tax calculations for the purpose of 
preparing accounting entries, except under certain circumstances in emergency situations [Rule 
204.4 (34) (b)]” for a listed firm, then they shall not perform audit services for that same firm. 
Makni et al. (2020) published the only study using Canadian data to explore the impacts of 
APTS, and find weak evidence that the ratio of APTS fees to total auditor fees is positively 
associated with the firms’ use of tax havens. 
The Certified Public Accountant Act in South Korea mandated the disclosure of NAS fees 
and their components in 2001, and prohibited certain types of NAS in 2002, although such 
prohibitions were less restrictive compared with the U.S. and EU (Kang et al., 2019). The 
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Korean National Assembly amended the Korean CPA Act on February 18, 2016, and banned 
additional NAS, making Korean law similar to the U.S. SOX (2002). However, like India, South 
Korea has not banned any APTS because the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(KICPA, 2006) suggests that the provision of APTS is unlikely to impair auditor independence. 
Empirical research supports this view (Choi et al., 2009). Taken together, my review of the 
APTS regulations reveals significant variations across jurisdictions. Table 3.2 provides an 
overview of APTS-related regulations in different jurisdictions. 







Canada Yes Yes Yes 
China Yes No No 
European Union Yes Yes Yes 
Hong Kong Yes No No 
India Yes No Yes 
Japan No N/A N/A 
South Korea Yes No Yes 
United States Yes Yes Yes 
Note: In this table, I provide an overview of APTS-related regulations in different selected jurisdictions. For 
the purpose of this paper, I focus on the APTS provided to audit clients only. Column (1) shows whether auditors 
in a certain jurisdiction are allowed to provide tax services, and Column (2) indicates whether certain types of 
APTS are clearly banned in the same jurisdiction. In Column (1), “Yes” means auditors are permitted to provide 
tax services to audit clients, and “No” means auditors are prohibited to provide any types of tax services to audit 
clients. In Column (2), “Yes” means there are additional restrictions on certain types of APTS, otherwise, it will 
show “No”. Conditional on the provision of APTS is permitted either fully or partially, Column (3) shows 
whether the audit clients need to disclose APTS fees in the financial statements. 
 
3.4 Determinant of APTS 
I review the literature investigating the determinants of purchasing tax services from incumbent 
auditors this section. Four types of APTS-related decisions are reviewed, namely, decisions 
involving: (1) voluntary APTS information disclosure; (2) choice of incumbent auditors as tax 
service providers; (3) retention or dismissal of incumbent auditors as tax service providers; and 






3.4.1 Voluntary disclosure of APTS information 
As discussed in Section 3.3, publicly listed firms were required to disclose APTS fees from 
2003 in the U.S. (from 2006 in the EU countries), although some firms voluntarily disclosed 
the APTS information prior to the passage of these regulations. Omer et al. (2006) examine the 
factors associated with firms’ decision to purchase APTS from 2000 to 2002. To control for 
potential selection bias resulting from purchase and disclosure decisions, they model the factors 
influencing such decisions in the first stage of the Heckman two-step estimation process. There 
are two findings from Omer et al.’s (2006) selection bias regressions. First, the decision to 
disclose APTS fees is positively associated with tax complexity, auditor tenure, and auditor 
change, and negatively associated with the proportion of NAS fees to total fees supporting the 
notion that firms are less likely to disclose APTS fees information to reduce political costs 
associated with heightened regulatory scrutiny. Second, their results imply that firm size and 
auditor size jointly affect a client’s decision to purchase APTS, but not the decision to disclose 
APTS fees. Bedard et al. (2010) extend Omer et al. (2006) by including two important players 
in the corporate governance structure of a firm (i.e., the audit committee and the auditor) in 
explaining firm’s voluntary APTS fees disclosure decisions. They confirm the negative 
association between APTS fees disclosure and the proportion of NAS fees to total fees. 
Importantly, the negative association is found to be more pronounced when firms have a strong 
audit committee: a finding that is inconsistent with the audit committee oversight theory. A 
stronger audit committee may perceive costs resulting from regulatory scrutiny as outweighing 
the additional benefits of disclosures to investors. Also, this negative association is stronger for 
firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors, which is consistent with the findings that clients of non-





3.4.2 Selecting incumbent auditors as tax service providers 
It is worthy of note that publicly listed firms are required to disclose only the tax services fees 
paid to their incumbent auditors, but not if they purchase tax services from other providers, or 
if their internal tax departments perform those services. Therefore, I could not find any 
empirical paper using publicly available data to examine the entire spectrum of tax services 
provider choices in publicly listed firms. However, using proprietary data from the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and focusing on tax compliance services only, Klassen et al. (2016) 
find that firms are more likely to hire incumbent auditors to prepare tax returns when they have 
been less tax aggressive in the past, higher-growing, and smaller. Furthermore, firms having 
less foreign activities, incurring losses, engaging in R&D activities, and exhibiting high other-
NAS fees ratios, also tend to select incumbent auditors to prepare tax returns. Neuman et al. 
(2015) provide additional evidence using data from the U.S. not-for-profit sector (NFPs), where 
the decision to choose a tax service provider is observable for all entities. They find that the 
NFPs are less likely to purchase tax services from the incumbent auditor, as the distance 
between the firm and the auditor increases, indicating that tax services, similar to financial 
statement audit services, also require a high degree of client contact. Moreover, Neuman et al. 
(2015) posit and find that clients are more likely to hire other audit firms or law firms when the 
set of substitute service providers is greater and, thus, the purchase of tailored services is 
facilitated. 
 
3.4.3 Retaining or dismissing incumbent auditors as tax service providers 
Instead of examining the determinants of purchasing APTS directly, another stream of studies 
provides some evidence about the reasons audit clients decide to dismiss or retain their 
incumbent auditors as their tax services providers (Ahn et al., 2021; Albring et al., 2014; Finley 
& Stekelberg, 2016; Lassila et al. 2010). Because SOX (2002) and SEC (2000, 2003, 2006) 
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prohibited certain types of NAS and required more granular classifications of fees disclosure, 
public firms substantially reduced or terminated the purchase of some NAS, including tax 
services, from their auditors, to reduce negative reactions from investors and regulators (Abbott 
et al., 2011; Finley & Stekelberg, 2016; Lennox, 2016; Maydew & Shackelford, 2007), even 
when the regulations clearly suggest that investors would view APTS more favourably than 
other types of NAS (SEC, 2003). Omer et al. (2006) show that the sample median APTS fees 
declined from US$256,880 in 2000 to US$145,150 in 2002, and Cook et al. (2020) further find 
that approximately 21% of the firms in their sample period (i.e., 2002 to 2005) eliminated or 
significantly reduced the use of APTS. Among these firms, the median APTS fees dropped 
from US$326,446 to $53,000. Therefore, firms’ decisions to retain or dismiss incumbent 
auditors as tax services providers became an important research question.  
Lassila et al. (2010) mention that ‘retaining or dismissing’ decisions appear to be a trade-
off between the benefits generated from knowledge spillover and the costs related to impaired 
auditor independence of mind, or in appearance. If benefits exceed costs, firms will retain or 
hire their auditors as tax services providers and, otherwise, dismiss them. Therefore, those 
factors that can either increase the benefits of knowledge spillover or decrease the costs of 
impaired auditor independence will contribute to the hiring and retaining decisions. Lassila et 
al. (2010) find a positive association between clients’ corporate governance and the likelihood 
of retaining auditors as tax services providers in the period surrounding the SOX (i.e., 2001 to 
2003). The association is consistent with the argument that strong corporate governance 
increases auditor oversight and decreases the likelihood of impaired auditor independence (e.g., 
Carcello & Neal, 2003). However, using a sample of the matched switch and non-switch firms 
in the post-SOX period (i.e., 2003 to 2006), Albring et al. (2014) find a negative association 
between corporate governance attributes and the decision to retain auditors as tax services 
providers. Likewise, both Almaqoushi and Powell (2021) and Bédard and Paquette (2021) show 
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that audit committee quality indices are negatively associated with the purchase and magnitude 
of APTS fees. These studies support the conservative behaviour of directors or audit committee 
members in response to the increased litigation and potential reputation risks after the passage 
of SOX. Furthermore, the ex-ante independence risk will increase the costs of retaining 
decisions. Both Ahn et al. (2021) and Lassila et al. (2010) posit and find evidence that auditors 
will be perceived as lacking independence if they provide high non-tax NAS relative to audit 
fees to their audit clients, and have a long relationship with them; consequently, the clients are 
less likely to retain incumbent auditors as tax services providers. 
On the other hand, if some firm-specific characteristics increase the potential benefits 
through knowledge spillover effects, firms are more prone to retain the incumbent auditors as 
their tax service provider. Both Albring et al. (2014) and Lassila et al. (2010) find that firms are 
more likely to retain their auditors as tax services providers when they have high tax and 
operational complexity, supporting the notion that the complexity (e.g., the existence of foreign 
operations and the M&A activities) will generate more knowledge spillover benefits. 
Complexity also encourages firms to purchase more tax advice from incumbent auditors (Omer 
et al., 2006). Similarly, Bédard and Paquette (2021) find the high ex-ante litigation risk of firms 
encourages audit committee members with accounting financial expertise to purchase more 
APTS. However, the moderating effects of firm litigation risk exist only in the period of 2007 
to 2011 when the public scrutiny had faded away.  
Finley and Stekelberg (2016) use a “natural experiment” method to examine the impact on 
retaining decisions of external oversight imposed on tax service providers. Specifically, KPMG, 
one of the Big 4 firms, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the U.S. 
Justice Department in 2005 to resolve charges stemming from the sale of tax shelter services to 
its individual clients. KPMG agreed to comply permanently with several tax services rules that 
are stricter than those required of other tax services providers, which limited KMPG’s ability 
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to facilitate some tax avoidance strategies for clients.33 The authors investigate the reactions of 
firms that are currently purchasing APTS from KPMG, in response to the potential damage to 
KPMG’s reputation and/or the decreased expected tax benefits owing to the DPA. The results 
show that whilst all other Big 4 firms’ provision of APTS declined in the post-DPA period, 
KPMG suffered more from to the DPA, compared with other firms, in terms of both the 
likelihood of purchasing APTS and the amount of purchased APTS. The authors also examine 
whether tax avoidance decreased significantly for the KPMG clients that decided to continue 
purchasing tax services from KPMG after the DPA, compared with clients of other Big 4 
auditors. Surprisingly, KPMG’s clients did not exhibit any difference in tax avoidance 
behaviour relative to clients of other Big 4 auditors. In addition, Baugh et al. (2019) find that 
the audit quality of KPMG did not change significantly relative to other Big 4 auditors after the 
DPA, even for KPMG clients that dropped KPMG as the tax service provider. Combining these 
two studies, I may conclude that the DPA had no or little effects on KPMG’s audit and tax 
services quality. 
Similarly, Ahn et al. (2021) examine the changes in APTS after the public disclosure of the 
2007 PCAOB Part II inspection report, which identified Deloitte’s deficiencies related to audits 
of income tax accounts. They find that, compared with other large audit firms inspected by the 
PCAOB, both the increased costs stemming from perceived impaired independence and the 
decreased benefits due to Deloitte’s inability to use knowledge transferred from the tax team, 
prompted Deloitte’s audit clients to dismiss or reduce the purchase of APTS from Deloitte. 
Overall, these results related to KPMG and Deloitte are supportive of Omer et al.’s (2006) 
finding that clients terminated or significantly reduced APTS investment around the uncertain 
external oversight environment. 
 
 
33 For detailed information about the DPA, see http://www.iaipsig.org/kpmg1005-remark.pdf   
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3.4.4 The magnitude of APTS fees 
Halperin and Lai (2015) develop a tax fee model from the clients’ demand side to examine the 
determinants of APTS fees. In addition to unexpected audit fees (Omer et al., 2006), they find 
that expected audit fees are also positively associated with APTS fees, indicating a cross-selling 
behaviour of auditors.34 While Chan et al. (2012) find results similar to those of Halperin and 
Lai (2015), they do not develop a specific model for APTS fees. Other factors found to be 
associated with APTS fees are firm characteristics, executive and board characteristics (e.g., 
tenure, compensation, publicity, interlocks, and alumni), auditor characteristics (e.g., size, 
tenure, and switch), among others (e.g., Alexander & Hay, 2013; Duan et al., 2018; Naiker et 
al., 2013; Omer et al., 2012; Parkash & Venable, 1993; Shi et al., in press). Parkash and Venable 
(1993) find that firms with fewer agency costs (i.e., firms having high managerial ownership, 
high outside ownership concentration, and low leverage), and firms having industry specialist 
auditors, tend to pay more APTS fees. Duan et al. (2018) utilize Google search volume to 
measure CEOs’ publicity and find that firms whose CEOs have high publicity tend to avoid tax 
to meet investors' performance expectations. Importantly, such firms pay more fees for tax 
planning services to their incumbent auditors. Naiker et al. (2013) show that audit committees 
with former audit firm partners are less likely to purchase more tax services from firms’ 
incumbent auditors, probably because of concerns over auditor independence. Regarding audit 
committee networks, Shi et al. (in press) find that, purchases of APTS increased with the prior 
year’s average of APTS purchased by board-interlocked firms via an audit committee board 
member. Omer et al. (2012, p. 33) develop a composite measure to differentiate a group of firms 
 
34 The cross-selling behaviour is called “mixed-leader bundling” by the marketing literature (Guiltinan, 1987). 
Guiltinan (1987) suggests that clients are potential buyers of a range of complementary services since those 
services are interdependent in their demand. The success of bundling of services could be increased owing to at 
least two reasons (Halperin & Lai, 2015). First, when a client has already purchased one type of service from an 
audit firm, it will save time and effort in acquiring information about another type of service from the same audit 
firm, rather than from other service providers (i.e., search economies). Second, if either type of service increases 
audit firms’ reputation or credibility of their provided services, clients are more likely to purchase another type of 
service from the same auditor when they need it. For a detailed discussion about the cross-selling of audit services 
and APTS, see Halperin and Lai (2015).  
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having a new economy business model that “allows firms to exploit their operational flexibility 
to align with tax incentives” and consequently reduce their tax burdens. Therefore, if they are 
following the new economy business model, firms have less demand for investment in tax 
planning services compared with their counterparts following the traditional business model.  
Two more recent studies use a change specification to examine the determinants of 
APTS fees (Kim et al., in press; Lynch et al., 2021). Using the changes in APTS fees as the 
dependent variable, Lynch et al. (2021) find that auditors receive more APTS fees in the next 
year when they stop issuing tax-related KAM in clients’ audit reports in the current year. Kim 
et al. (in press) explore the macroeconomic determinants of APTS fees. They argue that the 
benefits from investment in tax planning activities increase with an increase in the optimism 
about future economic growth, because firms expect to generate more pre-tax income and cash 
flows as well as more tax planning opportunities. Consequently, firms are likely to invest more 
in purchasing tax planning services. The authors find supportive results using U.S. 
macroeconomic forecasts of real gross domestic growth (GDP) as a proxy for expected 
macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, this positive association is found to be more pronounced 
for firms with financial constraints and high tax rate volatility. 
 
3.4.5 Section summary 
In this sub-section, I summarize prior studies examining four types of APTS-related firm 
decisions. Table 3.3 summarizes the research questions, samples used, and key findings of these 
papers. Although the papers examined different research questions, I can conclude that all of 
these decisions are related to a cost-benefit trade-off. If the expected benefits exceed the 
expected costs, firms are more likely to disclose APTS information, purchase or retain APTS, 
and pay more fees for APTS. I will discuss the costs and benefits (i.e., the consequences) of 
APTS in the next subsection. However, the extant literature does find significant variations in 
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the purchase of APTS based on firm-level and auditor-level characteristics, so it is important to 
control and correct selection bias induced by such factors, before investigating the 




Table 3.3 Determinants of APTS 
All papers in this table and following tables are published papers with at least one hypothesis that is directly related to APTS. 
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Omer et al. (2006) This paper examines the impact of 
uncertainty of external oversight on 
APTS. 
US: 5,727 firm-years from 
2000 to 2002, which 
consists of 2,405 tax fees 
disclosers and 3,322 non-
disclosers. 
Tax complexity, auditor tenure, and auditor change are positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure of APTS fees, whereas the proportion of NAS fees 
to total fees is negatively related. Firm size and auditor size are positively 
associated with the likelihood of purchasing tax service from the incumbent 
auditors.  
Unexpected audit fees are positively associated with APTS fees in 2000 and 
2001, whereas this association is significantly weakened in 2002. During 2000 
to 2001, new clients paid significantly greater APTS fees than continuing 
clients, whereas, in 2002, shorter-tenure client paid lower APTS fees. APTS 
fees are positively associated with reductions in future tax rate (i.e., more tax 
avoidance) during 2000 and 2001. However, such benefits reduced or 
eliminated in 2002.  
Bedard et al. (2010) This paper examines the decision of 
firms to voluntarily disclose tax service 
fees paid to their incumbent auditors 
before the SEC (2003) regulation. 
US: 807 disclosing APTS 
firms and 225 non-
disclosing firms in 2002. 
Firms with higher proportion of NAS fees to total fees are less likely to 
voluntarily disclose APTS fees information. This effect is exacerbated by 
strong audit committee governance and the use of a non-Big 5/4 auditor. 
Lassila et al. (2010) This paper examines factors that 
influenced listed firms to retain or 
dismiss their incumbent auditors as tax 
services providers during the years 
surrounding the passage of SOX (2002). 
US: 1,006 firm-years from 
2001 to 2003. 
Companies that experience relatively high tax or operating complexity, that 
have relatively strong corporate governance, and whose auditors are relatively 
more independent are more likely to retain their auditors for tax services than 
companies that do not exhibit these characteristics. 
Albring et al. (2014) This paper examines the relations 
between audit committee quality, 
corporate governance, and audit 
committees’ decision to switch 
permissible tax services providers from 
incumbent auditors to others.  
US: 203 switch firms and 
203 matched non-switch 
firm from 2003 to 2006. 
The switch decision is increasing with audit committee accounting financial 
expertise, board independence, institutional stockholdings, directors' stock 
ownership, and CEO duality. Firms with a history of restatement/accounting 
irregularity, with higher tax to audit fees ratios, and with unqualified audit 
opinions are more likely to switch. Larger, less leveraged firms, with higher 
stock returns, lower pre-tax accruals, and firms accessing equity markets are 
also more likely to switch. The likelihood of switching is negatively 
associated with proxies for tax complexity, such as foreign operations, and 
merger/acquisition activities. 
Neuman et al. (2015) This paper examines the determinants of 
tax services provider choice in the non-
for-profit sector (NFPs). 
US: 4,700 firm-years from 
2004 to 2008. 
Greater distance (i.e., spherical distance in miles) between the client and the 
auditor increases the likelihood that NFPs hire non-auditor professional 
services firms or self-prepare the tax return. 
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NFPs are more likely to hire non-auditor professional services firms as 
knowledge availability (i.e., the number of professionals employed in the local 
metropolitan statistical area) increases. Both external auditors and non-auditor 
tax service providers improved NFPs’ disclosure quality pertaining to 
executive compensation and helped NFPs to attract more donations in the 
following year.  
Halperin and Lai 
(2015) 
This paper examines the relation 
between APTS fees and audit fees after 
SOX from the perspective of cross-
selling of services. 
US: 3,545 firm-years from 
2004 to 2008. 
Audit fees are positively associated with APTS fees because of the cross-
selling behaviour of auditors. Firm size, complexity, executive compensation, 
foreign operation, loss carry-forward, auditor size, the proportion of tangible 
assets, and opportunity of tax avoidance are associated with APTS fees. 
Finley and Stekelberg 
(2016) 
This paper examines the effect of 
KPMG’s Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement (DPA) on the accounting 
firm’ ability to sell APTS and its clients’ 
tax avoidance. 
US: 9,787 firm-years with 
Big 4 auditors from 2002 
to 2008 (excluding 2005). 
Firms are more (less) likely to terminate (engage) purchasing APTS from 
KPMG following the DPA. Among firms continued engaging KPMG as their 
tax service providers, the amount of purchased APTS declines following the 
DPA, relative to the amounts for other Big 4 clients. While there is a 
significant decrease in tax avoidance for firms continuing to purchase APTS 
from Big 4 auditors from pre- to post-2005 periods, KPMG’s clients do not 
exhibit any difference in such behaviour relative to clients of other Big 4 
auditors. 
Klassen et al. (2016) The paper examines the large publicly 
traded firms’ selection of tax preparers 
for tax compliance work. 
US: 1,533 firm-years from 
2008 and 2009 (804 firms 
in 2008 and 729 firms in 
2009). 
Firms are more likely to prepare tax returns by internal tax staff when firms 
are more tax aggressive in the past, slower-growing, larger, and have more 
foreign activities. Also, firms incurring losses, engaging in R&D, and paying 
high other NAS fees are more likely to outsource tax compliance work to their 
auditors. 
Firms are more likely to hire incumbent auditors as tax return preparers rather 
than other external non-auditors when firms are less tax aggressive in the past, 
higher-growing, smaller, and have high other NAS fees ratios.  
Ahn et al. (2021) This paper examines whether and how 
the public disclosure of the Deloitte 
2007 PCAOB Part II inspection report 
related to income tax-specific quality 
control deficiencies, affects its audit 
clients’ retention of APTS. 
US: 9,292 matched firm-
years from 2009 to 2012 
(4,646 firm-years before 
and after October 17, 
2011, respectively).  
After publicly releasing the PCAOB Part II report, the likelihood of using 
APTS among Deloitte’s audit clients is 17% lower relative to audit clients of 
other annually inspected firms. Such effects are more evident among audit 
clients paying higher NAS fees and those with greater tax complexity, but are 
mitigated among audit clients whose auditor possesses tax expertise. Among 
audit clients that retained Deloitte as the tax service provider, reliance on 
APTS decreased (i.e., they had lower APTS fees). 
Almaqoushi and  
Powell (2021) 
This paper examines the relationships 
between the quality of audit committee, 
financial reporting, internal control 
quality, and firm value. 
US: 7,054 firm-years from 
2002 to 2012. 




Bédard and  
Paquette (2021) 
This paper examines the effect of the 
presence of financial expertise on the 
audit committee on the purchase of 
APTS. 
US: 19,806 firm-years 
from 2003 to 2011. 
Firms are less likely to purchase APTS and tend to pay less APTS fees when 
their audit committees have at least one accounting financial expert. 
Furthermore, this relationship is mitigated by the firms’ ex-ante litigation risk, 
especially in the period of 2007 to 2011. 
Kim et al. (in press) This paper examines the effect of 
expected economic growth on the firms’ 
investment in tax planning.  
US: 13,553 firm-years 
from 2003 to 2014. 
Firms tend to invest more in tax planning activities (i.e., APTS fees) in periods 
when forecasted economic growth is more optimistic. Such association is 
stronger when firms are financially constrained and when firms are more 






3.5 Consequence of APTS  
In this section, I synthesize the empirical research examining the consequences of purchasing 
tax services from the incumbent auditors. I structure my review based on the different types of 
audit quality measures. Following DeFond and Zhang (2014) and Francis (2011), I classify my 
audit quality proxies into output- and input-based measures. 
 
3.5.1 Output-based measures 
3.5.1.1 Binary audit quality: Material misstatements and auditor communication 
The first binary audit quality factor is the financial statement misstatement, the extent of which 
is measured by the restatements in subsequent periods. Christensen et al. (2016) reveal that both 
audit professionals and experienced investors view financial statement restatements as the most 
significant publicly available signal of low audit quality.  
Kinney et al. (2004) is one of the first papers linking the types of NAS with financial 
statement restatements before the SEC (2000, 2003) disclosure rules, and the passage of the 
SOX (2002) restrictions on NAS. By using proprietary data from years 1995 to 2000, the 
authors classify NAS into following five categories: (i) FISDI services; (ii) audit-related 
services; (iii) internal audit services; (iv) APTS; and (v) other unspecified services. They find 
insignificant associations between FISDI, audit-related, or internal audit services and the 
likelihood of restatement, but find a significant negative association between APTS fees and 
restatement, especially for large firms (i.e., total assets over US$200 million). The results of 
Kinney et al. (2004) support the ‘knowledge spillover benefits’ of providing APTS, while 
supporting the impaired independence notion for the unspecified NAS. The insights gained 
from Kinney et al. (2004) also partially support the SOX ban on certain types of NAS, whilst 
allowing APTS. Supporting this argument, Schmidt (2012) documents no relation between the 
levels of APTS fees and auditors’ litigation risks following financial statement restatements. 
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However, if auditors provide aggressive tax planning services to audit clients, U.S. jurors tend 
to charge auditors high punitive damages when audit failure occurs (Thornton & Shaub, 2014). 
Beardsley et al. (2021) find that audit quality is lower (i.e., there are more restatements) among 
those audit offices that are more focused on providing NAS, suggesting a distraction effect of 
NAS on audit quality. However, this effect is driven by non-tax NAS, rather than APTS. 
Following Kinney et al. (2004), the literature explored the possible moderators for the 
negative association between APTS and financial statement restatements, including the 
recurrence of APTS (Paterson & Valencia, 2011), types of restatements (Seetharaman et al., 
2011), auditor size (Notbohm et al., 2015), institutional settings (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014; 
Castillo-Merino et al., 2020), and SEC (2006) restrictions on certain types of APTS (Lennox, 
2016). Notbohm et al. (2015) report an auditor size effect incremental to the audit client size 
effect documented by Kinney et al. (2004). That is, if a client is audited by a small audit firm, 
the provision of tax services leads to fewer restatements regardless of client size, compared 
with clients audited by big audit firms. The authors give two possible reasons. First, large audit 
firms have ex-ante high audit quality regardless of APTS, because they have more experienced 
employees and specialists (O’Keefe & Westort, 1992). Thus, small audit firms have more to 
gain from knowledge spillovers derived from providing APTS. Second, as small audit firms 
normally have fewer professionals to perform the audit and other NAS, knowledge spillovers 
may transfer easily between audit and tax professionals (e.g., Joe & Vandervelde, 2007).  
Considering the types of APTS, Paterson and Valencia (2011) find that the negative 
association between APTS and future restatements holds only when the APTS are recurring in 
nature. On the contrary, firms purchasing non-recurring APTS from their auditors incur more 
high-concern restatements: evidence supportive of impaired independence. Based on 953 firm-
years from 2007 to 2009, Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) also document a negative relationship 
between recurring APTS and restatements in Malaysia, a market that has not experienced audit 
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regulatory reforms like the SOX in the U.S. However, the negative association holds only for a 
subgroup of firms with political connections. The authors, however, did not offer any 
explanation for this potentially interesting finding. Castillo-Merino et al. (2020) examine the 
association between future APTS fees and several audit quality measures including 
restatements in Spain. The authors find that neither current nor future APTS fees have any 
relationships with restatements. However, a positive (negative) relationship between current 
(future) APTS fees and the probability of issuing qualified opinions is documented by the 
authors.35  
Although auditors are still permitted to provide tax services to their audit clients post-
reforms, such services require pre-approval by the audit committee. As a result, both clients 
and auditors evaluate the costs and benefits of purchasing and providing APTS carefully. 
Seetharaman et al. (2011) posit and find a significantly negative association between APTS and 
tax-related restatements using proprietary data from a Big 4 audit firm from 2003 to 2005. 
However, inconsistent with prior studies, they fail to find any association between APTS and 
general financial statement restatements using the Audit Analytics database. The possible 
explanation is that providing APTS facilitates auditors’ familiarity with audit clients’ tax 
strategies, contributing to more certain assessments of tax-related components than other 
components of financial statements. A recent study focuses on whether the PCAOB restrictions 
on the provision of certain types of APTS improves audit quality (Lennox, 2016). Using a 
difference-in-difference (DiD) design for the 2002 to 2009 period, Lennox (2016) finds that 
firms that reduced APTS purchases significantly owing to the restrictions are more likely to 
 
35 Castillo-Merino et al. (2020) argue that banning APTS will not likely to improve audit quality since they fail to 
find any relationship between APTS fees and audit quality measures. However, as mentioned in their study, the 
enforcement environment in Spain is weak relative to that in the U.S., and the EU regulations on the prohibition 
of NAS have not been enforced very diligently in the Spanish market. Therefore, such a weak enforcement 
environment introduces noise in their research design. For instance, the APTS fees include fees paid to both banned 
and permitted tax services, and this may offset the beneficial or detrimental effects of such services on audit quality. 
Garcia-Blandon et al. (2017), too, fail to find any relationship between the provision of APTS and discretionary 
accruals in Spain. Future research could investigate the similar research questions in other European countries with 
stronger enforcement environments, to provide more robust evidence on the effect of EU regulations. 
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have experienced accounting or tax-related restatements for the period prior to the restrictions, 
and this did not change in the post-restriction era. These results contradict the PCAOB’s (2005) 
argument that those banned APTS impair auditors’ independence. In a similar vein, Notbohm 
et al. (2015) find no significant difference for the detrimental effect of APTS on restatements 
between the pre- and post-2006 subsamples.   
The second binary audit quality factor is auditor communication through audit reports. Like 
restatements, the issuance of going concern opinions (GCOs) is a clear and direct indicator of 
audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2011). Robinson (2008) operationalizes the 
accurate issuance of GCOs prior to bankruptcy filings as a measure of high audit quality in the 
U.S., to investigate the consequences of purchasing APTS. She finds a positive relationship 
between this measure of audit quality and the level of APTS fees (i.e., knowledge spillover 
effects).36 Another audit quality indicator in terms of auditor communication is the audit report 
lag (ARL), but it is a continuous measure. Knechel and Payne (2001) document that the 
presence of APTS potentially reflects more complexity related to tax positions, which is 
associated with more audit work and a longer ARL. This result is echoed by Knechel et al. 
(2009) in a new audit production model. On the contrary, Lee et al. (2009) and Knechel and 
Sharma (2012) find significant and negative relationships between the levels of APTS fees and 
ARL in their additional tests, supporting the knowledge spillover effects. Walker and Hay (2013) 
find no association between the provision of APTS and ARL in New Zealand. Table 3.4 
provides a summary of the papers discussed in this sub-section. 
 
 
36 The dependent variable used in Robinson (2008) is different from that used in Castillo-Merino et al. (2020). As 
reviewed by Carson et al. (2013), a type II misclassification arises when the auditors did not issue GCOs to audit 
clients that filed for bankruptcy later: clear evidence of audit failure (Francis, 2011). However, the likelihood of 
issuing GCOs is a proxy for continuous audit quality (i.e., non-audit failure), given the premise that a less 
independent auditor is less likely to issue a negative report, to avoid losing clients (Krishnan, 1994). GCOs here 
refer to going concern opinions, qualified opinions, and modified opinions.  
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Table 3.4 Consequences of APTS: Binary audit quality 
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Kinney et al. 
(2004) 
This paper examines the effects of 
different types of NAS (including APTS) 
on financial statements restatements in 
the pre-SEC (2000) period. 
US: 432 restating firm-years and 512 
non-restating firm-years from 1995 to 
2000, or small sample size for matched 
sample or different specifications. 
Firms are less likely to restate financial statements when they 
purchase more tax services from incumbent auditors. The significant 
associations are driven primarily by larger registrants (i.e., over $200 
million total asset). 
Robinson (2008) This paper examines the effect of APTS 
on the likelihood of correctly issuing a 
going concern opinion prior to the 
bankruptcy filing.  
US: 209 bankrupt firms from 2001 to 
2004 including 153 firms that correctly 
received a GCO. prior to filing, and 56 
firms that did not. 
Auditors are more likely to correctly issue going-concern opinions 





This paper examines the association 
between APTS and financial statements 
restatements in a post-SOX environment.  
US: 3,888 matched pairs with/without 
general restatements from 2003 to 2005. 
259 match pairs with/without tax-
related restatements from 2003 to 2005 
using proprietary data. 
No significant association is found between APTS and general 
financial statement restatements. However, a significant negative 
association between APTS and tax-related financial statement 
restatements is documented. 
Paterson and 
Valencia (2011) 
This paper examines the association 
between the recurrence of APTS and 
financial statement restatements. 
US: 3,232 restatement observations, and 
15,087 non-restatement observations 
from 2003 to 2006.  
Recurring APTS are negatively associated with restatements. Non-
recurring APTS are not associated with restatements in the whole 
sample but are positively associated with high-concern restatements.  
Abdul Wahab et 
al. (2014) 
This paper examines the effects of types 
of NAS and their recurring nature on 
financial statements restatement in 
Malaysia. 
Malaysia: 953 firm-years from 2007 to 
2009. 
The purchase of APTS decreases the likelihood of restatements. 
Recurring APTS are negatively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of restatements. These findings hold for politically 
connected firms only.  
Notbohm et al. 
(2015) 
This paper examines the relations 
between APTS, auditor size, SEC (2006) 
regulations, and financial statements 
restatements.   
US: 33,514 firm-years including 6,795 
restating and 26,719 non-restating 
observations from 2003 to 2008. 
The authors find a negative relation between APTS and restatements. 
This relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a 
small accounting firm. The SEC (2006) restriction on certain types 
of APTS does not influence such relations.  
Lennox (2016) This paper examines whether SEC’s 
(2006) ban on certain types of APTS 
affect audit quality. 
US: 41,535 firm-years from 2002 to 
2009. 
Firms that substantially reduced their APTS purchases in the period 
around restrictions had exhibited significantly more accounting and 
tax-related restatements during the period both prior to and post the 
restrictions, suggesting no changes in audit quality for those firms 
after restrictions.  
Castillo-Merino 
et al. (2020) 
This paper examines the association 
between current and future NAS fees 
(including APTS fees) and audit quality. 
Spain: 973 firm-years from 2005 to 
2016. 
Both current and future APTS fees are not associated with a set of 
financial reporting quality measures, including restatements, 
earnings surprises, loss avoidance, and meeting or just beating 
earnings benchmarks. Current APTS fees are positively associated 
with the issuance of qualified audit opinions, whereas future APTS 
fees show a negative association.  
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3.5.1.2 Continuous audit quality 
3.5.1.2.1 Earnings quality 
Non-tax related earnings quality 
The quality of clients’ earnings is another indicator of audit quality that is widely used in the 
accounting literature, based on the assumption that high-quality auditors constrain earnings 
management (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Francis, 2011). Auditors are more likely to curtail clients’ 
opportunistic accounting practices based on the information gained from providing tax services 
(i.e., knowledge spillover effect), leading to a positive association between APTS and earnings 
quality. On the other hand, auditors tend to acquiesce in clients’ earnings management activities 
when the auditors develop strong economic bonds with their clients (i.e., impaired 
independence effects), suggesting a detrimental effect of APTS on earnings quality. Results 
from the extant literature are inconclusive, both in the U.S. and in other countries.  
Huang et al. (2007) investigate whether the lack of association between composite NAS 
fees ratio and earnings quality measures found in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) are sensitive to the 
types of NAS in the period immediately after SOX (i.e., 2003 and 2004). With respect to APTS, 
Huang et al. (2007) find weak evidence on the negative association between discretionary 
accruals and the ratio of APTS fee to total fees. They suggest that auditors may become more 
conservative when levels of APTS are high to avoid financial statement users’ perceptions of 
compromised auditor independence. Using loss avoidance as a measure of earnings quality, 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) report that APTS fees constrain clients’ propensity for 
engaging in loss-avoidance behaviour in the post-SOX era. They point out that there will be 
better communication between the audit and tax sides of audit firms during the joint provision 
of audit and APTS throughout the fiscal year (De Simone et al., 2015; Gleason & Mills, 2011), 
thereby, reducing information asymmetry and helping auditors to detect contentious issues on 
a timely basis. Therefore, it will reduce clients’ future earnings management opportunities. The 
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negative association is found to be more pronounced for large firms and firms with high tax 
and operational complexity: firm characteristics that should generate high knowledge spillover 
benefits. Dechow et al. (2010, p. 365) suggest that the use of loss avoidance as a proxy for 
earnings management is “unsubstantiated”, but the use of meeting or beating analyst forecasts 
to represent earnings management is somewhat more persuasive. Both Huang et al. (2007) and 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) fail to find any association between the absolute or relative 
magnitude of APTS fees and meeting or beating analyst forecasts. A possible explanation is 
that the provision of APTS reduces the analysts’ forecast accuracy (Francis et al., 2019) and, in 
turn, decreases the statistical power of using the meet or beat analyst forecast as a proxy for 
earnings management. Moreover, Carcello et al. (2020) do not (do) find a detrimental effect of 
APTS (audit-related services) on the likelihood of goodwill impairment. 
The findings of APTS and earnings quality research in other countries are mixed as well. 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2020) document a positive association between discretionary accruals and 
APTS in Malaysia. On the other hand, Choi et al. (2009b) find a negative relationship between 
the levels of APTS fees and earnings management in South Korea. Considering the institutional 
settings in South Korea where the book-tax conformity is high, Choi et al. (2009b) argue that 
the negative relationship between APTS fees and earnings management may not only results 
from high-quality audits, but also possibly is caused by tax avoidance purposes. However, the 
authors find either no or negative associations between APTS fees and tax avoidance measures, 
indicating that the negative association between APTS fees and earnings management is not 
driven by tax avoidance argument. Similarly, Watrin et al. (2019) find a negative association 
between the ratio of APTS fees and the volatility of abnormal accruals in Germany. However, 
Garcia-Blandon et al. (2017) fail to find any association between the provision of APTS and 
earnings quality in Spain, where the potential impaired independence effects should be clearly 
observed, owing to the lower litigation risk for Spanish auditors compared with that for U.S. 
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auditors. Also, Svanström (2013) finds no evidence of reduced discretionary accruals in 
Swedish small and medium-sized firms. 
The nontax-related earnings quality measures used in the above studies may fail to capture 
the more relevant outcome variables, i.e., tax-related consequences (reviewed in the following 
subsection). However, there is still a possibility that the two-way knowledge spillover effects 
from the audit and tax teams could increase the quality of audit clients’ overall pre-audit 
accounting information. Such ex ante high-quality accounting information could also positively 
affect most of the outcomes discussed above, which somehow rationalizes the links between 
APTS and non-tax consequences. For example, De Simone et al. (2015) argue that the extensive 
knowledge of clients’ operations gathered through providing APTS in conjunction with auditors’ 
expertise related to financial statement auditing and internal controls, enables the auditors to 
identify and remedy material internal control weaknesses (ICWs) in a timelier manner and, 
hence, improve financial reporting quality. Supporting this argument, the authors find that firms 
purchasing more APTS are less likely to disclose both tax and non-tax related ICWs, confirming 
the existence of the knowledge spillover benefits. Alternatively, Harris and Zhou (2013) 
interpret such results as suggesting that auditors are less likely to disclose discovered ICWs. Li 
et al. (2017) continue to find similar results for APTS fees after considering the ambiguity in 
auditing standards for internal control audits. Moreover, firms with high levels of APTS fees 
exhibit high future operating performances (i.e., after-tax profit margins) and reduced future 
operating risk (i.e., cash flow volatility and stock return volatility) (Ciconte et al., 2014). 
Axelton et al. (2019) also find that a high APTS fees to total assets ratio increases the power of 
discretionary changes in the deferred tax assets valuation allowance as predictors of firms’ 
future performance. Thus, such firms are more likely to issue their preliminary earnings 
announcements, voluntarily and in a timely fashion, before the audit completion date, owing to 
their increased confidence in financial statements that stems from a combination of enhanced 
90 
 
pre-audit financial reporting quality and audit efficiency (Hogan et al., 2019). However, this 
positive relationship does not hold in cases when APTS constitute a small proportion of total 
fees (Hogan et al., 2019; Legoria et al., 2017). 
 
Tax related earnings quality 
Another strand of research focuses on clients’ earnings management behaviour through tax-
related accounts: a more relevant outcome proxy than general earnings quality measures 
(Choudhary et al., 2021; Christensen et al., 2015; Cook et al., 2008; Lisic, 2014; Luo, 2019). 
Owing to the complexity of estimating tax expenses and tax reserves, managers’ discretionary 
reporting of tax accounts is difficult to evaluate and challenge by financial statement users. 
Using the difference between the actual annual effective tax rate (ETR) at year-end and the 
estimated annual ETR at the third quarter as the measure of earnings management in tax 
expense, Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms are more likely to be involved in tax expense 
earnings management if their earnings without managing tax expense would miss the analysts’ 
consensus forecasts. However, auditors are in better positions to evaluate the reasonableness of 
the tax accrual than other financial statement users and, hence, are likely to constrain such 
opportunistic tax expense management techniques.  
Using post-SOX samples spanning from 2004 to 2011, Christensen et al. (2015) find that 
auditors’ audit or tax expertise constrains tax expense earnings management. Moreover, the 
results show that firms purchasing significant amounts of tax services from their incumbent 
auditors can use fewer ‘last-chance earnings management’ techniques, irrespective of whether 
incumbent auditors have tax expertise or not. This suggests that APTS is a substitute, at least 
in part, for industry expertise in constraining earnings management through the tax accounts. 
Cook et al. (2008), on the other hand, consider the purchase of APTS as an investment in 
legitimate tax planning activities, and posit that it will be positively associated with greater 
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reductions in the third-to-fourth quarter ETR changes.37 However, they find such association 
only for firms that would miss earnings forecasts without tax expense management. Their 
findings cannot rule out the possibility that audit clients failing to meet earnings benchmarks 
without managing tax expense, can buy more APTS: a possibility that supports impaired 
independence effects. Lisic (2014) incorporates ‘audit committee effectiveness’ as a contextual 
setting to corroborate the findings of Cook et al. (2008). Lisic (2014) suggests that more 
effective audit committees are expected to have better skills in identifying cost-beneficial tax 
planning activities and, thus, the reductions in ETRs are more likely to occur if the provision of 
APTS is related to additional tax planning opportunities when audit committee effectiveness is 
high. However, Lisic (2014) fails to find support for this hypothesis. Instead, she finds that 
APTS become negatively related to the reduction in ETR, once audit committee effectiveness 
exceeds a certain threshold, highlighting the audit committee’s effective role in screening and 
monitoring APTS after the passage of the SOX.  
Another measure of pre-tax earnings management is the temporary book-tax difference 
(BTD), which is driven by the accruals process (Badertscher et al., 2009; Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010). Using a propensity-score matched sample spanning the period 2000 to 2013, Luo (2019) 
evidences that U.S. firms have relatively lower temporary BTD when they purchase APTS from 
incumbent auditors than firms that do not purchase. This is supportive of the argument that 
auditors constrain clients’ earnings management behaviour. However, Choudhary et al. (2021) 
find opposite results when utilizing tax accruals quality, a modification of working capital 
accruals quality (Choudhary et al., 2016), to measure tax-specific earnings quality. The authors 
find that a significant level of APTS fees decreases audit clients’ tax accruals quality. This is 
 
37 However, there is a stronger argument for considering the reduction in ETR as a proxy for earnings management 
rather than a legitimate tax planning investment. The construction of this measure has considered the effect of tax 
planning in the fourth quarter. Specifically, the U.S. Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 28 requires 
firms, in quarterly reports, to use their best estimate of the annual ETRs that reflects anticipated tax planning 
effects in future quarters. Thus, the reduction in the third-to-fourth quarter ETRs is used to measure unanticipated 
changes in ETRs (i.e., earnings management) as suggested by Dhaliwal et al. (2004). 
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owing to the audit team’s inappropriate evaluation of judgments made by the tax team from the 
same audit office (i.e., the self-review threat of auditor independence). However, such an 
adverse effect is fully (partially) mitigated by audit industry expertise (audit office size) and is 
concentrated in clients of greater economic importance (i.e., the self-interest threat of auditor 
independence). Carr et al. (2021) complement Choudhary et al. (2021) by finding that tax 
accrual quality increased significantly after firms reduced APTS purchases substantially 
following the SEC’s (2006) restrictions on certain types of APTS. 
 
3.5.1.2.2 Other tax-related consequences 
Tax avoidance 
Tax avoidance is used to describe activities or strategies that would reduce firms’ explicit tax 
liability (Brühne & Jacob, 2020; De Simone et al., 2020; Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). Auditors are proscribed from providing tax services for achieving aggressive 
tax positions to avoid taxes (e.g., PCAOB Rule 3522 in the U.S.). However, auditors could 
provide useful advice on tax strategies that would reduce tax liability based on their client-
specific or industry-specific expertise (Christensen et al., 2015; Lassila et al., 2010; Maydew & 
Shackelford, 2007; McGuire et al., 2012; Simunic, 1984). Such advice would not be questioned 
by the audit team and tax authorities (i.e., knowledge spillover perspective). This could be the 
reason, at least in part, why APTS could reduce tax-related restatements (Seetharaman et al., 
2011). On the other hand, however, from the impaired independence perspective, auditors are 
more (less) likely to approve (resist) clients aggressive tax strategies, because of the economic 
bonding between the two parties. Both perspectives suggest a positive relationship between the 
provision of APTS and tax avoidance. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle the ‘knowledge 
spillover’ versus ‘impairment of independence’ effects for this strand of the research.  
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Omer et al. (2006) provide some preliminary results on the relationships between the 
provision of APTS and tax avoidance. Using data from the pre-SOX periods (i.e., 2000 to 2002), 
the authors document a positive relationship between APTS fees with tax avoidance (proxied 
by reductions in current year cash ETR and one-year-ahead marginal tax rate). However, such 
tax benefits are reduced or eliminated during 2002 owing to the heightened external oversight 
pressures. Halioui et al. (2016) support Omer et al. (2006) by finding a negative association 
between the ratio of APTS fees to audit fees and annual book ETR in the post-SOX periods 
(i.e., 2008 to 2012). Correspondingly, firms tend to purchase more APTS to reduce tax expense 
when they face higher costs of using accruals to meet earnings expectations (e.g., Kubick et al., 
2020). Liu et al. (2021) show that both book and cash ETRs are less likely to increase after 
mandatory rotation of audit partners when firms have been less tax aggressive in the past, and 
are purchasing APTS from their incumbent auditors. Chyz et al. (2021) find that the reduced 
ETRs (both book and cash) are concentrated in firms purchasing more tax planning services, 
rather than more tax compliance services. The positive association between APTS and tax 
avoidance, however, may have an upper boundary beyond which the next additional tax 
planning might be too aggressive and more likely to violate PCAOB Rule 3522. This suggests 
the possibility of a nonlinear relation (Nesbitt et al., 2020). Using quantile regressions, Nesbitt 
et al. (2020) find that the statistical significance stops at the 23rd (55th) percentile of the book 
(cash) ETR, which translates into a book (cash) ETR of 16.23% (23.77%). These results are 
also corroborated by Neuman (2019) who finds that firms purchasing APTS are less likely to 
be in the lowest quintile of the distribution of cash ETR. Xu and Zheng (2020, p. 739) find that  
“…firms receiving greater net benefits from tax avoidance as they spend more on tax-related 
expenditures [APTS in this case]…However…for firms in the highest TaxFee group, the net 
benefits from tax services diminish due to significant costs incurred on tax-related services…”. 
With respect to BTD, especially the tax avoidance component, both Huang and Chang (2016) 
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and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) find no association with the provision of APTS in the 
U.S. However, Huang and Chang (2016) show that the provision of APTS can indirectly affect 
tax avoidance by mitigating the positive association between tax related ICWs and permanent 
BTD. 
Lassila et al. (2010) suggest that firms’ decision to dismiss their incumbent auditors as tax 
services providers is influenced by a trade-off between the benefits and costs of such decisions. 
Cook et al. (2020) extend this line of research by investigating whether the audit clients’ tax 
avoidance (or tax savings) behaviour is affected by their decisions to dismiss or substantially 
reduce the purchase of APTS during the period 2002 to 2005. They find that such decisions are 
related positively to the current-year book and cash ETR and related negatively to discretionary 
permanent BTD, implying a tax cost (i.e., declined tax avoidance benefits) of avoiding the 
perception of impaired independence.38 Furthermore, they find that these tax costs are larger 
when the outgoing tax service providers are tax-specific industry experts, and such costs are 
short-lived as the decline in tax avoidance lasted for only one year. McGuire et al. (2012) 
propose and find significant associations between auditors’ tax expertise and clients’ short-term 
tax avoidance measures (both less and more aggressive avoidance measures). However, for 
clients appointing auditors with both audit and tax expertise, the association becomes confined 
to less aggressive measures only.   
Prior studies examining the impacts of APTS on short-term tax avoidance in countries 
outside the U.S. are relatively scarce. Choi et al. (2009b) fail to find a relation between APTS 
fees and abnormal total BTD in South Korea, which is consistent with Krishnan and 
Visvanathan’s (2011) finding in the U.S. Similarly, Garcia-Blandon et al. (2021) find neither 
 
38 There are two possible reasons for Cook et al.’s (2020) findings. When a firm switches to a new tax service 
provider other than its incumbent auditor, the succeeding tax service provider may lack familiarity with the client’s 
existing tax planning or the expertise to generate new tax-avoidance opportunities. When a firm reduces its 
purchase of APTS substantially, on the other hand, the remaining tax services may be for tax-compliance purposes 
only, rather than for tax-planning purposes that would increase tax avoidance.  
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the provision nor the levels of APTS fees are associated significantly with tax avoidance in 
Spain. Specific to the Germany setting, Watrin et al. (2019) state that German auditors may be 
more conservative when providing tax services to their audit clients, in response to the higher 
litigation, reputation, or restatement risks in Germany compared with those faced by the U.S. 
auditors.39 Consistent with this argument, the authors document a negative association between 
APTS fees ratio, and both short and long-term tax avoidance. Makni et al. (2020) find a weak 
positive relation between the magnitude of APTS fees relative to total auditor fees and listed 
firms’ use of tax havens to avoid tax in Canada.  
Because of the large year-to-year variations in annual ETR, prior studies also suggest using 
the long-term version of ETR to measure tax avoidance behaviour (Dyreng et al., 2008; Omer 
et al., 2006). Existing U.S. studies generally support the negative relationships between the 
provision of APTS (or levels of APTS fees) and long-term ETRs (Hogan & Noga, 2015; 
Huseynov & Klamm, 2012), except for one early study that did not find any significant relation 
(Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2011). Also, such relations are moderated by corporate social 
responsibility performance (Huseynov & Klamm, 2012) and the decision to reduce or terminate 
purchasing APTS for a short period (Hogan & Noga, 2015). Although Hogan and Noga (2015) 
support Cook et al.’s (2020) finding that the termination or substantial reduction in APTS 
purchasing imposes a significant cost on audit clients immediately (i.e., more cash tax paid), 
the effects persist for the long run, rather than just for one year as found in Cook et al. (2020). 
 
39 Unlike in the U.S. setting, where, since 2006, firms are required to recognize and disclose a reserve named 
“unrecognized tax benefit” (UTB) for potentially additional tax payment after a tax audit, the IFRS Interpretations 
Committee published IFRIC 23 in 2017 requiring public firms to recognize and report tax reserves. The first draft 
of IFRIC 23 was published in October 2015, passed and issued in Jun 2017, and would be effective for annual 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019. Therefore, the EU member states (including Germany) just started 
to work on similar tasks in 2015 following the guidelines and requirements of the IFRIC 23. Thus, auditors in the 
EU may face higher risks of financial statements restatements and auditor liabilities brought by the tax 
uncertainties, in comparison to U.S. auditors. Because of the recent emergence of IFRIC 23, future studies could 
explore the effects of this regulation on the provision of APTS in countries adopting IFRS, when sufficient 
observations become available to researchers. 
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Instead of focusing on tax minimization captured by low ETRs, researchers also use ETR 
volatility (a measure that captures tax sustainability or tax risk) to explore the effect of APTS 
(e.g., Abernathy et al., 2019; Chyz et al., 2021; Neuman, 2019; Watrin et al., 2019). Watrin et 
al. (2019) find that APTS fees are positively related to the sustainability of reported tax expense 
(book ETR) in the financial statements, but not to the sustainability of cash taxes paid (cash 
ETR) in Germany. However, Francis et al. (2019) find opposite results that the levels of APTS 
fees increase the book ETR volatility; and Neuman (2019) and Chen et al. (2021) find that firms 
obtaining APTS tend to have more sustainable cash ETR in the U.S. Chyz et al. (2021) 
document that tax planning services are related to both sustainable book and cash ETR, whilst 
tax compliance services do not have any impact. These conflicting findings may result from 
different research design and sample selection approaches used in specific papers. For example, 
the measurement of ETR volatility varies across different papers. Neuman (2019) and Watrin 
et al. (2019) utilize past and future ETRs, respectively, whereas Francis et al. (2019) use ETR 
that span across past and future periods.  
 
Tax reserves (UTBs) 
As noted in footnote 39, there has not been any specific guidelines and disclosure requirements 
about the recognition of UTB before 2006, which has led to diverse accounting practices for 
recording UTB. From a knowledge spillover perspective, auditors providing tax services to 
their clients would have done better reporting of UTB in the pre-2006 period. Consistent with 
this argument, Gleason and Mills (2011) find that firms that purchased APTS between 2000 
and 2002 recorded UTB for the IRS assessments adequately and accurately, whilst firms not 
purchasing APTS did not.  
To reduce the inconsistency of recording UTBs, the U.S. regulators provided clearer 
guidance and requirements to publicly listed firms through FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 
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48, now ASC 740-10-25), which was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 
2006 (FASB, 2006). FIN 48 standardizes the recognition, measurement, and disclosure of UTB. 
Accordingly, whether the information advantages enjoyed by auditors providing both audit and 
tax services, increased or decreased after the enactment of FIN 48, required empirical 
investigation. Gleason et al. (2018) extend Gleason and Mills (2011) by using a relatively long 
sample period, including both the pre-FIN (2003 to 2007) and the post-FIN 48 (2008 to 2014) 
periods, to compare the adequacy and accuracy of UTBs in those two sample groups. In line 
with Gleason and Mills (2011), Gleason et al. (2018) find that firms procuring substantial tax 
services from the incumbent auditors provided more adequate UTBs than firms that used little 
tax services in the pre-FIN 48 periods. However, such knowledge spillover benefit is no longer 
existent in the post-FIN 48 period, indicating an overall improvement in cumulative auditor 
knowledge about clients’ UTB after FIN 48, irrespective of the level of APTS. However, 
Ciconte et al. (2016) complement Gleason et al. (2018) by finding that, in the post-FIN 48 
period, firms accurately recorded UTBs when they purchased APTS from their auditors with 
both tax and audit expertise. Klassen et al. (2016) examine how the identity of the firm’s tax 
compliance services providers affects firms’ tax aggressiveness, as proxied by the current-year 
increase in the UTBs, in the post FIN 48 sample periods. Klassen et al. (2016) find that, 
although the overall APTS fees are associated with tax aggressiveness, firms claim less 
aggressive tax positions when hiring incumbent auditors as tax returns preparer than do those 
using others. This is consistent with auditors being more sensitive to having tax positions 
overturned by tax authorities when providing both audit and tax services than when they provide 






3.5.1.3 Continuous audit quality: Perception studies 
In the previous sections, I reviewed empirical studies on the consequences of APTS on earnings 
quality in general, and on tax-related earnings quality measures, with mixed findings. Studies 
summarized in the preceding sections also reveal that firms voluntarily dismiss or significantly 
reduce the purchase of APTS to avoid potentially negative reactions from market participants. 
Research on APTS, therefore, also examines the market perception of auditor provision of both 
audit and tax services. In this sub-section, I review this strand of the literature, and split it into 
archival and non-archival studies. Overall, both categories of study show mixed perceptions 
regarding the provision and magnitude of APTS. 
 
Archival studies 
Opposing the SEC’s (2002, 2003) argument that investors would view APTS more positively 
than the other types of NAS, Mishra et al. (2005) find that shareholders view audit related NAS 
but not APTS and other NAS, as beneficial. They used auditor ratification voting as a proxy for 
perception of audit quality. Similarly, Hermanson et al. (2019) find that firms with relatively 
high APTS fees ratios are more likely to receive shareholder proposals seeking to restrict NAS 
purchases from 2001 to 2004. However, the uncertainty associated with the regulatory 
environment around the passage of the SOX in conjunction with the subsequent ban on certain 
types of APTS may have driven these findings. Thus, whether such relations exist in the current 
environment is worthy of investigation. Gal-Or et al. (2016) expand Mishra et al. (2005) by 
showing that an audit committee is more likely to reduce the purchase of APTS in the year 
following their election to alleviate the concerns over their effectiveness when shareholders are 
dissatisfied with the audit committee and the auditors as expressed through low votes. Such 
reductions in APTS fee ratios are significant only among firms having non-staggered boards, 
where all board members, including audit committee members, need to be re-elected annually. 
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Alsadoun et al. (2018) find that clients providing high APTS revenues to auditors at the office 
level, also incur high costs of equity capital in the post-SOX era. This finding supports investors’ 
perceptions of high APTS as compromising auditor independence. Moreover, such negative 
perceptions are exacerbated by the presence of large UTB, especially when those uncertain tax 
positions are promoted by auditors with tax or overall industry expertise. This is because such 
large UTB are more likely to attract regulatory scrutiny, and are more likely to be challenged 
by the tax authorities: actions that will reduce future cash flows and have an adverse effect on 
the cost of capital. 
However, studies also find support for positive market perceptions of firms procuring high 
APTS. In contrast to Alsadoun et al. (2018), Nam and Ronen (2012) find that investors require 
lower returns using pre-SOX data (i.e., 2001 to 2003), suggesting that investors perceive the 
provision of APTS favourably. Also, the provision of APTS results in high value relevance of 
earnings (Krishnan et al., 2013), low cost of debt capital (Fortin & Pittman, 2008), and high 
earnings response coefficients (ERCs) (Chen et al., 2019; Eilifsen et al., 2018). 
Using matched observations on the ETR in the supplemental analysis, Krishnan et al. (2013) 
also show that the positive effects of the APTS fees ratio on the value-relevance of earnings are 
not attributable mainly to the tax savings associated with more APTS, but instead, to the 
enhanced financial reporting quality resulting from knowledge spillover effects. Chen et al. 
(2019b) utilize quarterly ERCs as the proxy for investors’ perception, and find results 
supporting Krishnan et al. (2013). In addition, the results are driven by firms with high levels 
of accruals and by smaller firms, which have greater earnings uncertainty, higher information 
asymmetry and, hence, greater expectation of the benefits of knowledge spillover. Chen et al. 
(2019b) also show that the firms’ tax strategies play a role in investors’ perceptions, as investors 
place higher confidence in the UTBs supported by incumbent auditors, compared with UTBs 
prepared by internal staff or external non-auditors (e.g., other audit firms or law firms). The 
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contrasting finding vis-a-vis Alsadoun et al. (2018), might relate to high measurement 
consensus and low measurement error associated with ERCs (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) rather 
than to the cost of capital proxies.  
Eilifsen et al. (2018) document similar results for Germany using annual ERCs, but such 
results are found only for certain sub-periods in their sample. Specifically, the market 
perception was found to be negative/insignificant in the pre and during the global financial 
crisis (GFC) regime, but became positive in the post GFC period (2010 to 2015). They show 
that the proportion of NAS fees to total fees paid to auditors dropped from 31.5% before the 
GFC to 26.1% after the GFC, with all three component fees’ percentages (i.e. audit-related, 
APTS, and other NAS) having dropped as well. They suggest that both the criticism of the 
auditing profession during the GFC and the EU-wide proposed restrictions on NAS encourage 
firms’ managers to reduce the purchase of NAS with higher risks to auditor independence, in 
order to avoid future losses. Such reductions in NAS purchase may have been favourably 
perceived by investors, thereby, enhancing investors perception of auditor independence. Their 
findings are generally consistent with prior U.S. studies (Chen et al., 2019b; Krishnan et al., 
2013), but the latter two studies did not differentiate the results using different sample periods. 
The lower level of temporary BTD resulting from the provision of APTS might lead to more 
persistent future earnings: a catalyst for positive market perception (Luo, 2019).  
Finally, Habib and Hasan (2016) document a negative relation between APTS fees and 
stock price crash risk and, further, provide two possible channels through which APTS could 
affect crash risk. They argue that the provision of APTS reduces earnings management through 
tax expense and clients’ tax avoidance behaviour and, thus, discourages managers from 
hoarding bad news via such accounts. This, in turn, reduces crash risk. However, the authors 
do not test their arguments directly, but just show that the negative associations between APTS 
fees and stock price crash risk are stronger when firms exhibit higher third-to-fourth quarters 
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ETR changes and more tax avoidance. However, prior literature also finds that APTS promote 
client tax avoidance and earnings management through tax expenses (e.g., Cook et al., 2008; 
Klassen et al., 2016; Lisic, 2014; McGuire et al., 2012). It may be that the provision of APTS 
increases the credibility of those tax accounts and then hinders managers’ ability to conceal bad 
news in such accounts. Nevertheless, both explanations support the knowledge spillover effect.  
The studies reviewed above focus on the effects of APTS on shareholders’ perceptions. 
However, such a narrow focus on shareholders alone may provide a biased picture of the 
perceptions regarding APTS. To alleviate such concern, Fortin and Pittman (2008) investigate 
the perceptions of bondholders by testing the link between the APTS fees ratio and the cost of 
newly issued debts. Using 694 public debts newly issued from January 1, 2001 to December 
31, 2005, they find that firms procuring proportionately more APTS enjoy lower yield spreads 
when issuing new debts, thereby, supporting the knowledge spillover argument. Francis et al. 
(2019) use the levels of APTS fees as proxies for firms’ tax planning activities and examine 
whether such activities affect analysts’ forecast accuracy. They argue and find that tax planning 
negatively affects analysts’ forecast accuracy because such tax planning strategies complicate 
the accurate processing of earnings and tax expenses. However, the authors also suggest that 
their findings for APTS fees may be generalized to other tax planning services providers (e.g., 
external non-auditors and internal tax professional staff). Therefore, the reduced accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts is specific to overall tax planning activities, rather than subject to auditor-
provided tax planning activities. It is worth noting that the differences between firms’ actual 
earnings and analysts’ inaccurate forecasts (i.e., earnings surprise) may be viewed differently 
by investors based on the tax planning services providers’ identity. For instance, as I discussed 
above, investors perceive the earnings surprises positively when firms hire their incumbent 
auditors for tax services (Chen et al., 2019b). In other words, although the APTS could 
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influence analysts’ forecast accuracy negatively, such inaccuracy has less influence on 
investors’ decisions compared with tax services provided by other providers. 
 
Non-Archival studies 
In addition to the archival studies reviewed above, I also review prior studies using non-archival 
approaches (either surveys or experiments) to examine participants’ perceptions of APTS 
provision. I find that there are differences in perceived auditor quality across participant groups, 
which is not surprising, given that their interests, their expertise in accounting and auditing, and 
their levels of knowledge differ widely (e.g., Dart, 2011; van Liempd et al., 2019; Wines, 2012). 
For instance, Wines (2012) requests each of his participants to use 22 semantic scales for 
assessing auditor independence under certain scenarios and finds that the perceptions of auditor 
independence in relation to APTS vary with subject groups. Specifically, by comparison with 
the auditors, Australian financial report preparers and users have more negative perceptions of 
APTS. 
Using a survey approach, Pany and Reckers (1983) find that corporate directors are more 
likely to approve the purchase of tax preparation and acquisition review services, than the 
purchase of system design services. In addition, if auditors do engage in these services, auditor 
independence is perceived as being lowest when system design services are being provided, 
compared with the other two service types. Similarly, Meuwissen and Quick (2019) investigate 
the perceptions of German supervisory board members regarding auditor independence when 
three types of NAS are provided: tax compliance services (i.e., APTS); accounting information 
system consulting; and human resource consulting. Although all three types of NAS are 
perceived as impairing auditor independence, the provision of APTS is found to be relatively 
less harmful than the others. In a similar vein, using a survey approach among UK institutional 
investors, Dart (2011) provides descriptive evidence that provision of APTS is considered less 
likely to impair auditor independence compared with provision of other types of NAS. In sum, 
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these studies suggest that APTS are perceived to be less harmful than other types of NAS by 
corporate insiders and outsiders. 
Focusing on APTS, non-archival evidence is rather mixed. Solomon et al. (2005) use third-
year law students as participants, and find they exhibit greater confidence in earnings quality 
when the auditor provides audit services only: evidence consistent with Mishra et al. (2005) 
and Hermanson et al. (2019). Accordingly, they are more willing to invest in firms that do not 
purchase substantial amounts of APTS. In Austria, Aschauer and Quick (2018) find that both 
auditor independence in appearance, and audit quality, are perceived to be low by Austrian 
investment consultants when auditor provision of tax services is substantial (i.e., 60% of total 
audit fees). Although the provision of APTS is not associated with auditor 
objectivity/independence in general (Iyer & Reckers, 2007), both Iyer and Reckers (2007) and 
Favere-Marchesi (2006) find that auditors’ objectivity (proxied by the initial assessment of 
fraud risk or material misstatement) is significantly and negatively influenced by the provision 
of APTS, where there are certain “red flags” (e.g., weak management integrity) in audit clients’ 
information. That is, auditors report a lower risk assessment when they provide APTS to their 
audit clients, compared with their counterparts who do not provide APTS.\ 
On the other hand, some prior studies find positive effects (or no effect) of the provision of 
APTS on perceived auditor independence. For instance, Law (2010) finds that both Big 4 
auditors and financial analysts perceive the provision of APTS as a value-added service to audit 
clients in Hong Kong. Furthermore, although APTS are the most commonly purchased NAS in 
Swedish small and medium-sized firms (Svanström & Sundgren, 2012), Svanström (2013) 
finds no evidence of impaired auditor independence in such firms, in terms of both perceived 
and actual audit quality. Furthermore, CEOs and CFOs think the provision of APTS could 
improve the accounting and audit quality of their firms. Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009) 
provide survey evidence that German private investors perceive the provision APTS 
unfavourably. However, a later experimental study conducted by the same authors (i.e., Quick 
& Warming-Rasmussen, 2015) finds no significant negative perception of APTS, after 
controlling for auditor and investor characteristics. 
Thornton and Shaub (2013) conduct experiments among 168 U.S. jurors and find that 
perceived audit quality is low when auditors provide aggressive tax planning services to audit 
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clients. However, perceived audit quality is not affected by providing tax compliance services 
to audit clients. Moreover, van Liempd et al. (2019) is the only study investigating the external 
stakeholders’ perceptions of APTS in an EU country (i.e., Denmark) after the implementation 
of EU Regulation (2014). The authors surveyed five types of Danish external stakeholders (i.e., 
lawyers, bank loan officers, financial analysts, private shareholders, and journalists) in 2016, 
and asked for their opinions on the provision of 38 different types of NAS. Among those NAS, 
eight types are related to tax services. In general, all eight types of APTS are perceived as 
problematic. However, ‘preparing tax forms’ and ‘support regarding tax inspections’ (i.e., two 
types of tax compliance services) do not impact nearly as much on perceived auditor 
independence as the provision of other types of APTS. Furthermore, these negative perceptions 
of APTS are driven mostly by lawyers and financial analysts. 
 
3.5.2 Input-based factors  
In Section 3.5.1, I have discussed the effects of APTS on output-based measures, which could 
be used to infer audit quality. DeFond and Zhang (2014) also find that audit clients could choose 
audit quality based on some observable inputs, such as auditor-specific characteristics (e.g., 
auditor size and industry specialization) and audit-client contracting features (e.g., audit fees).  
Extant APTS literature has examined the association between APTS and audit fees, but the 
results are inconclusive as well. Audit fees could measure the audit effort levels, given the 
intuition that more audit efforts increase audit quality. However, over and above the audit effort 
exerted by auditors, audit fees are also influenced by the unit cost of audit effort and the risk 
premium charged to cover future losses (Houston et al., 2005; Pratt & Stice, 1994; Simunic, 
1980). Thus, audit fees could be a noisy measure of auditor quality in the context of APTS for 
at least two reasons. First, the knowledge spillover effects of providing APTS facilitate auditors’ 
assessments of clients’ internal control, and tax-related, or non-tax related accounts (e.g., De 
Simone et al., 2015), reducing the required audit effort, and the high-quality pre-audit financial 
information decreases the auditors’ concerns about future losses. Also, the economies of scope 
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achieved by the simultaneous provision of NAS and audit services may reduce the unit cost of 
audit effort (Arruñada, 1999). These factors suggest that the provision of APTS would reduce 
audit fees without impairing audit quality. Second, audit fees could be increased either because 
the reduced unit cost of both audit and NAS encourages clients to buy more services from 
incumbent auditors (Simunic, 1984), or because of the cross-selling behaviour of auditors 
(Halperin & Lai, 2015). In these cases, the provision of APTS would increase audit fees without 
improving audit quality. As a result, researchers should interpret previous papers examining the 
relations between APTS and audit fees with caution. 
Early studies using proprietary data, or data collected through surveys, generally find a 
positive association between audit fees and APTS fees in both the U.S. (e.g., Palmrose, 1986) 
and the UK (Ezzamel et al., 2002). Palmrose (1986) is the first study to investigate the effects 
of different types of NAS on audit fees. She decomposes total NAS into three categories: tax, 
accounting-related, and nonaccounting services. Her results show a significantly positive 
relationship between audit fees and APTS fees, especially for small clients. Later, Davis et al. 
(1993) test and attribute this audit fee premium resulting from tax services to increased audit 
effort, proxied by audit hours. However, O’Keefe et al. (1994) fail to find any evidence that the 
APTS fees ratio is related to either audit hours or audit fees. From a cross-selling perspective, 
Halperin and Lai (2015) use simultaneous equations to test whether APTS fees and audit fees 
are jointly determined. Their results suggest that the demand for tax services gives rise to a 
higher demand for audit services and vice versa (cross-selling behaviour). Alexander and Hay 
(2013) and Klumpes et al. (2016) test the associations between APTS fees and audit fees in 
New Zealand and the UK, respectively. While Alexander and Hay (2013) find that APTS fees 
are positively associated with audit fees, Klumpes et al. (2016) find negative associations 
between these two types of fees in the UK life insurance industry. The former suggests that 
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there is no issue of impaired independence, whereas the latter suggests the opposite. Fleischer 
and Goettsche (2012) also find a positive relation between these fees in the German context.  
Instead of testing the associations between the provision of APTS and audit fees directly, 
the research could examine the moderating effects of APTS on the relationships between some 
variables and audit fees. Prior auditing and taxation studies show that auditors charge higher 
audit fees for clients with high levels of tax aggressiveness (Donohoe & Knechel, 2014) and 
with high tax risk (Abernathy et al., 2019). However, both studies document that such risk 
premiums charged by auditors are significantly lower when audit clients also purchase a 
material level of APTS. Consistent with my arguments suggesting that the provision of APTS 
may reduce audit fees without impairing audit quality, both studies attribute the reduced audit 
fees to synergies between the tax and audit teams. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) also find that 
auditors’ tax or overall industry expertise could provide high-quality audits to clients regardless 
of whether clients hire their incumbent auditors for tax services, which increase the audit fees, 
especially for tax-aggressive clients. Surprisingly, Abernathy et al. (2019) show that the 
provision of APTS reduces approximately 48% to 68% of the audit fee premiums associated 
with different tax risk measures, which could be a huge benefit of hiring incumbent auditors as 
tax service providers. 
 
3.5.3 Section summary 
In this sub-section, I reviewed studies related to the consequences of APTS. I categorized these 
studies into five themes: (1) misstatement and auditor communication; (2) earnings quality 
(both tax and non-tax related); (3) tax avoidance and tax reserves; (4) market perceptions of 
APTS; and (5) APTS and input-based audit quality proxy. In general, the APTS literature in the 
U.S. supports the knowledge spillover effect with some exceptions. However, the findings in 
the non-U.S. settings are mixed, a finding that may be attributed to diverse institutional factors 
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in different countries. The market perceptions of APTS in both the U.S. and non-U.S. settings 
seem to suggest that market participants value APTS in uncertain periods negatively and value 
APTS in more stable periods positively. Non-archival studies suggest that the perceptions of 
APTS vary with stakeholder groups and with the type of APTS provided. Table 3.5 provides a 





Table 3.5 Consequence of APTS: Continuous audit quality 
Panel A: Earnings quality 
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Huang et al. (2007) This paper examines the associations 
between the types of NAS (including 
APTS) and earnings quality measures. 
US: 6,891 firm-years from 2003 
to 2004.  
Weak evidence between lower discretionary accruals and higher 
APTS ratio. No evidence is found between APTS and meeting or 
beating earnings benchmark. 
Cook et al. (2008) This paper examines the effects of APTS 
fees on earnings management using 
changes in ETRs between the third and 
fourth quarters. 
US: 1,802 firm-years from 2000 
to 2004. 
For firms that would miss their earnings forecasts without tax expense 
management, the levels of APTS fees are positively associated with 
the reductions in third-to-fourth quarters ETRs changes. The findings 
hold for both the pre- and post-SOX periods.  
Choi et al. (2009b) This paper examines the associations 
between APTS, earning quality, and tax 
avoidance.  
South Korea: 8,794 firm-years 
or less from 2000 to 2006. 
APTS fees are negatively associated with discretionary accruals and 
with tax avoidance measures. Tax avoidance result reveals that APTS 
fees are negatively associated with the total book-tax difference 
(BTD) but not associated with abnormal total BTD. 
Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2011) 
This paper examines whether APTS fees 
mitigate earnings management and tax 
avoidance. 
US: 2,935 firm-years for 
earnings management model 
and 6,299 firm-years for tax 
avoidance model from 2000 to 
2007. 
APTS fees mitigate clients’ loss avoidance behaviour, particularly in 
the post-SOX era, for larger firms, and for firms with high tax and 
operational complexity. APTS fees are not associated with tax 
avoidance. 
Svanström (2013) This paper examines the relationship 
between audit quality and the provision of 
NAS (and its types). 
Sweden: 420 private firms in 
2005. 
The provision of APTS has no association with discretionary accruals.  
Lisic (2014) This paper examines whether the 
association between APTS and earnings 
management in tax expense varies with 
audit committee effectiveness.  
US: 799 observations from S&P 
1500 companies with non-zero 
$APTS in 2003. 
APTS fees increase (decrease) earnings management in tax expense 
for firms with less (more) effective audit committees. Overall, APTS 
fees reduce earnings management in tax expense as audit committee 
effectiveness increases. 
Christensen et al. 
(2015) 
This paper examines the associations 
between audit firm expertise, APTS, and 
earnings management through the tax 
accounts. 
US: 2,905 firm-years from 2004 
to 2011. 
Firms audited by an audit firm with either national audit or tax 
expertise do not appear to manage tax expense. When firms audited 
by neither an audit nor a tax expert, firms purchasing significant 
amount of APTS also do not appear to manage tax expense. 
Garcia-Blandon et 
al. (2017) 
This paper examines whether the 
provision of NAS (including APTS) is 
related to earnings quality. 
Spain: 813 firm-years from 
2005 to 2013. 
The provision of APTS is not associated with discretionary accruals.  
Luo (2019) This paper examines the effects of APTS 
on temporary BTD and on investors’ 
mispricing of temporary BTD. 
US: 8,702 or less matched firm-
years from 2000 to 2013. 
Firms that have purchased APTS have significantly lower levels of 
temporary BTD than firms that have not. Investors’ mispricing of 
temporary BTD is reduced in the presence of APTS.  
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Abdul Wahab et al. 
(2020) 
This paper examines the relationship 
between the recurrence and types of NAS 
and accruals quality. 
Malaysia: 1,117 firm-years 
from 2009 to 2011. 
Both APTS fees ratio and recurring APTS fess ratio decrease accruals 
quality. 
Carr et al. (2021) This paper examines whether SEC’s 
(2006) ban on certain types of APTS 
affects tax accrual quality. 
US: 4,696 or fewer matched 
firm-years from 2003 to 2009. 
Firms that substantially reduced their APTS purchases owing to the 
new restrictions had exhibited significantly lower tax accrual quality 
during the pre-regulation period, but such firms experienced a greater 
improvement in tax accrual quality after the regulation. However, 
these effects are concentrated in firms with high tax-aggressiveness in 
the pre-regulation period. In addition, such firms recorded more 
adequate tax reserves after the regulation. 
Panel B: Pure tax-related consequences  
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Gleason and Mills 
(2011) 
This paper examines whether APTS 
improve the estimate of tax reserves. 
US: 497 firm-years from 2000 
to 2002. 
Firms that purchase APTS make adequate and accurate reserves to 
defend IRS disputes, supporting the knowledge spillover effects. 
However, firms that do not purchase APTS require additional tax 
reserves for IRS disputes. 
McGuire et al. 
(2012) 
This paper examines the association 
between auditors’ tax-specific industry 
expertise and tax avoidance.  
US: 8,025 firm-years with non-
zero APTS fees from 2002 to 
2009. 
Firms purchasing APTS engage in greater tax avoidance (both more 
and less aggressive avoidance measures) when their auditors are tax 
experts. Auditors’ overall expertise (both audit and tax) is associated 
with greater tax avoidance, but such associations exist only when 
using book and cash ETRs as tax avoidance measures.  
Huseynov and 
Klamm (2012) 
This paper examines the role of CSR in 
the relationship between APTS and tax 
avoidance. 
US: 2,237 S&P500 firm-years 
with non-zero APTS fees from 
2000 to 2008. 
In general, the use of APTS reduces both long-term book ETR and 
cash ETR. The negative association is stronger for cash ETR for firms 
with strong governance. The negative associations between APTS and 
ETRs are stronger for firms that have diversity concerns. The 
associations between APTS and ETRs turn to become positive for 
firms that have community concerns. 
Hogan and Noga 
(2015) 
This paper examines the association 
between APTS and long-term tax 
avoidance. 
US: 4,173 firm-years from 2003 
to 2009. 
APTS fees are negatively and significantly related to cash taxes paid 
(i.e., cash ETR) over the long run. A part of these tax savings is lost 
for firms that repurchase APTS after a one-year break. 
Klassen et al. 
(2016) 
This paper examines the link between the 
tax preparer type and the aggressiveness 
of the corporation’s tax positions. 
US: 1,533 firm-years from 2008 
and 2009. (804 firms in 2008 
and 729 firms in 2009). 
Tax returns prepared by internal tax departments and external non-
auditors report more aggressive tax positions than auditor-prepared 
returns. Big 4 tax preparers are linked to less tax aggressiveness when 
they are the auditors than when they are not the auditors. APTS are 




Halioui et al. (2016) This paper examines the impact of APTS 
on the level of tax aggressiveness. 
US: 471 firm-years listed on the 
NASDAQ 100 from 2008 to 
2012. 
APTS has a positive relationship with tax aggressiveness (lower book 
ETR).  
Huang and Chang 
(2016) 
This paper examines the moderation 
effect of APTS on the relation between 
tax-related internal control weakness 
(ICW) and BTD. 
US: 197 firm-years with tax-
related ICW and matched firms 
without tax-related ICW from 
2005 to 2011. 
The purchase of APTS mitigates the positive relation between tax 
ICW and permanent BTD, where has no effect on the relation between 
tax ICW and temporary BTD. 
Gleason et al. 
(2018) 
This paper examines the effects of FIN 48 
and APTS on the adequacy and accuracy 
of tax reserves (UTBs). 
US: 2,798 firm-years, from 
2003 to 2014. 
Prior to FIN 48, firms that purchase a significant amount of APTS are 
adequately reserved, whereas firms that do not purchase a significant 
amount of APTS are under-reserved for IRS assessments. Post FIN 
48, there is no significant difference between the adequacy of reserves 
for high and low APTS purchase firms. APTS do not improve the 
accuracy of UTBs in both pre- and post-FIN 48 periods. 
Watrin et al. (2019) This paper examines the effects of APTS 
on tax avoidance and tax uncertainty. 
Germany: 829 firm-years from 
2009 to 2014. 
APTS are negatively and significantly associated with tax avoidance. 
Specifically, firms purchasing more APTS have higher both annual 
and long-run book ETR and cash ETR and have lower permanent 
BTD. The volatility of the book ETRs decreases with more APTS, 
i.e., the tax strategies are more sustainable (i.e., less uncertain). APTS 
are positively related to audit quality (as measured by the lower 
volatility of discretionary accruals). 
Cook et al. (2020) This paper examines the effects of firms’ 
decision to dismiss or significantly reduce 
the using of APTS on tax avoidance. 
US: 7,976 firm-years from 2002 
to 2005. 
Book and cash ETR significantly increase after terminating or 
substantially reducing APTS, whereas discretionary permanent BTD 
declines significantly. Such effects persist for only one year, 
suggesting that these effects are short-lived. Such effects are stronger 
when outgoing APTS providers are tax experts. 
Chyz et al. (2021) This paper examines the different effects 
of tax compliance and tax planning 
services on tax avoidance and tax risk. 
U.S.: 8,122 or fewer firm-years 
for tax avoidance tests, and 
6,509 or fewer firm-years for 
tax risk tests over fiscal years 
2007 to 2012. 
Tax planning services are positively associated with tax avoidance 
and negatively associated with tax risk, whereas tax compliance 
services are associated with neither tax avoidance nor tax risk. Tax 
avoidance results are more pronounced for firms having auditors with 
more tax expertise and long tenure, as well as for firms with higher 
tax and operational complexity. Tax avoidance results hold only when 
firms also purchase tax compliance services from their auditors.  
Garcia-Blandon et 
al. (2021) 
The paper examines the relationship 
between APTS and tax avoidance 
strategies.  
Spain: 495 firm-years from 
2008 to 2016. 
None of APTS measures is significantly associated with both book 
ETR and cash ETR. 
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Liu et al. (2021) This paper examines the impact of 
mandatory audit partner rotation on tax 
avoidance and the moderating role of 
APTS. 
U.S.: 5,137 firm-years from 
2016 to July 2019. 
Firms exhibit less increase in both book and cash ETRs after an audit 
partner rotation if they are less tax aggressive in the past and 
purchasing APTS from their incumbent auditors. 
Panel C: Perceived audit quality (capital market consequences) 
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Mishra et al. (2005) This paper examines the investors’ 
perceptions of the types of NAS in terms 
of auditor ratification voting. 
US: 248 of the S&P1500 firms 
in 2003. 
The likelihood of investors voting against ratification of the auditor is 
positively associated with APTS fees ratio. 
Fortin and Pittman 
(2008) 
This paper examines the association 
between APTS and corporate debt pricing 
(i.e., cost of debt). 
US: 694 public debt issues from 
2001 to 2005. 
 
 
Firms that pay proportionately more APTS fees enjoy lower cost of 
debt (i.e., lower yield spreads). This effect is stronger for newly debts 
issued by firms with high information asymmetry risk (i.e., shorter 
maturity and financial firms). 
Krishnan et al. 
(2013) 
This paper examines investors’ perception 
of APTS, as reflected in the value 
relevance of earnings. 
US: 27,919 firm-years from 
2000 to 2008. 
The value-relevance of earnings is increasing in the ratio of APTS 
fees over total fees. For firms that dismiss APTS, the value-relevance 
of earnings is lower in the year of dismissal/switch. 
Habib and Hasan 
(2016) 
This paper examines (1) whether APTS 
affect stock price crash risk and (2) the 
factors mediating and moderating such 
effects.  
US: 21,950 firm-years or less 
from 2002 to 2012. 
APTS attenuate crash risk by constraining both earnings management 
in tax expenses and tax avoidance. APTS constrain tax avoidance and, 
hence, reduce crash risk for firms following innovator business 
strategies. 
Alsadoun et al. 
(2018) 
This paper examines the investors’ 
perception of APTS, as reflected in the 
cost of equity capital. 
US: 11,329 firm-years with Big 
4 auditors and non-zero APTS 
fees from 2003 to 2012. 
Investors demand higher returns from firms that are responsible for 
more APTS revenue for their auditors’ offices in the post-SOX era. 
Investors’ concerns about APTS are exacerbated by the presence of 
large UTB (high tax risk), especially when such uncertain tax 
positions are promoted by auditors with tax or overall expertise.  
Eilifsen et al. (2018) This paper examines the investors’ 
perception of NAS and its types, as 
reflected in the long-term earnings 
response coefficients (ERCs). 
Germany: 2,723 firm-years, 
from 2005 to 2015. 769 are pre-
crisis, 504 are during crisis, 
1,450 are post-crisis. 
Ratio of APTS to total fees is not significantly associated with ERCs 
for the entire sample period and for the financial crisis period (2008 
and 2009). In the pre-financial crisis period (2005 to 2007), investors 
negatively perceive high APTS fees ratio. In the post-financial crisis 
period (2010 to 2015), investors positively perceive high APTS fees 
ratio. 
Chen et al. (2019b) This paper examines the investors’ 
perception of NAS and its types, as 
reflected in the short-term ERCs. 
US: 127,690 firm-quarters from 
2004 to 2015. 
Investors have positive perceptions of APTS, manifested in higher 
ERCs. This result is driven by firms with high levels of accruals and 
smaller firms. The positive association between APTS fees ratio and 
ERCs is stronger when firms exhibit higher level of UTBs.  ERCs 
decrease with the level of UTBs when firms do not purchase APTS. 
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Francis et al. (2019) This paper examines whether and how 
APTS affects the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts.  
US: 212,372 firm-year-analyst 
observations from 16,954 firm-
years with non-zero APTS fees 
from 2003 to 2016. 
Analysts’ forecast errors at both individual analyst level and the 
consensus forecast level increase with the ratio of APTS fees over 
audit fees. Analysts underestimate after-tax EPS for firms engaged in 
more APTS. Firms that pay higher APTS fees are more likely to meet 
analysts’ earnings target. APTS fees are negatively associated with 
the accuracy of analysts’ pre-tax EPS and book ETR forecasts. Firms 
with higher levels of APTS fees ratio have more volatile book ETRs 
(i.e., higher uncertainty) and less persistent after-tax earnings. APTS 
increase disagreement among individual analysts, because it is 
positively associated with the dispersion of EPS forecasts. 
Panel D: Perceived audit quality – non-archival studies 
Authors (Year) Method Sample Internal or 
external 
Results 
Pany and Reckers 
(1983) 
Survey U.S.: 92 directors. Internal In comparison to the purchase of system design services, corporate 
directors are more likely to approve the purchase of APTS and acquisition 
review services. Also, they perceive high auditor independence in the 
provision of the latter two types of services.  
Solomon et al. 
(2005) 
Experiments U.S.: 95 third-year law 
students in the post-SOX 
period. 
External Earnings quality is perceived to be higher when auditors only provide audit 
services to audit clients compared with when auditors also provide 
substantial APTS. Accordingly, investors have more willingness to invest 
in firms with high perceived earnings quality. 
Favere-Marchesi 
(2006) 
Experiments U.S.: 90 audit partners and 
senior managers of small- and 
medium sized firms. 
External Auditors whose firms also provide APTS to audit clients assess a lower risk 
of fraud than auditors whose firms do not provide any APTS to audit 
clients. 
Iyer and Reckers 
(2007) 
Experiments U.S.: 47 audit seniors from a 
Big 4 firm. 
External The provision of APTS does not affect the initial assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement in general. However, auditors significantly discount 
the incremental risks arising out of weak management integrity if they 
provide APTS in addition to audit services, compared with auditors who 




Survey Germany: 98 private investors 
in the spring of 2006. 
External Respondents tend to perceive a negative effect on auditor’s independence 
for the provision of APTS. 
Law (2010) Survey Hong Kong: 203 Big 4 
auditors and 210 financial 
analysts in 2008. 




Dart (2011) Survey UK: 113 institutional 
investors in the summer of 
2005. 
External The provision of APTS causes the least concerns about auditor 
independence impairment compared with other types of NAS. 
Wines (2012) Experiments Australia: 658 responses from 
auditors, financial report 
preparers, and users in March 
2004 to May 2005. 
Internal and 
External 
Compared with auditors, financial report preparers and users are more 
worried about the provision of APTS. 
Svanström (2013) Survey Sweden: 420 small and 
medium-sized firms in 2006. 
Internal Managers’ (i.e., CEOs and CFOs) perception of audit quality is positively 
associated with the provision of APTS. 
Thornton and Shaub 
(2014) 
Experiments U.S.: 168 jurors in the late 
June 2005. 
External Jurors perceive that the audit quality is low when auditors provide 
aggressive tax planning services, but not tax compliance services. Jurors’ 
assessment of auditor responsibility for plaintiff losses is not associated 
with the provision of APTS. Jurors propose to charge auditors higher 
punitive damage awards when they provide aggressive tax planning 
services than the amount proposed for no APTS provision or for providing 




Experiments Germany: 212 private 
investors in 2010.  
External Investors do not have significant concerns about the provision of APTS 
(i.e., representation of the client in the resolution of a tax dispute before a 
tax court). 
Aschauer and Quick 
(2018) 
Experiments Austria: 140 professional 
investment consultants from 
credit institutions in 2013. 
External Investment consultants perceive lower auditor independence in appearance 
and audit quality when the audit clients purchase a considerable amount of 
APTS (in this case, 60% of total audit fees) compared with the auditors of 
audit clients with no APTS purchase. 
van Liempd et al. 
(2019) 
Survey Denmark: 205 lawyers, 
private shareholders, bankers, 
financial analysts, and 
financial journalists in 2016. 
External All eight types of APTS are perceived as problematic. However, tax 
compliance services are less harmful compared with other types of APTS. 
These results are driven by lawyers and by financial analysts, whereas 
private shareholders and bank loan officers perceive the provision of APTS 
favourably.  
Meuwissen  
and Quick (2019) 
Experiments Germany: 110 responses from 
supervisory board members in 
the fall of 2006. 
Internal The provisions of tax compliance services (APTS), accounting information 
system consulting (AIS consulting), and human resource consulting (HR 
consulting) are perceived as impairing auditor independence. Compared 
with AIS consulting and HR consulting, APTS is perceived as relatively 
less harmful to auditor independence. 
Panel E: Input-based and other measures   
Authors (Year) Research questions Sample Results 
Palmrose (1986) This paper examines the effects of 
different types of NAS on audit pricing. 
US: 298 firms with Big 8 
auditors from 1980 to 1981. 




Davis et al. (1993) This paper examines the relationship 
between NAS and audit effort. 
US: 95 engagements from a 
large public accounting firm. 
APTS fees are positively associated with audit effort (i.e., more audit 
hours). 
O’Keefe et al. 
(1994) 
This paper examines the determinants of 
audit hours and audit fees. 
U.S.: 249 engagements from a 
Big 6 firm in 1989. 
The percentage of APTS fees to audit fees is associated with neither 
audit hours nor audit fees. 
Ezzamel et al. 
(2002) 
This paper examines the relationship 
between audit fees and different types of 
NAS. 
UK: 193 firms in 1995. APTS fees are positively associated with audit fees, especially for 
clients with overseas subsidiaries. The fees paid for tax services 
provided by other providers are not associated with audit fees. 
Alexander and Hay 
(2013) 
This paper examines the associations 
between different types of NAS and audit 
fees. 
New Zealand: 643 firm-years 
from 1995 to 2001. 
Firms that purchase NAS are significantly larger and more complex 
than those that do not purchase any NAS. 
APTS fees are positively associated with higher audit fees. 
Donohoe and 
Knechel (2014) 
This paper examines (1) whether 
corporate tax aggressiveness influences 
audit pricing; (2) the moderation effect of 
APTS and tax expertise. 
US: 32,315 firm-years from 
2002 to 2010. 
A substantial amount of APTS fees may alleviate the audit fee 
premium associated with tax aggressiveness unless clients’ tax 
uncertainty is high. Tax-related industry expertise is not associated 
with a fee premium unless the client is tax aggressive. 
De Simone et al. 
(2015) 
This paper examines the association 
between purchasing APTS and internal 
control (IC) quality. 
US: 32,048 firm-years with 
auditor internal control opinions 
from 2004 to 2012. 
Firms purchasing more APTS are significantly less likely to disclose 
a tax or non-tax material IC weakness. APTS fees have more positive 
effects on IC quality when companies experience a significant shock 
to their IC environment. The effect of APTS is greatest earlier in the 
audit firm tenure. 
Halperin and Lai 
(2015) 
This paper examines the relation between 
APTS fees and audit fees after SOX from 
the perspective of cross-selling of 
services. 
US: 3,545 firm-years from 2004 
to 2008. 
Firms that purchase APTS from incumbent auditors are likely to pay 
higher audit fees than in the case when they hire only incumbent 
auditors for audit services. 
Klumpes et al. 
(2016) 
This paper examines the effect of actuarial 
services and APTS on audit pricing in UK 
life insurance firms. 
UK: 198 firm-years from 1999 
to 2009. 
APTS fees are weakly and negatively associated with audit fees. 
Abernathy et al. 
(2019) 
This paper examines the auditors’ 
responses to tax risk and how the 
provision of APTS moderate such 
responses. 
US: 18,955 firm-years from 
2002 to 2015. 
The provision of APTS mitigates the positive associations between 





3.6 Chapter Summary and Some Future Research Agendas 
In this essay, I first summarize two widely used theoretical frameworks pertaining to the 
simultaneous provision of audit and APTS in the literature. They are (1) the knowledge 
spillover and (2) the impaired independence theories. Then I provide a review of APTS 
regulations for the U.S., EU, and some other jurisdictions. Finally, I offer a detailed review of 
the literature, published between 1983 to April 2021, on both the determinants and 
consequences of APTS. In terms of determinants, my review focused on firms’ decisions to (1) 
voluntarily disclose APTS information; (2) choose incumbent auditors as tax service providers; 
(3) retain or dismiss incumbent auditors as tax service providers; and (4) the magnitude of 
APTS fees. Firms trade-off the expected benefits against potential costs in assessing whether 
to disclose APTS information, purchase or retain APTS, and pay more fees for APTS. In terms 
of the consequences, prior studies have used both output-based and input-based measures of 
audit quality in examining APTS-related research questions. Although most papers support the 
knowledge spillover theory, there are some papers that provide mixed evidence for similar 
research questions. Below I provide some suggestions to standard setters, and useful directions 
for future research to academic researchers. 
 
3.6.1 Measurement of APTS 
There remain wide variations in the measurement of APTS in the existing literature. Table 3.6 
provides an overview of APTS measures used in the surveyed archival papers. It is evident that 
APTS measures vary significantly across studies, which is not surprising given that different 
measures capture different aspects of APTS pertinent to different research questions. For 
instance, the APTS ratios either consider the importance of APTS fees to each audit client (e.g., 
APTS fees/total fees) or control for client size (e.g., APTS fees/total assets). The absolute value 
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of APTS fees, on the other hand, captures the magnitude of fees auditors received from their 
audit clients. Conceptually, both the high levels of relative and absolute APTS fees indicate a 
high degree of involvement in the client’s tax-related work and an increased economic bond 
between the incumbent auditors and their clients. It remains unclear which measure has the 
largest explanatory power in a specific research setting. Future studies could examine several 




Table 3.6 Measurement of APTS (archival studies) 
Measures of APTS Definition Reference 
$APTS Raw value of APTS fees  Habib and Hasan (2016) 
$APTS/SqrtTA  APTS fees divided by the square root of 
total assets 
Kinney et al. (2004); Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2011) 
$APTS/TA APTS fees divided by total assets Klumpes et al. (2016) 
$APTS/SG&A APTS fees divided by selling, general, and 
administrative expense. 
Cook et al. (2008); Hogan and Noga 
(2015) 
$APTS/PretaxIncome APTS fees divided by total pretax income Huseynov and Klamm (2012) 
$APTS/Total fees APTS fees divided by total fees paid to the 
auditor 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2014, 2020); 
Chen et al. (2019b); Huang et al. 
(2007); Klassen et al. (2016); 
Krishnan et al. (2013); Robinson 
(2008); Seetharaman et al. (2011)  
$APTS/Audit fees APTS fees divided by audit fees paid to 
the auditor 
Francis et al., (2019); Garcia-Blandon 
et al. (2021); Mishra et al. (2005); 
Parkash and Venable (1993); Watrin 
et al. (2019) 
$APTS/(Audit + 
Audit-related fees) 
APTS fees divided by the sum of audit 
fees and audit-related fees 
Fortin and Pittman (2008) 
$APTS/Total office 
revenue 
APTS fees divided by total auditor office 
revenue 
Alsadoun et al. (2018) 
$Tax compliance 
(planning) 
services/Total fees  
Auditor-provided tax compliance 
(planning) services fees divided by total 
fees paid to the auditor 
Chyz et al. (2021) 
Changes in $APTS $APTS/TA in the current year minus 
$APTS/TA in the previous year 
Kim et al. (in press) 
Ln (APTS) Natural log of APTS fees Castillo-Merino et al. (2020); Choi et 
al. (2009b); De Simone et al. (2015); 
Halperin and Lai (2015); Lisic (2014); 
Notbohm et al. (2015); Omer et al. 
(2006); Robinson (2008) 
Ln (Future APTS 
fees) 
Natural log of APTS fees in the subsequent 
two years 
Castillo-Merino et al. (2020) 
Recurring APTS Recurring APTS fees divided by total fees Abdul Wahab et al. (2014, 2020) 
Natural log of recurring APTS fees Paterson and Valencia (2011) 
APTS dummy An indicator coded one if clients purchased 
tax services from incumbent auditors, and 
zero otherwise. 
Ahn et al. (2021); Finley and 
Stekelberg (2016); Garcia-Blandon et 
al. (2017, 2021); Gleason and Mills 
(2011); Huang and Chang (2016); Liu 
et al. (2021); Luo (2019); 
Seetharaman et al. (2011); Svanström 
(2013) 
An indicator coded one if tax services fees 
exceed a certain amount or ratio, and zero 
otherwise. 
Abernathy et al. (2019); Christensen et 
al. (2015); Donohoe and Knechel 
(2014); Gleason et al. (2018)  
APTS purchase, 
retention, and switch 
decisions 
Firms’ decision to hire, retain, or dismiss 
auditors as tax service providers. 
Albring et al. (2014); Cook et al. 
(2020); Klassen et al. (2016); Lassila 
et al. (2010); Neuman et al. (2015) 
Tax expertise 
(specialization) 
An indicator coded one if the audit firm 
receives 30% or more of all APTS fees 
paid in the industry-year, and zero 
otherwise. 
Christensen et al. (2015); Donohoe 







3.6.2 Replication of previous studies 
Over the years, the regulators from different jurisdictions implemented a multitude of 
regulations and restrictions on the provision of NAS and APTS, to regain investor confidence: 
confidence that rock bottomed because of large-scale corporate frauds. Prior studies have 
shown that behaviours of key stakeholders substantially changed during those uncertain times 
(Cook et al., 2020; Eilifsen et al., 2018; Maydew & Shackelford, 2007; Omer et al., 2006). 
Several prior studies reviewed in this paper explored the effects of SOX (2002) on certain 
research questions in the U.S. (e.g., Cook et al., 2008; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2011). 
However, there is a lack of research investigating the impacts of other worldwide events on 
APTS-related questions. First, the GFC has had extensive and major consequences for 
worldwide economics. Both archival and non-archival findings related to stakeholders’ 
perceptions of APTS may have changed after the GFC period. Therefore, some earlier findings 
might no longer be relevant to standard setters or academic researchers. Indeed, Eilifsen et al. 
(2018) show that the German investors’ perceptions of APTS changed significantly during the 
GFC period. Thus, a revisit to some prior research questions using updated data is warranted. 
Second, the EU audit and non-audit markets have experienced significant reforms, owing 
to the enactment and implementation of EU Regulation (2014), which became effective on 17 
June 2016. I believe that this provides a rich research setting to compare the effects of APTS 
on certain research questions, such as tax avoidance, in both the pre- and post-regulation periods, 
thereby, informing regulators about the effectiveness of the new regulations. My review of non-
archival literature also reveals that there is only one study that examined the stakeholders’ 
perceptions of APTS in the post-regulation period (van Liempd et al., 2019). It is reasonable to 
expect that stakeholder perceptions might have changed because of recent reform in the EU. 
Both archival and non-archival evidence is needed in this area.  
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Third, similar to the GFC, the outbreak of COVID-19 has affected global economies 
significantly. Since 2020, academic researchers started to explore the consequences of COVID-
19 extensively. I have not been aware of any COVID-related papers related to APTS. As 
discussed in Section 3.5, one benefit of purchasing APTS is to avoid tax. While the pandemic 
lasts, firms that suffer from financial constraints may choose to use APTS to avoid more tax, as 
a survival mechanism. However, curtailed demand in many of the sectors also means that firms 
may have to scale back their investments, leading to a decreased demand for APTS. 
Furthermore, the effects of COVID-19 vary with industries (Qin et al., 2020). Firms from 
certain industries (e.g., tourism, restaurant, and accommodation) are facing more serious 
challenges than those from others. The relations between the demand for APTS, COVID-19, 
and industry groups are unclear, and worthy of investigation. Another interesting topic is the 
relation between the provision of APTS and the cost of debt capital during the COVID-19 
period. Audit Analytics (2021) illustrates that the total debt offerings in the U.S. surged in 2020. 
Given the negative association between the cost of debt and the levels of APTS fees found by 
Fortin and Pittman (2008), it would be meaningful to examine whether such an association still 
exists in the U.S. or in other non-U.S. settings. 
 
3.6.3 APTS research in other jurisdictions   
In my review of the APTS literature, I find that more than half of the surveyed papers are from 
the U.S., followed by some studies from the EU. However, the APTS-related research in other 
jurisdictions is relatively scarce, which makes my review more U.S. and EU-centric. As 
reviewed in Section 3.3, the regulations pertaining to APTS vary across jurisdictions. Although 
prior research has examined the effects of APTS in certain non-U.S. jurisdictions, it is 
surprising to find little research on APTS in Canada and India, for example, where APTS-
related data is readily available. After summarizing research findings related to APTS in this 
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paper, I call for more research employing both archival and non-archival designs from other 
jurisdictions to enrich our understanding about various facets of APTS. Empirical research 
suggests that investors and other stakeholders do incorporate APTS-related information into 
their decision-making processes. I also hope that my review will provide useful information to 
jurisdictions that have not mandated the disclosure of APTS information (e.g., China and Hong 
Kong). Mandatory disclosure of APTS-related information could help various stakeholders to 
understand and assess auditor independence more precisely. 
I also encourage more research in an international (i.e. cross-country) setting to better 
understand the role of institutional settings across different jurisdictions in influencing firms’ 
decision to purchase APTS from the incumbent auditors and its associated consequences. Habib 
et al. (2019) document that some institutional factors such as political connections, investor 
protection, and national culture determine auditor choice decisions. It is plausible to contend 
that such factors might also affect both the demand for and supply of APTS. Regarding the 
consequences of APTS, some prior studies have shown conflicting findings for the same 
research question in different countries. For example, APTS fees are found to be positively 
associated with tax avoidance in the U.S. (e.g., Hogan & Noga, 2015; Omer et al., 2006), 
whereas they are associated negatively or insignificantly in other countries (Garcia-Blandon et 
al., 2021; Watrin et al., 2019). Some prior studies attribute the different findings found in their 
papers to the different institutional environments across jurisdictions, such as book-tax 
conformity (Aschauer & Quick, 2018), auditor liability (Watrin et al., 2019), enforcement level 
(Castillo-Merino et al., 2020), and investor protection (van Liempd et al., 2019). To the best of 
my knowledge, there is no research using an international dataset to examine the determinants 
and consequences of APTS.  
Given that APTS-related regulations vary across countries, it may not be productive to 
explore the effects of APTS regulation using a global dataset. However, the EU is a good setting 
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for this line of research, because all EU member states follow similar audit regulation with little 
variation (e.g., EU Regulation, 2014). Although European firms have similar financial reporting 
standards (i.e., IFRS), some variations in the regulatory environment do exist within Europe. 
For example, EU member states have different legal origins (i.e., code or common law), 
financial secrecy (i.e., high or low transparency), and tax filing rules (i.e., independent or IFRS-
based rules). These differences could affect both the determinants and consequences of APTS: 
a fruitful avenue for future research in the EU setting. 
 
3.6.4 Tax services fees and its components 
Finally, I discuss research opportunities related to the disclosure requirements of tax services 
fees, rather than APTS fees discussed in Section 3.6.2. A firm could choose to purchase tax 
services from several tax service providers (e.g., in-house, third-party, or incumbent auditor). 
Under the current regulatory environment, firms need to disclose only the tax services fees paid 
to their incumbent auditors, but not those paid to other providers. Therefore, extant studies 
could investigate only the APTS supplied by incumbent auditors, without simultaneously 
considering the role played by other tax service providers. One exception is Chen et al. (2021) 
who hand-collected data on firms’ in-house tax departments, and find that firms’ in-house tax 
investments and APTS work as substitutes. Such evidence suggests that ignoring the effects of 
other types of tax service provider, may bias research findings significantly, especially when 
APTS fees decline but the total tax service revenue for audit firms increases, or remains steady 
(Maydew & Shackelford, 2007). For example, McGuire et al. (2012) measure auditors’ tax 
expertise using data on the market share of tax services fees charged by the incumbent auditor, 
rather than total fees charged by both the incumbent auditor and other tax service providers. 
This problem can be mitigated if regulation requires firms to disclose tax service fees paid to 
all providers. Such a mandatory disclosure requirement can also help future studies to enrich 
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the literature on the consequences of dismissing or switching tax services providers. For 
instance, how did the tax service fees change after firms’ decisions to switch from incumbent 
auditors to others as tax service providers? 
Regulators could also consider mandating the disclosure of APTS fees components, i.e., 
tax compliance and tax planning fees. As discussed in Section 3.1, tax planning services are 
more damaging than tax compliance services. Also, prior studies show, both theoretically and 
empirically, that tax planning and tax compliance components of total APTS fees have 
differential effects on tax outcomes (e.g., Chyz et al., 2021; Klassen et al., 2016). Some prior 
studies use total APTS fees as the measure of tax planning (e.g., Cook et al., 2008; Francis et 
al., 2019; Kim et al., in press; Kubick et al., 2020). However, using hand-collected data, Chyz 
et al. (2021) show that total APTS fees normally represent significant fees paid to both tax 
compliance and tax planning services. Although Kim et al. (in press) use a change specification 
to mitigate this concern, since tax compliance fees are likely to be relatively constant across 
years, mandatory disclosure of APTS fee components would enrich APTS research. It would 
be helpful in tax planning and tax avoidance research as well. A finer disclosure of APTS fees 
would help academic researchers use archival data to confirm some non-archival evidence 
suggesting that perceptions of APTS are dependent on the type of tax service provided (e.g., 




BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY AND THE DEMAND FOR AUDITOR-




In this essay, I examine whether the demand for auditor-provided tax services (hereafter APTS) 
varies with the required level of book-tax conformity (hereafter BTC) in the EU countries.41 
Potential benefits and costs of non-audit services (hereafter NAS), including APTS, have been 
debated internationally for many decades, especially after the occurrence of major accounting 
scandals (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) at the beginning of this century. The proponents for the 
joint provision of audit and APTS by the incumbent auditor suggest that such activities lead to 
significant knowledge spillover benefits to both auditors and audit clients. For auditors, this can 
facilitate audits of both tax-related and non-tax related accounts, and reduce audit costs related 
to information gathering (e.g., Gleason & Mills, 2011). Such joint provision of services can 
help clients too, because the expertise in audits of financial statements together with the 
extensive knowledge of clients’ operations, help auditors identify and remedy clients’ material 
internal control weaknesses, thereby, improving pre-audited financial reporting quality (De 
Simone et al., 2015). Also, clients could achieve substantial tax savings through purchasing tax 
services from their auditors possessing tax specialization (McGuire et al., 2012). 
 
40 I am grateful to Linda Myers for her constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier version. I also thank 
Alistair Hodson, Markus Milne, Adrian Sawyer, and seminar participants at University of Canterbury for their 
useful comments. 
41 Similar to the auditor choice decision for financial statements auditing, the APTS decision is also a two-party 
contractual arrangement (audit clients and their auditors). In this essay, I develop theoretical predictions and 
provide empirical tests from the demand side perspective (i.e., the client’s APTS purchase decision). I use the 
demand for APTS and the purchase of APTS interchangeably for the remainder of this essay. 
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The opponents, on the other hand, argue that the increased economic bonding resulting 
from more profitable tax services could lead auditors to, or be perceived to, acquiesce in clients’ 
aggressive accounting and tax practices (Alsadoun et al., 2018; Mishra et al., 2005). In some 
cases, auditors even help clients by developing client-suited tax avoidance strategies. For 
example, PwC, one of the largest auditors worldwide, was investigated by the PCAOB for 
helping Caterpillar Inc., one of PwC’s clients, avoid taxes to the tune of US$2.4 billion since 
2000 (Rapoport, 2014; U.S. Senate, 2014). Although regulators acknowledge the potential 
benefits of APTS, certain types of APTS that are more likely to compromise auditor 
independence are prohibited in both the U.S. and Europe (SEC, 2006; the EU, 2014). Given the 
increased dependence on APTS in recent years by the audit firms, the regulators expressed their 
concerns over APTS and considered further prohibiting certain types of APTS. For instance, 
Steven B. Harris, a former board member of PCAOB, in 2015, states that “[PCAOB] should 
examine whether certain kinds of tax consulting services create conflicts of interests that may 
impair auditor independence.”42 
Despite the extensive discussion of the costs and benefits associated with purchasing APTS 
from the incumbent auditors, only a few academic studies investigate the factors influencing 
clients’ decisions to purchase APTS. Intuitively, such decisions are likely based on cost-benefit 
trade-offs, which vary with firm characteristics (Lassila et al., 2010). For example, Klassen et 
al. (2016) show that firms tend to appoint their incumbent auditors to prepare tax returns, a type 
of APTS, when they are smaller, exhibit lower tax reporting aggressiveness in the past, fast-
growing but incurring losses, engaging research and development (R&D) activities, and 
exhibiting higher other NAS fees ratios and lower foreign operation activities. Lassila et al. 







when they have high tax and operational complexity, generating more knowledge spillover 
benefits. I extend the determinants of APTS literature by exploring the EU market: a market 
that is characterized by sizable variation in NAS services including APTS, and also in the 
required degree of BTC. 
BTC represents the degree of alignment between accounting (book) income and taxable 
income. Since accounting standards and tax rules serve distinct purposes, accounting income 
often differs from taxable income (Hanlon et al., 2005). The considerable discretion to report 
accounting and taxable income could lead to low-quality financial and tax reporting (e.g., Desai, 
2005). For example, when accounting income differs significantly from taxable income (i.e., a 
low level of BTC), firms are able to simultaneously overstate accounting income to 
shareholders and understate taxable income to tax authorities. This has raised significant 
concerns, and discussion has been ongoing as to whether to increase the conformity between 
book and taxable income. The former U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, has proposed 
tax reforms to “reduce the gap between book income, reported to shareholders, and taxable 
income, reported to the IRS” (i.e., U.S. Internal Revenue Service) (The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 2012, p. 10). The benefits of a high level of BTC include less earnings management 
and tax avoidance behaviour (Atwood et al., 2012; Tang, 2015), reduced tax compliance costs 
(Chan et al., 2010), and easier auditing (Kuo & Lee, 2016), among others. On the other hand, a 
high level of BTC could result in the loss of earnings informativeness (e.g., Atwood et al., 2010; 
Hanlon & Shevlin, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005, 2008), lower international capital mobility 
(Young & Guenther, 2003), and accounting and tax misreporting (Niggemann, 2020).  
I study firms listed in the EU markets for two reasons. First, owing to the mandatory 
adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the consolidated financial 
statements of EU firms are prepared under the same accounting standard. However, there is still 
not a common consolidated corporate tax base in the EU (Procházka & Molín, 2016; Watrin et 
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al., 2014) and, consequently, different levels of BTC are found in EU countries. Thus, I am able 
to explore the impact of differences in BTC on the demand for APTS. Second, during recent 
years, the EU audit and NAS markets have experienced significant reforms, owing to the 
enactment and implementation of EU Regulation (see Section 3.3.2 for details). I believe that 
this provides me an opportunity to compare the effects of the levels of BTC and the demand for 
APTS in both pre- and post-regulation periods, thereby, enabling me to better understand the 
consequences of the relevant regulation. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the APTS and BTC 
literature and develops my hypotheses. In Section 4.3, I describe my research design. 
Descriptive statistics, main results, and robustness test results are presented in Section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Auditor-provided tax services 
Firms can fulfil their demand for tax-related services through in-house tax departments, external 
tax services providers, or both. For instance, Klassen et al. (2016) show that 45% of tax returns 
are prepared by external service providers, whereas the remaining are prepared by in-house tax 
departments in 2008 and 2009. In addition, Chen et al. (2021) show that, although 85% of the 
S&P 1500 firms had in-house tax departments during their sample period of 2009 to 2014, 81% 
of those firms also purchased tax services from their incumbent auditors. Therefore, like the 
selection of external auditors for financial statement audits, the selection of tax services 
providers is not a random decision. Ideally, firms will weigh the relative costs and benefits of 
hiring a pool of tax service providers and then choose the one provider, or the combination of 
providers, that provides the highest net benefit to the clients. Since procuring APTS is based on 




4.2.1.1 Costs and benefits related to APTS 
The primary benefit of the joint purchase of audit services and APTS is the knowledge spillover 
effect: the sharing of client-specific knowledge between auditors’ tax and audit teams that might 
help auditors to increase audit quality and/or help clients to achieve certain tax and non-tax 
related benefits. First, the purchase of APTS could generate direct benefits to audit clients’ tax 
accounts. Tax services could be split into two categories: tax compliance services and tax 
planning services. Tax compliance services include preparing, signing, and filing tax returns to 
tax authorities, whereas tax planning services include efficient management of tax affairs and 
legitimate tax-saving opportunities. 43  Auditors could use their client-specific or industry-
specific expertise to help clients to reduce tax liability (both taxes paid and tax expenses), which 
will not be questioned by both the audit team and tax authorities (e.g., Maydew & Shackelford, 
2007; McGuire et al., 2012). Prior studies have found that the purchase of APTS is associated 
with tax avoidance activities (e.g., Cook et al., 2008, 2020; Hogan & Noga, 2015; Omer et al., 
2006), less tax-related restatements (Seetharaman et al., 2011), more sustainable effective tax 
rates (Watrin et al., 2019), and adequate tax reserves (Gleason & Mills, 2011; Gleason et al., 
2018). 
 Second, the purchase of APTS could also generate some non-tax related benefits. Through 
providing tax services to audit clients across the fiscal year, auditors could obtain extensive 
knowledge of clients’ operations, which would enable auditors to detect and remedy clients’ 
internal control weakness, to be aware of material risky transactions, and to understand clients’ 
attitudes towards financial reporting and tax reporting aggressiveness (e.g., De Simone et al., 
2015; Frank et al., 2009). Thus, the simultaneous purchase of audit and tax services by audit 
clients might allow auditors to design significantly different and more effective audit 
 
43 The aforementioned (in Section 3.2.2) “(i) preparation of tax forms” and “(v) support regarding tax inspections 
by tax authorities” generally belong to tax compliance services, while “(iv) identification of public subsidies and 
tax incentives”, “(vi) calculation of direct and indirect tax and deferred tax”, and “(vii) provision of tax advice” 
could be classified as tax planning services. 
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procedures (e.g., Joe & Vandervelde, 2007), thereby increasing audit quality. Existing evidence 
suggests that the purchase of APTS reduces financial restatements (Kinney et al., 2004; 
Paterson & Valencia, 2011), increases the possibility of issuing appropriate audit opinions 
(Robinson, 2008), increases earnings quality (Chen et al., 2019b; Choi et al., 2009b; Huang et 
al., 2007; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2011; Krishnan et al., 2013; Watrin et al., 2019), reduces 
stock price crash risk by constraining both earnings management in tax expenses and tax 
avoidance (Habib & Hasan, 2016), lowers cost of debt (Fortin & Pittman, 2008), and 
strengthens clients’ internal control (De Simone et al., 2015). 
The costs related to APTS stem mainly from potential negative market reactions and 
regulatory scrutiny apart from the APTS fees (e.g., Alsadoun et al., 2018; Tepalagul & Lin, 
2015). High APTS fees may increase the economic bonding between auditors and their clients, 
thereby compromising, or being perceived to compromise, auditor independence (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Hermanson, 2009). The SEC (2006) prohibited auditors from providing certain 
types of APTS that are more likely to impair auditor independence. The European Commission 
(2010, 2011) proposed to establish “pure audit firms”, where auditors could provide only audit 
services to their audit clients. The U.S. evidence shows that firms paying more APTS fees were 
more likely to receive investors voting against auditor ratification (Mishra et al., 2005) and 
proposals seeking to restrict NAS purchases (Hermanson et al., 2019) during the period 
surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Alsadoun et al. (2018) show 
that cost of equity capital increases for firms with a high ratio of APTS fees to total audit office 
revenues. Francis et al. (2019) document a negative relationship between APTS fees as a 
proportion of audit fees and analysts’ forecast accuracy. Therefore, evidence remains 




4.2.1.2 Determinants of APTS purchase decisions 
As discussed above, managers face cost-benefit trade-offs when making APTS-related 
decisions and will purchase tax services from the incumbent auditors when expected benefits 
of doing so exceed expected costs. Two studies examine firms’ selection of tax service 
providers by using either proprietary data (Klassen et al., 2016) or hand-collected data for a 
specific sector (Neuman et al., 2015). Using proprietary data obtained from the U.S. IRS, 
Klassen et al. (2016) find that firms are more likely to select their incumbent auditors as tax 
compliance service provider when firms are smaller, less tax aggressive in the past, fast-
growing but incurring losses, engaging in R&D activities, having less foreign activities, and 
exhibiting higher other NAS fees ratios. Focusing on the U.S. not-for-profit sector, Neuman et 
al. (2015) document that firms are less likely to appoint their incumbent auditors as tax service 
providers when the firm’s headquarter is far from the audit firm and when there is a greater set 
of substitute tax service providers in the market.  
Other studies focus on firms’ decisions to dismiss or retain their incumbent auditors as tax 
service providers. Lassila et al. (2010) find a positive association between firms’ corporate 
governance structure and retaining the incumbent auditor as the tax service provider in the 
period surrounding the SOX, whereas Albring et al. (2014) find a negative association in the 
post-SOX period (i.e., 2003 to 2006), indicating that directors and/or audit committee members 
behaved in more conservative ways in response to the increased litigation and potential 
reputation risks after the passage of the SOX. Finley and Stekelberg (2016) and Ahn et al. (2021) 
examine the impact of reputation concerns related to two Big 4 auditors (e.g., KPMG and 
Deloitte) on firms’ decision to retain them as tax service providers.44 Their results show that, 
compared with other Big 4 auditors, both KPMG’s and Deloitte’s audit clients, especially high 
tax avoidance clients, are more likely to dismiss them as tax service providers, because of the 
 
44 See Section 3.4 for details. 
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increased costs resulting from regulatory scrutiny and damaged auditors’ reputations and/or the 
decreased tax benefits (e.g., tax avoidance).45 
Another strand of this APTS literature examines firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose 
APTS information before the mandatory disclosure regulations became effective. Omer et al. 
(2006) find that audit clients’ tax complexity, auditor tenure, and auditor change are associated 
positively with the decision to voluntarily disclose APTS fees, whereas the proportion of NAS 
fees to total fees is associated negatively with such a decision. Bedard et al. (2010) further find 
that the negative association between the voluntary disclosure of APTS fees and the proportion 
of NAS fees to total fees is stronger when firms have an effective audit committee, suggesting 
that an effective audit committee would better assess the cost-benefit trade-offs stemming from 
such voluntary disclosures.  
Some research has also been conducted on how much firms need to pay for APTS. Halperin 
and Lai (2015) develop an APTS fee model to test the relationship between expected audit fees 
and APTS fees. They find that expected audit fees are associated positively with APTS fees, 
which complements Omer et al.’s (2006) finding that unexpected audit fees increase APTS fees. 
Some governance factors are also found to be associated with APTS fees. For instance, Duan 
et al. (2018) show that CEOs with high publicity tend to pay more APTS fees as a tax avoidance 
strategy in order to meet investors’ performance expectations. Furthermore, most of the factors 





45 Finley and Stekelberg (2016) find that their results are significantly more negative among retail firms than 
nonretail firms, consistent with the argument that retail firms may be more sensitive to reputational concerns 
(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). The DPA also exposed KPMG’s tax practice, and by extension its tax clients, to 
potential scrutiny from regulatory authorities following the settlement. The DPA put a stricter rule on tax strategies 
that KPMG could promote to its clients and appointed a monitor from the Justice Department that could review 
any of KPMG’s files.  
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4.2.2 Book-tax conformity 
BTC represents the degree of alignment between accounting income and taxable income. Under 
the current dual reporting system in most jurisdictions, accounting income and taxable income 
are characterized by different revenue and expense recognition criteria to achieve different 
financial reporting and tax reporting purposes (Hanlon et al., 2005). Such reporting flexibilities 
provide managers with considerable discretion to report both types of income (Frank et al., 
2009). Managers have incentives to report higher book income and lower taxable income 
simultaneously to maximize shareholders’ wealth or to maximize mangers’ personal gain. As a 
result, the quality of the reported book and taxable incomes would be compromised by 
managers’ opportunistic reporting behaviour (Desai, 2005). The extent of reporting discretion, 
however, is determined by the levels of BTC.  
When a country has a low (or zero) level of BTC, managers’ ability to report high book 
income to shareholders and low taxable income to tax authorities simultaneously is less 
constrained (or unconstrained). In other words, a low level of BTC could lead to more 
aggressive financial and/or tax reporting. This argument has been supported in prior studies by 
using data from Brazil (Nakao & Gray, 2018), China (Chan et al., 2010, 2013, 2016), Greece 
(Karampinis & Hevas, 2013), Israel (Chen & Gavious, 2017), among others. Chan et al. (2010), 
for example, show that book-tax differences (BTD) became a less useful indicator of tax 
noncompliance for tax authorities in China owing to the “noise” brought by a low level of 
conformity.46  
An increased BTC makes book income more aligned with taxable income, thereby 
increasing the costs of overstating book income and understating taxable income (Chan et al., 
 
46 Total BTD can result from (1) legitimate differences in accounting standards and tax rules, (2) overstating book 
income (i.e., earnings management), and (3) understating taxable income (i.e., tax avoidance/aggressiveness) 
(Chan et al., 2010; Hanlon, 2005). When the book and taxable incomes are required to exhibit high conformity, 
any significant differences between them would be indicative of tax noncompliance. However, all these three types 
of BTD increase in a low conformity environment, which reduces the informativeness of BTD. 
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2010; Desai, 2005; Yin, 2001). Therefore, managers face a trade-off between financial 
reporting and tax planning objectives that reduces misreporting activities and, hence, results in 
improved financial reporting and less tax avoidance activities. Both Atwood et al. (2012) and 
Tang (2015) support this argument using international data. However, prior studies also present 
some contradictory results. Blaylock et al. (2015) find a positive, rather than a negative, 
association between the levels of BTC and earnings management. Watrin et al. (2014) find that 
the firms in European countries with a one-book system (i.e., a high level of BTC) engage in 
more downward and less upward earnings management, compared with firms from European 
countries with a two-book system.47 Other benefits of increasing the level of BTC include 
reduced compliance costs (Chan et al., 2010) and easier auditing (Kuo & Lee, 2016).  
It is worth noting that increasing the level of BTC, however, can result in unintended 
consequences. For example, increased BTC results in the loss of earnings informativeness (e.g., 
Atwood et al., 2010; Hanlon & Shevlin, 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005, 2008). Generally, managers 
could use some of their discretion over accounting earnings to signal value-relevant private 
information to the equity market (Bushman, 1991; Dechow, 1994). However, the additional 
taxes to be paid on overstated earnings (i.e., tax costs) resulting from the increased level of BTC 
restricts their willingness and ability to do so. Using the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86 
hereafter) as a natural experiment, Guenther et al. (1997) find that firms that experienced an 
increased level of BTC (“converting firms”) deferred more income.48 Also, Hanlon et al. (2008) 
find a significant decrease in the informativeness of “converting firms” earnings, as proxied by 
 
47 EU firms need to prepare three types of financial statements: (1) consolidated statements, (2) single statements, 
and (3) tax statements. The consolidated statements are prepared on a group-level basis, and the remains are 
prepared on a single-entity basis. Watrin et al. (2014) find similar results by using either consolidated- or single-
level BTC measures. Therefore, they conclude that the book-tax trade-off between consolidated statements and 
tax statements result from the book-tax trade-off between single financial statements and tax statements. 
48 The TRA 86 requires firms with more than five million U.S. dollars in revenues to use the accrual method for 
tax purposes. Prior to the TRA 86, firms could use either the cash method or the accrual method for tax purposes. 
Therefore, the TRA 86 would not affect firms that already used the accrual method for tax accounting and firms 
that use the cash method but do not meet the revenue threshold in the pre-TRA period. Rather, the TRA 86 only 
affected a unique sample of firms, i.e., firms using the cash method and meeting the revenue threshold, by forcing 
them to change from the cash method to the accrual method for tax purposes, thereby increasing their BTC level. 
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earnings response coefficients, leading to an increased cost of equity capital and, hence, such 
firms increase their leverage (Blaylock et al., 2017).  
As accounting standards and tax rules serve their distinct purposes, a perfect conformity 
level is neither possible, nor desirable. Niggemann (2020) argues that mandating a perfect or 
very high level of BTC may foster overall misreporting activities. Similarly, Eichfelder et al. 
(2020) argue that a high level of BTC promotes conforming tax avoidance (a reduction in both 
book income and taxable income) activities, and will not be captured by common 
nonconforming tax avoidance (a reduction in tax liabilities but not book income) measures used 
in prior studies (e.g., Atwood et al., 2012; Tang, 2015). They find supportive results that firms 
are more willing to report lower pre-tax book income in countries with a high statutory tax rate 
and a high level of BTC, where firms need to pay relatively higher marginal taxes (i.e., they 
have more tax pressure). Moreover, Chan et al. (2013) find that firms with more book income 
pressure are more likely to pay more taxes to keep a high book income when the level of BTC 
is high. Therefore, Niggemann (2020) suggests that allowing a moderate level of BTC 
minimizes overall misreporting and maximizes reporting compliance. 
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses development 
I develop my first hypothesis using both the “tax planning” and “tax compliance” perspectives. 
From the tax planning perspective, a high level of BTC introduces a trade-off between financial 
accounting and tax reporting, leading to less non-conforming tax avoidance (Atwood et al., 
2012; Tang, 2015). Given additional scrutiny on financial statements by tax authorities in high 
BTC countries (van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008), the costs associated with tax planning 
increase. Therefore, firms’ abilities and incentives to engage in tax planning activities might be 
decreased and, hence, the demand for APTS will be reduced accordingly. From the tax 
compliance perspective, a higher level of BTC provides managers less reporting discretion, 
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leading to less tax noncompliance caused by errors or irregularities (e.g., Chan et al., 2010, 
2016). In other words, firms are more likely to be tax compliant when the level of BTC is high. 
Therefore, the demand for tax compliance service will be decreased. Both arguments suggest 
that the demand for APTS is low (high) when the level of BTC is high (low).  
Furthermore, from the audit risk perspective, a low level of BTC gives managers 
considerable discretion to report different book and taxable income (Hanlon et al., 2005), which 
complicates financial statement audits (Kuo & Lee, 2016). Tax-related issues are often 
associated with financial statement restatements and are one of the most cited deficiencies in 
the PCAOB inspection reports (Acito et al., 2018; Audit Analytics, 2016; Badertscher et al., 
2009). The joint purchase of audit and tax services by audit clients enables auditors to be 
familiar with both the accounting and tax treatments of clients, thereby, facilitating more 
accurate auditing of tax accruals. Likewise, low BTC increases the “noise” in reported book-
tax differences (Chan et al., 2010; Hanlon, 2005), which requires auditors to exert additional 
audit effort (Hanlon et al., 2012). Thus, the knowledge spillover benefits are expected to be 
higher in countries with lower levels of BTC. In contrast, a high level of BTC simplifies tax 
accruals and narrows book-tax differences, thereby, reducing the complexity of auditing 
financial statements. The expected benefits associated with the joint provision of audit and 
APTS, as a result, are lower in countries with high levels of BTC. Since audit clients are 
expected to be aware of such reduced benefits of purchasing APTS in high BTC countries, I 
should expect a negative relationship between the levels of BTC and the purchase of APTS. 
Alternatively, I might find a positive association (or no association) between the demand 
for APTS and the levels of BTC. Even if the level of BTC is high, there might still be 
possibilities for tax planning activities desired by clients (e.g., conforming tax avoidance 
activities). Auditors have competitive advantages over other tax service providers as well as 
over clients’ in-house tax staff, because they have a good understanding of clients’ operations 
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and structures, superior knowledge of tax planning, including industry-specific tax planning 
opportunities, and excellent expertise related to financial statement auditing (Maydew & 
Shackelford, 2007; McGuire et al., 2012). As a result, the demand for auditor-provided tax 
planning services may be increased even when the BTC is high. Also, the book-tax differences 
resulting from non-conforming tax avoidance activities are more likely to be challenged by the 
tax authorities when the level of BTC is high (Chan et al., 2010; Mills, 1998), leading to an 
increased demand for tax compliance services. Such increased demand could offset or outweigh 
the declined demand for the purchase of APTS, as discussed above. Based on these competing 
arguments, I develop the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H1: There is an association between the demand for APTS and the levels of BTC. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the EU Regulation (2014), which became effective from 17 
June 2016, restricted certain types of APTS that auditors could provide to their audit clients. 
Thus, I expect the demand for APTS in the EU countries to decline in the post-regulation period 
compared with the pre-regulation period. However, an unanswered question is whether the 
implementation of new regulations has had a moderating effect on the association between the 
demand for APTS and the levels of BTC. On the one hand, in the post-regulation period, certain 
types of APTS that generate material effects on audit clients’ financial statements (e.g., 
aggressive tax planning) are prohibited, thereby, reducing the benefits of purchasing APTS. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the EU Regulation increased the regulatory scrutiny on the 
performance of audit committee members, as they are required to assess and pre-approve APTS 
purchase decisions. The strengthened regulatory scrutiny further increases the costs of 




On the other hand, I might observe an increase in the demand for APTS in countries with 
high BTC in the post-regulation period. Horton et al. (2018) examine the investors’ reactions 
to nine events between 2010 and 2013 when the European Commission was working on the 
proposals of the EU Regulation (2014). They find that investors reacted positively to the events 
that had increased the probability of adopting the reforms. In other words, investors were 
expecting that auditor independence would be increased after adopting the EU Regulation 
(2014). This is also consistent with the U.S. evidence that investors’ concerns over auditor 
independence were mitigated in the post-SOX period (Hollingsworth & Li, 2012). Therefore, 
the costs of purchasing NAS, including APTS, would be lower in the post-regulation period in 
comparison to the costs in the pre-regulation period. In addition, given that the majority of prior 
APTS studies suggest market participants perceive APTS positively compared with other types 
of NAS (e.g., Chen et al., 2019b; Fortin & Pittman, 2008), the purchase of APTS may bring 
more benefits to the audit clients in the post-regulation period. For example, when firms need 
to comply with high BTC, the cost of equity increases as a result of decreased financial 
reporting quality, thereby, forcing firms to rely more on debt capital (Blaylock et al., 2017). 
Prior evidence shows that firms can reduce their cost of debt capital by purchasing more APTS 
(e.g., Fortin & Pittman, 2008). As a result, firms listed in countries with a high level of BTC 
may purchase more APTS from their incumbent auditors after implementing the EU Regulation 
(2014). I, therefore, state my second non-directional hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The implementation of the EU Regulation (2014) moderates the association between 




4.3 Research Methodology 
4.3.1 Measurement of BTC 
Atwood et al. (2010, p. 115) define book-tax conformity as “the flexibility that a firm has to 
report taxable income (TI) that is different from pre-tax book income (PTBI)”, which is based 
on the conditional variance of current tax expense for a given level of PTBI. This measure is 
also used by prior studies to examine the impact of book-tax conformity on earnings 
management, tax avoidance and audit fees, among others (e.g., Atwood et al., 2012; Blaylock 
et al., 2015; Kuo & Lee, 2016; Tang, 2015). Following prior studies, I compute the conditional 
variance of current tax expense from the following equation, estimated by country-year:49 
𝐶𝑇𝐸 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼 + 𝜃2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼 + 𝜃3𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝑒,                                   (4.1) 
 
where CTE is the current tax expense; PTBI is the pre-tax book income; ForPTBI is the 
estimated foreign pre-tax book income [(foreign tax expense / total tax expense) * PTBI]; DIV 
is the total dividends; and e is an error item.50 CTE, PTBI, ForPTBI, and DIV are scaled by 
average total assets to control for cross-sectional differences in firm size. 
The book-tax conformity measure, denoted as BTC1, is calculated as the scaled ranking of 
the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) obtained from country-year estimates of Equation (4.1), 
which provides an unbiased estimate of the conditional variance of current tax expense. I use 
descending RMSEs to rank countries each year. In particular, a country with the highest RMSE 
in a given year is ranked 0, and a country with the lowest RMSE in a given year is ranked n-1, 
 
49 In this essay, I design my BTC measures based on consolidated financial statements. I acknowledge that my 
measures have limitations, since the tax burden is levied on a single-entity level rather than a consolidated group 
in Europe (Procházka & Molín, 2016; Watrin et al., 2014). Owing to data unavailability, I am unable to calculate 
my BTC measures using separate financial statements. However, I conduct robustness tests using BTC measures 
provided by these two studies in Section 4.4.5. I find qualitatively similar results, suggesting that my results are 
not sensitive to BTC measurement. 
50 When the current tax expense is missing, I calculate it using total tax expense minus deferred tax expense (if 
available). Like Atwood et al. (2010), I include ForPTBI, since foreign earnings may be charged at different tax 
rates than firms’ domestic statutory tax rates, and include DIV to control for those countries with tax rates that 
depend on whether the earnings are distributed. In addition, I replace missing dividend values with zero.  
138 
 
where n is the number of countries ranked in that year. I then scale these rankings by n-1 to 
calculate BTC1.51 Thus, BTC1 ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher value indicates a higher required 
book-tax conformity level in a firm’s home country. 
However, Tang (2015) argues that managers’ opportunistic behaviours (e.g., earnings 
management and tax avoidance) could also affect reported CTE for a given level of PTBI, and 
this contaminates required BTC calculated by Atwood et al. (2010). Therefore, she develops a 
new measure of BTC using regulatory sources of book-tax differences from the following 
equation, estimated by country-year:  
𝐵𝑇𝐷 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 + 𝜃2𝑇𝑃 +  𝜃3𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 + 𝜀,                                   (4.2) 
 
where BTD is book-tax differences, calculated as PTBI times firm’s statutory tax rate (STR) 
minus CTE; DACC is discretionary accruals, calculated from the modified Jones model with 
lagged return-on-asset (Kothari et al., 2005); TP is the tax avoidance measure, calculated as the 
firm’s STR minus the current effective tax rate (CETR). CETR is measured as CTE divided by 
operating cash flow, and it is truncated to lie between 0 and 1. BTD is scaled by average total 
assets to control for cross-sectional differences in firm size. DACC and TP are included to 
control for managers’ earnings management and tax avoidance behaviours, respectively. Since 
the total BTD arises from (1) regulatory differences in accounting and tax rules, (2) earnings 
management, and (3) tax avoidance behaviour (Hanlon, 2005), the RMSEs obtained from 
country-year estimates in Equation (4.2) capture book-tax differences that are regulation-driven. 
I calculated my alternative BTC measure, denoted as BTC2, using the scaled ranking of these 
 
51 A high RMSE (i.e., higher conditional variance) represents greater flexibility in the reporting of TI for a given 
level of PTBI, indicating a low level of BTC. For example, in 2014, the UK exhibited the highest RMSE and 
Latvia the lowest. Since my data comes from 11 EU countries, I rank the UK zero and Latvia ten (n-1). Then I 
scale these two rankings by n-1. The BTC1 is 0 (0/10) for the UK and 1 (10/10) for Latvia, suggesting that Latvia 
(UK) has a relatively higher (lower) required BTC level, respectively. Another example is Germany, which is 
ranked fifth in 2014 based on RMSE. So, the BTC1 for Germany is 0.4 [(5-1)/10] in 2014. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the levels of BTC in each EU member country ranked in this essay over the sample period. 
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RMSEs obtained from Equation (4.2). Like BTC1, BTC2 ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher value 
indicates a higher required BTC level in a firm’s home country. 
 
4.3.2 Model specification 
I estimate the following Probit and Ordinary Least Square regressions to test H1:  
𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒋,𝒕 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐴𝑆_𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑁𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽18𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                                                          (4.3)             
                                                                                    
where the dependent variable is the demand for APTS (i.e., APTS_D and APTS_FEE). APTS_D 
is a dummy variable coded one if clients purchase tax services from their incumbent auditors 
and zero otherwise, while APTS_FEE is measured as APTS fees scaled by the square root of 
total assets at the beginning of the year (Kinney et al., 2004).52 My variable of interest is BTC 
as discussed in Section 4.3.1. Given the non-directional nature of H1, I expect the coefficient 
on 𝛽1 to be either positive or negative.  
I include several control variables that are likely to affect the demand for APTS as shown 
in the literature (e.g., De Simone et al., 2015; Halperin & Lai, 2015; Lassila et al., 2010; 
McGuire et al., 2012). AFEE is total audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets at the 
beginning of the year; NAS_AF is the ratio of non-tax NAS fees to audit fees received from the 
client, a proxy for auditor independence; SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets at the beginning of the year; MERGER is coded one for firms participated in M&A 
activities, and zero otherwise; LOSS is coded one for firms reporting negative pre-tax income, 
and zero otherwise; ROA is measured as pre-tax income divided by total assets at the beginning 
 
52 I do not use the logarithm of APTS fees, as other APTS studies did (e.g., De Simone et al., 2015; Halperin & 
Lai, 2015), because of the different currencies used in preparing the financial statements in some of the EU 




of the year; FI is coded 1 for firms reporting foreign income taxes, and zero otherwise; R&D is 
total research and development expenses divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; 
LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year; NPPE is net 
property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; INTANG is 
the net intangible assets divided by total assets at the beginning of the year; CASH is the ratio 
of cash and cash equivalent to total assets at the beginning of the year; ACC is the total accruals 
calculated as net income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flow, divided by pre-
tax income; NBS is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of business segments; BTM 
is defined as the book value of common shareholder equity divided by the firm market value of 
equity; SALES_G is sales growth defined as [(SALESt-SALESt-1)/SALESt-1]; ASSET_G is asset 
growth and defined analogously; and BIG4 is coded 1 for firms audited by one of the Big 4 
auditors, and zero otherwise. I predict positive coefficients on AFEE, SIZE, MERGER, FI, and 
CASH. In addition, I predict significant coefficients on NAS_AF and BIG4, but given the mixed 
evidence reported in earlier studies, I do not make predictions regarding the sign of these two 
variables.   
I also include two institutional factors that are likely to affect firms’ tax planning or tax 
avoidance activities and, hence, might possibly affect the demand for APTS. PROTECT is the 
mean of four World Bank Indices (i.e., the Extent of Director Liability Index, the Ease of 
Shareholder Suits Index, the Rule of Law Index, and the Control of Corruption Index), which 
measure the strength of county-level investor protections (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019).53 Chun 
et al. (2020) find that investors value tax avoidance activities positively in countries with strong 
investor protection. Thus, I predict a positive association between PROTECT and APTS. STR 
is the country-level statutory tax rate in each year, and it is expected to be associated with tax 
 
53 The Extent of Director Liability Index (EDL) and the Ease of Shareholder Suits Index (ESS) range from 0-10, 
whereas the Rule of Law Index (RL) and the Control of Corruption Index (CC) range from 0 to 100. Similar to 
Atwood and Lewellen (2019), I divide the latter two by ten to make scales consistent across four indexes. 
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avoidance incentives and decisions positively (Atwood et al., 2012; Tang, 2015). I also include 
year, industry, and country-fixed effects in my Equation (4.3) to control for unobserved (time-
invariant) characteristics at year, industry, and country-level that might affect the demand for 
APTS. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix C. 
I develop the following equation to test H2: 
𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒋,𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑶𝑺𝑻 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                  (4.4) 
 
where POST is a dummy variable coded one (zero) if clients have a fiscal year-end in the post 
(pre)-regulation period. I define the pre-regulation period as the time period before 17 June 
2016, whereas the post-regulation period is the time period after 17 June 2017. To avoid the 
potentially confounding effect of the transition period, I exclude firm-year observations from 
the transition period (i.e., firms with a fiscal year-end between 17 June 2016 and 17 June 2017): 
an exclusion commonly made in regulation-related studies, for example, the adoption of the 
IFRS (DeFond et al., 2011).54 Because the APTS was partially banned in the post-regulation 
period, I predict a negative coefficient on POST. My variable of interest in the Equation (4.4) 
is the interaction variable, BTC*POST. Similar to H1, I have a non-directional prediction on 
BTC*POST (i.e., 𝛽3 could be either positive or negative). Other control variables are the same 
as those in Equation (4.3). 
 
 
54 European Commission Group FAQs document that the restrictions on NAS including APTS would apply to the 
first fiscal year beginning on or after 16 June 2016 (KPMG, 2020). Thus, for a firm with a 31 December 2016 
fiscal year-end, the new regulations would mandatorily apply from 1 January 2017. However, during the transition 
period, the APTS purchase decisions may have been influenced by the new regulations. If firms have a fiscal year-
end during the transition period, they may voluntarily adopt the new regulations from the beginning of that year. I 
mitigate concerns related to the voluntary adoption of the new regulations by excluding such firms. After excluding 
these firms from my sample, I could identify a set of firms that were not influenced by the regulation (i.e. POST=0), 
and a set of firms that were affected by the regulation (i.e. POST=1). For example, for a firm with a 30 June 2017 
fiscal year-end (i.e., starting the fiscal year on 1 July 2016), the APTS purchase decision was mandatorily regulated 
by the new regulations. However, the EU Regulation (2014) was announced in 2014 and became effective from 
17 June 2016, so there might have been some voluntary adopters since 2014. I could not identify those voluntary 
adopters based on financial statement disclosures and, hence, I cannot rule out the influence of voluntary adoption. 
I, therefore, acknowledge this as a potential limitation of my research design. 
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4.3.3 Sample and industry distribution 
I use IFRS-based consolidated financial statements from eleven (11) EU countries for the period 
of 2013 to 2019 to investigate my research questions. I choose 2019 as the ending year to avoid 
the effect of COVID-19 on financial reporting, and also to retain the United Kingdom in the 
sample. Since the EU Regulation (2014) became effective on 17 June 2016, I choose three years 
before 2016 (i.e., 2013-2015) and three years after 2016 (i.e., 2017-2019) to investigate the 
impact of EU Regulation (2014) on the demand for APTS. My initial sample included 20 EU 
countries where the purchase of APTS was allowed throughout the sample period. Audit fees, 
other assurance related fees, APTS fees, and other services fees are first retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuter Eikon. I then check, correct, and complement these data by hand-collecting 
missing data from firms’ annual reports. Owing to the data coverage issues in the Thomson 
Reuter Eikon, and difficulties in translating some of the annual reports published in non-English 
languages, I were able to collect data from 13 EU countries (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom).55 This generated an initial sample of 19,739 firm-year observations. 
Similar to Kuo and Lee (2016), when calculating country-year BTC measures (i.e., BTC1 
and BTC2), I start with all firm-year observations in the Thomson Reuters WorldScope database 
from 2013 to 2019 with available data to estimate Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Following the 
selection criteria of prior studies (e.g., Atwood et al., 2010; Blaylock et al., 2015; Tang, 2015), 
I eliminate observations with negative pre-tax book income (i.e., PTBI < 0) or negative current 
tax expense (i.e., CTE < 0), since such observations add noise to the estimation procedure. To 
 
55 For firms using non-English language as their reporting languages, I first retrieved auditor fees information by 
searching numbers reported by the Thomson Reuter Eikon database. Once I found the section related to auditor 
fees information, I used the Google translation function to translate the whole section to English and then collected 
data for audit and non-audit fees. However, I was unable to apply this approach to seven EU countries (i.e., 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia), because there are few data points for 




mitigate the influence of outliers, I drop observations in the top and bottom 0.5% of the 
distributions of variables included in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) in each year. I further require 
each EU member country to have at least 40 useable observations: a requirement that led me to 
remove the Czech Republic and Malta from my sample. This results in 13,384 (10,225) firm-
year observations from 11 EU countries, for calculating BTC1 (BTC2). 
I then merge this BTC data with firm-level control data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters 
Fundamentals. I exclude observations from financial and utilities industries (1,133), because of 
their unique regulatory environments. My final sample for estimating Equation (4.3) (test of H1) 
consists of 11,371 firm-year observations from 2,012 unique firms. This is further reduced to 
9,721 firm-year observations from 2,008 unique firms for estimating Equation (4.4) (test of H2) 
because of the exclusion of firms with a fiscal year-end during the transition period. Country-
level statutory tax rates are collected from the KPMG Corporate Tax Rates Table, and the 
investor protections data are collected from the World Bank website. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their respective distributions to mitigate the impact 
of outliers. In Table 4.1, I present the industry-based sample distributions. The Capital Goods 
industry (GICS 2010) accounts for 17.93% of the firm-year observations, followed by 9.31% 
from Software & Services (GICS 4510), 8.57% from Materials (GICS 1510), and 6.30% from 
Commercial & Professional Services (GICS 2020).  
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Table 4.1 Industry distribution.  
Industry Group Name N % of N 
1010 Energy 417 3.67 
1510 Materials 974 8.57 
2010 Capital Goods 2,039 17.93 
2020 Commercial & Professional Services 716 6.30 
2030 Transportation 347 3.05 
2510 Automobiles & Components 186 1.64 
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 503 4.42 
2530 Consumer Services 412 3.62 
2550 Retailing 534 4.70 
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 90 0.79 
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 508 4.47 
3030 Household & Personal Products 110 0.97 
3510 Health Care Equipment & Services 594 5.22 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 641 5.64 
4510 Software & Services 1,059 9.31 
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 601 5.29 
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 131 1.15 
5010 Telecommunication Services 191 1.68 
5020 Media & Entertainment 663 5.83 
6010 Real Estate 655 5.75 
Total  11,371 100.00 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
In Table 4.2, I present descriptive statistics for my main variables of interest (i.e., BTC1, BTC2, 
and APTS). Using the mean values of BTC1 across seven sample years, I can classify Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, and Latvia as high BTC countries; Belgium, Denmark, and Spain as moderate-
BTC countries; and Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as low BTC 
countries. This measure is comparable to the BTC measures shown by Kuo and Lee (2016), 
who use the same data sources and method as mine and cover a somewhat similar sample period 
as mine. The alternative BTC measure (i.e., BTC2) also provides a similar classification, except 
that the United Kingdom could be classified as a moderate-BTC country. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the distribution of both BTC measures over time for each EU member country. It shows that, 
in general, my two BTC measures have comparable values and trends across years. However, 
I find that BTC1 and BTC2 in Belgium are inconsistent, even opposite in some years. Thomsen 
and Watrin (2018) show that Belgium has a relatively high STR and its average effective tax 
rates (ETR) were much lower than the STR (i.e., ETR<STR) every year, indicating high tax 
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avoidance behaviour. Since BTC2 excludes earnings management and tax avoidance activities 
from the calculation, these exclusions may explain why it differs from BTC1 in Belgium. 
 
Table 4.2 Country distribution 
Country  N BTC1 BTC2 APTS_D APTS_FEE STR (%) PROTECT 
Austria 236 0.800 0.757 0.199 0.701 25.000 7.692 
Belgium 524 0.443 0.357 0.441 2.261 32.564 7.753 
Denmark 473 0.471 0.571 0.884 8.846 22.786 8.175 
Finland 680 0.743 0.786 0.519 2.317 20.643 7.971 
Germany 2,360 0.229 0.229 0.452 2.009 29.766 7.166 
Ireland 87 0.743 0.757 0.851 7.579 12.500 8.699 
Latvia 51 0.957 0.986 0.039 0.023 16.429 6.894 
Luxembourg 18 0.243 0.157 0.056 0.064 27.844 6.716 
Spain 637 0.571 0.386 0.359 1.795 26.857 6.809 
Sweden 1,884 0.143 0.143 0.562 6.140 21.914 7.678 
United Kingdom 4,421 0.157 0.371 0.543 3.023 20.143 8.419 
Total 11,371 0.500 0.500 0.517 3.394 23.313 7.634 
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The distribution and comparison of two BTC measures across years in each EU member country. 
BTC1 is estimated from Equation (4.1), and BTC2 is estimated from Equation (4.2). The calculations are based on 





I also observe significant variations in the demand for APTS (i.e., APTS_D and APTS_FEE) 
across EU countries in Table 4.2. For example, the percentage of firms that purchase APTS 
ranges from about 4% in Latvia to 88.4% in Denmark. Figure 4.2 illustrates the changes in the 
demand for APTS_D. On average, I can see a descending trend in the percentage of firms 
purchasing APTS over the entire sample period. Especially after 2016, there is a sharp decline 
in the demand for APTS in most of the sample countries. This is consistent with EU Regulation 
(2014) achieving its objectives of prohibiting the purchase of certain types of APTS: categories 
of APTS that were considered to be compromising auditor independence. Regarding other 
country-level control variables, I find a significant difference between STRs in EU countries. 
The highest average STR is 32.56% in Belgium, whereas the lowest average STR is 12.5% in 
Ireland. In addition, investors are better protected in Ireland (mean PROTECT is 8.699), the 
United Kingdom (mean PROTECT is 8.419), and Denmark (mean PROTECT is 8.175), 





Figure 4.2. The change in demand for APTS across years in each EU member country. This graphical presentation 
is based on my final sample of 11,371 firm-year observations. As shown in Table 4.2, Luxembourg has only 18 
firm-year observations across the sample period and only one firm appointed its incumbent auditor as the tax 
service provider in 2013. That is the reason for the flat line at 0 for Luxembourg, from 2014 to 2019. 
 
I present the descriptive statistics for variables used to calculate my BTC measures in Table 
4.3, Panel A. The pre-tax book income (PTBI) is 8.8% of average total assets and current tax 
expense (CTE) is 1.7% of average total assets. The average signed discretionary accruals 
(DACC) is 0.4% of lagged total assets, and the average tax avoidance measure (TP) is 0.037. 
Table 4.3, Panel B, shows the descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables included in my 
Equations (4.3) and (4.4). The mean of APTS_D is 0.517, indicating that more than 50% of 
sample firms purchased tax services from their incumbent auditors. The mean SIZE of sample 
firms is 12.39 at the beginning of the fiscal year, corresponding to 2,572 million Euros. About 
39.1% of firms engage in M&A, and over 26% of firms report negative pre-tax income for the 
current year. The average firm is fast-growing (SALES_G and ASSET_G of 10.7% and 12.1%, 
respectively) and low levered (LEV statistic of 16.7%). Net PPE (20.7%), net intangible assets 
(13.1%), and cash (15.2%) account for about 49% of the average firm’s total assets at the 
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beginning of the fiscal year. Moreover, nearly 75% of sample firms are audited by one of the 
Big 4 auditors and the average firm pays non-tax NAS fees (NAS_AF) equivalent to 38% of 
audit fees to its auditor. 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Variables to calculate BTC 
Variables N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
CTE 13384 0.017 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.024 
PTBI 13384 0.088 0.078 0.035 0.069 0.117 
ForPTBI 13384 0.011 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIV 13384 0.024 0.036 0.000 0.012 0.032 
BTD 10225 0.002 0.012 -0.004 0.001 0.007 
DACC 10225 0.004 0.106 -0.033 0.004 0.042 
TP 10225 0.037 0.200 -0.033 0.069 0.172 
CETR 10225 0.198 0.199 0.064 0.160 0.260 
Panel B: Variable included in regressions 
Variables N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
APTS_D 11,371 0.517 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
APTS_FEE 11,371 3.394 6.227 0.000 0.209 3.970 
BTC1 11,371 0.277 0.248 0.100 0.200 0.400 
BTC2 11,371 0.354 0.242 0.100 0.300 0.500 
POST 9,721 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AFEE 11,371 28.163 27.444 11.343 18.740 34.496 
NAS_AF 11,371 0.380 0.655 0.034 0.158 0.405 
SIZE 11,371 12.388 2.285 10.703 12.262 14.033 
MERGER 11,371 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOSS 11,371 0.262 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 11,371 -0.023 1.461 -0.007 0.052 0.104 
FI 11,371 0.170 0.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R&D 11,371 0.025 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.015 
LEV 11,371 0.167 0.189 0.007 0.117 0.256 
NPPE 11,371 0.207 0.218 0.036 0.132 0.309 
INTANG 11,371 0.131 0.182 0.016 0.060 0.167 
CASH 11,371 0.152 0.177 0.041 0.090 0.187 
ACC 11,371 -0.370 2.242 -0.839 -0.204 0.365 
NBS 11,371 0.534 0.727 0.000 0.000 1.099 
BTM 11,371 0.600 0.556 0.251 0.463 0.806 
SALES_G 11,371 0.107 0.342 -0.031 0.051 0.163 
ASSET_G 11,371 0.121 0.324 -0.032 0.048 0.163 
BIG4 11,371 0.746 0.435 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
4.4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 4.4 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables included in my baseline 
regression. Both BTC measures are significantly (p<0.01) and negatively correlated with 
APTS_D (correlation coefficient of -0.06 and -0.04, respectively) and with APTS_FEE 
(correlation coefficient of -0.06 and -0.07, respectively), implying that higher book-tax 
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conformity decreases the demand for APTS. I also find that firms are more likely to appoint 
their incumbent auditors as tax service providers when firms pay higher audit fees (AFEE; 
coefficient of 0.15), engage in M&A activity and international operation (coefficients of 0.08 
and 0.05 for MERGER and FI, respectively), and when firms are larger and audited by large 
audit firms (coefficients of 0.06 and 0.04 for SIZE and BIG4, respectively). These firms tend to 
pay more APTS fees as well. Regarding the country-level variables, the demand for APTS is 
higher when investors are better protected. The magnitudes of Pearson’s correlations among 
independent variables are seldom greater than 0.70, with an exception between STR and 
PROTECT (coefficient of -0.76). I then estimate the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for my 
independent variables included in Equation (4.3). The untabulated results show that the highest 




Table 4.4 Correlation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
APTS_D (1) -            
APTS_FEE (2) 0.53 -           
BTC1 (3) -0.06 -0.06 -          
BTC2 (4) -0.04 -0.07 0.61 -         
AFEE (5) 0.15 0.41 -0.16 -0.21 -        
NAS_AF (6) 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -       
SIZE (7) 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.01 -      
MERGER (8) 0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.20 0.04 0.32 -     
LOSS (9) -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.38 -0.21 -    
ROA (10) 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.00 0.11 0.03 -0.15 -   
FI (11) 0.05 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.17 0.10 -0.09 0.03 -  
R&D (12) 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.18 -0.09 0.18 -0.04 -0.01 - 
LEV (13) -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.28 0.13 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 
NPPE (14) -0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.00 0.20 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 -0.13 
INTANG (15) 0.03 0.04 -0.14 -0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.26 0.07 0.22 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 
CASH (16) -0.00 0.01 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.13 -0.39 -0.14 0.20 -0.12 -0.04 0.30 
ACC (17) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.38 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 
NBS (18) 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.33 0.16 -0.17 0.04 0.09 -0.10 
BTM (19) -0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.05 -0.17 
SALES_G (20) -0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.14 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 
ASSET_G (21) 0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 0.09 0.22 -0.19 0.11 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.11 
BIG4 (22) 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.21 0.07 0.46 0.15 -0.19 0.06 0.06 -0.05 
STR (23) -0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.30 -0.14 -0.01 0.18 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.08 0.05 




Table 4.4 Correlation (continued) 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
LEV (13) -            
NPPE (14) 0.25 -           
INTANG (15) 0.02 -0.21 -          
CASH (16) -0.19 -0.17 0.19 -         
ACC (17) -0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.02 -        
NBS (18) 0.10 0.12 -0.15 -0.20 -0.05 -       
BTM (19) -0.06 0.10 -0.08 -0.20 -0.01 0.04 -      
SALES_G (20) 0.09 -0.02 0.20 0.20 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -     
ASSET_G (21) 0.23 0.09 0.38 0.47 -0.00 -0.08 -0.13 0.39 -    
BIG4 (22) 0.11 0.09 -0.15 -0.19 -0.06 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -   
STR (23) 0.09 0.02 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -  
PROTECT (24) -0.10 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.76 - 




4.4.3 Regression results for the demand for APTS and the levels of BTC (H1) 
Table 4.5 shows the baseline regression results for H1. Throughout this essay, all reported t-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm, to 
account for any serial correlation. Columns (1) and (3) report regression results using BTC1 as 
the BTC measure, whereas the association between BTC2 and APTS is presented in Columns 
(2) and (4). The demand for APTS is proxied by APTS_D in Columns (1) and (2), and by 
APTS_FEE in Columns (3) and (4). I find negative and significant coefficients for both BTC 
measures (coefficients on BTC1 and BTC2 are -0.246 and -0.621, respectively) in Columns (1) 
and (2) (for APTS_D). Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. I calculate 
the marginal effects of my BTC measures, and the results show that a one-unit change (i.e., 
from no conformity to perfect conformity) in BTC1 (BTC2) decreases the probability of APTS 
purchase by 8.79% (22.10%). The coefficients, too, are negative and significant for both the 
BTC measures (coefficients on BTC1 and BTC2 are -0.708 and -1.294, respectively) in 
Columns (3) and (4) (for APTS_FEE). Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In terms of economic significance, the reported coefficient in Column (3) suggests that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in BTC1 (0.248) is associated with a 5.17% [(-
0.708*0.248)/3.39] decrease in APTS fees paid to incumbent auditors, relative to the square 
root of total assets at the beginning of the year. These results suggest that the country-level 
required BTC affects the firms’ demand for APTS negatively. 
With respect to the sign and significance of the control variables, I find that large firms 
(SIZE; coefficient of 0.084, p<0.01) and firms paying high audit fees (AFEE; coefficient of 
0.005, p<0.01) are more likely to purchase APTS from their incumbent auditors. However, 
firms audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG4; coefficient of -0.149, p<0.05) and more independent 
auditors (NAS_AF; coefficient of 0.103, p<0.01) are less likely to appoint their incumbent 
auditors as tax service providers. Consistent with my expectation, I find positive and significant 
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coefficients on STR and PROTECT (coefficients of 0.033 and 1.205, respectively), indicating 
that the demand for APTS is higher in countries with higher statutory tax rates and stronger 
investor protection. I find similar results using BTC2 as the independent variable in Column (2) 
and using APTS_FEE as the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.5.  
The pseudo R-square and the area under the ROC curve shown in Table 4.5, Columns (1) 
and (2), and adjusted R-square shown in Columns (3) and (4), are comparable to prior studies 
(e.g., Finley & Stekelberg, 2016; Halperin & Lai, 2015). The area under the ROC curve is about 
0.7 in both Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.5, which indicates that my model has acceptable 
discrimination power or moderate accuracy level (e.g., Hosmer et al., 2013). The inclusion of 
the country-fixed effect increases the explanatory powers of Equation (4.3) by about 0.025, 




Table 4.5 Baseline regression results (N=11,371)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APTS_D APTS_D APTS_FEE APTS_FEE 
BTC1 -0.246***  -0.708***  
 (-4.32)  (-2.71)  
BTC2  -0.621***  -1.294*** 
  (-8.46)  (-4.15) 
AFEE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (4.31) (4.37) (12.18) (12.20) 
NAS_AF 0.103*** 0.106*** 1.082*** 1.086*** 
 (3.91) (4.00) (7.67) (7.69) 
SIZE 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 
 (5.34) (5.33) (3.43) (3.42) 
MERGER 0.024 0.025 -0.089 -0.086 
 (0.56) (0.59) (-0.51) (-0.50) 
LOSS -0.042 -0.044 -0.167 -0.171 
 (-0.78) (-0.80) (-0.81) (-0.83) 
ROA 0.006 0.006 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.67) (0.63) (-0.14) (-0.15) 
FI 0.038 0.038 0.161 0.160 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.56) 
R&D -0.165 -0.159 2.990* 3.008* 
 (-0.40) (-0.39) (1.82) (1.83) 
LEV -0.041 -0.032 -0.419 -0.397 
 (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.77) (-0.73) 
NPPE -0.054 -0.055 -0.355 -0.358 
 (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.72) (-0.73) 
INTANG 0.082 0.088 0.170 0.184 
 (0.57) (0.61) (0.29) (0.32) 
CASH 0.117 0.123 0.640 0.657 
 (0.76) (0.79) (1.03) (1.06) 
ACC 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.004 
 (1.63) (1.58) (0.17) (0.14) 
NBS 0.005 0.005 0.141 0.141 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.94) (0.94) 
BTM 0.049 0.051 -0.243* -0.240 
 (1.17) (1.20) (-1.65) (-1.64) 
SALES_G 0.028 0.026 0.044 0.039 
 (0.69) (0.64) (0.26) (0.23) 
ASSET_G 0.015 -0.003 -0.142 -0.178 
 (0.20) (-0.04) (-0.45) (-0.57) 
BIG4 -0.149** -0.153** -0.449** -0.458** 
 (-2.26) (-2.32) (-2.00) (-2.04) 
STR 0.033** 0.002 0.051 -0.005 
 (2.53) (0.18) (1.03) (-0.11) 
PROTECT 1.205*** 1.407*** 0.819 1.112 
 (4.02) (4.60) (0.68) (0.91) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -13.552*** -11.009*** -9.859 -10.168 
 (-5.25) (-4.50) (-1.02) (-1.04) 
Area under ROC 0.6974 0.7005 - - 
R-square 0.0979 0.1006 0.2463 0.2470 
Note: Robust t-statistics in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix C. 





4.4.4 The effect of EU Regulation (H2) 
Table 4.6 presents the regression results for the potential moderating effect of EU Regulation 
(2014) on the association between the demand for APTS and the levels of BTC. Similar to 
Table 4.5, I use both APTS_D (Columns 1 and 2) and APTS_FEE (Columns 3 and 4) as my 
dependent variables. I continue to find negative and significant coefficients on my BTC 
measures in all four columns of Table 4.6, supporting my main results. Moreover, the 
coefficients on POST are negative and significant at the 1% level in all columns, suggesting 
that firms substantially reduced the purchase of tax services from their incumbent auditors after 
the enforcement of the EU Regulation. Importantly, I find that the coefficients on BTC*POST 
are positive and significant, which suggests that the negative impact of the levels of BTC on 
the demand for APTS is attenuated in the post-regulation period.56 
 
Table 4.6 The effect of EU Regulation (2014) (N=9,721)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 APTS_D APTS_D APTS_FEE APTS_FEE 
BTC1 -0.595***  -1.329***  
 (-6.92)  (-3.97)  
BTC2  -0.660***  -1.127*** 
  (-8.36)  (-3.25) 
POST -0.469*** -0.611*** -1.795*** -1.954*** 
 (-8.75) (-11.33) (-7.58) (-8.06) 
BTC*POST 0.703*** 0.381*** 1.499*** 0.869* 
 (5.85) (3.69) (3.09) (1.81) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -12.500*** -9.959*** -10.012 -6.062 
 (-4.81) (-4.04) (-0.96) (-0.59) 
Area under ROC 0.7042 0.7054 - - 
R-square 0.1024 0.1038 0.2437 0.2437 
Note: Robust t-statistics in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix C. 




56 I apply a mean-centering approach to BTC1 and BTC2 variables before constructing the interaction terms, to 
mitigate the multicollinearity problem stemming from the introduction of interactive terms and to ease 
interpretation. Moreover, I find similar results when I include firm-years from the transition period in the post-
regulation period and when I use a balanced sample (i.e., all firms have seven consecutive years of data). 
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4.4.5 Robustness tests 
In this section, I conduct two robustness tests to support my main results. First, Kuo and Lee 
(2016) find that the level of BTC, to some extent, is affected by other country-level institutional 
variables. Following their method, I perform a two-stage regression to mitigate this concern. In 
the first stage, I regress BTC1 or BTC2 on EDL, ESS, RL, CC, and STR. In the second stage, I 
replace original BTC measures with the residual values generated from the first stage (i.e., 
BTC_R) and rerun Equations (4.3) and (4.4). For brevity, I report only the results of two-stage 
regressions using BTC1 to proxy the level of BTC in Table 4.7. Column (1) shows that all the 
institutional variables are associated with my BTC measures significantly. The second stage 
regressions show that BTC_R remains negatively and significantly associated with the demand 
for APTS, while the coefficients on BTC*POST are significantly positive. These results are 
supportive of those reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.  
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Table 4.7 Robustness tests – Excluding the effects of country-level institutional variables from BTC 
measures 
 APTS_D APTS_FEE 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
 BTC1 APTS APTS APTS APTS 
EDL -0.144***     
 (-48.59)     
ESS 0.151***     
 (44.09)     
RL -0.271***     
 (-18.84)     
CC -0.033***     
 (-3.90)     
STR 0.015***     
 (18.03)     
BTC_R  -0.199*** -0.464*** -0.637** -1.192*** 
  (-3.43) (-4.93) (-2.37) (-3.30) 
POST   -0.494***  -1.833*** 
   (-9.22)  (-7.61) 
BTC*POST   0.413***  1.232* 
   (2.79)  (1.76) 
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 2.515*** -12.320*** -13.993*** -11.745 -14.307 
 (27.52) (-5.14) (-5.09) (-1.20) (-1.33) 
N 11,371 11,371 9,721 11,371 9,721 
Area under ROC - 0.6972 0.7011 - - 
R-square 0.2805 0.0978 0.0999 0.2463 0.2431 
Note: Robust t-statistics in brackets. Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
*** p< 0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Second, I rerun Equation (4.3) using two alternative measures of BTC. The first alternative 
measure is BTC_WET provided by Watrin et al. (2014) who construct their measure using 
single-entity level financial statements and tax statements. Since tax burden is levied on a single 
entity rather than a consolidated group in the EU, Watrin et al. (2014) argue that the BTC 
measure developed by Atwood et al. (2010) may be affected by the consolidation process. I still 
find a significant and negative coefficient on BTC_WET (coefficient -3.652, p<0.01) 
(untabulated). These results mitigate concerns regarding the construction of my BTC measures.  
The second alternative measure I use is provided by Procházka and Molín (2016) who also 
developed their BTC measure (BTC_PM) based on the single entity level. Each EU member 
country is classified into low BTC, middle BTC, or high BTC groups depending on the number 
of adjustments required by tax authorities when firms prepare tax statements. Procházka and 
158 
 
Molín (2016) argue that ex-post BTC measures (i.e., BTC1 and BTC2 in this essay) capture the 
real differences between the book and taxable incomes that vary with changes in firms’ business 
operations, even if both accounting standards and tax rules remain unchanged. However, 
BTC_PM is proposed to measure policy-based BTC (ex-ante), and is invariant unless an 
amendment in accounting standards or tax rules occurs. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4.1, both 
my BTC measures are subject to substantial annual changes. Therefore, I test whether my 
results are sensitive to the ex-ante or ex-post feature of BTC measures. Untabulated results find 
significantly negative coefficients on BTC_PM in the pooled sample and the high-conformity 
subsample, but significantly positive coefficients in the low- and middle-conformity 
subsamples. This supports my main findings that the demand for APTS decreases as the level 
of BTC increases. Overall, my results are robust using alternative measurements of BTC. 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I examine the association between the country-level BTC index and the audit 
clients’ demand for APTS. Using a hand-collected sample from 11 EU member countries for 
the period 2013 to 2019, I find that the levels of BTC are significantly and negatively associated 
with both the likelihood of purchasing APTS and the amount paid for APTS. When testing the 
moderating role of recent APTS reforms in the EU (i.e., the EU Regulation (2014)), I find that 
the negative association between the demand for APTS and the levels of BTC is weaker in the 
post-regulation regime. Findings from this study contribute to both the scarce literature on the 
determinants of APTS and the consequences of BTC. 
My study provides some directions for future research. First, I find that the country-level 
required BTC is a significant determinant of APTS purchase decisions. Thus, I suggest that 
future studies consider the effects of BTC on APTS purchase decisions when exploring possible 
consequences of APTS using multi-country data. Second, this study is unable to suggest 
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whether the declining demand for APTS reflects the cost or benefit of a high level of BTC. 
Future research could fulfil this void by analysing the cost-benefit effects for different 
stakeholders (e.g., audit clients, audit firms, and capital providers). Finally, although this study 
provides some preliminary results that the implementation of the EU Regulation (2014) 
moderates the association between the demand for APTS and the levels of BTC, the possible 
reasons for this finding have not been explored adequately. Future research could compare 
market reactions to APTS purchase decisions in the pre- and post-regulation period, to extend 







Auditing has become a globalized profession in the past decades (Carson, 2014). Thus, this 
thesis aims to offer insights into the extant literature on audit services, especially on how 
country-level institutional factors influence audit outcomes. Other than their audit services, 
non-audit revenues also account for a substantial portion of auditors’ incomes. This thesis also 
provides novel evidence as to how country-level tax system characteristics affect the demand 
for auditor-provided tax services from their audit clients. 
This thesis consists of three essays. Essay One investigates the relationship between audit 
clients’ workforce environment and audit service fees, using a sample of firms from 30 
countries spanning the period 2002 to 2017. I posit that auditors perceive audit clients with a 
good (favourable) workforce environment as being less risky and, hence, exert less audit effort 
and charge lower audit risk premiums, leading to lower audit fees. I find supportive evidence 
for this argument. Moreover, I examine the channels through which the workforce environment 
reduces audit fees and find that a fewer media coverage of workforce controversies is one such 
channel. In terms of the role played by country-level labour market flexibility, I find that the 
negative relationship between workforce environment and audit fees is stronger in countries 
with a more flexible labour market. 
Essays Two and Three explore the research questions related to APTS. Essay Two provides 
a systematic review on the determinants and consequences of APTS in both the U.S and non-
U.S. settings. An overview of regulations pertaining to the approval as well as the prohibition 
of APTS in the U.S., EU, and some selected countries or jurisdictions, is first discussed in Essay 
Two. Furthermore, Essay Two reviews and summarizes two widely used theoretical 
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frameworks in APTS literature, namely, the knowledge spillover and the impaired 
independence theories. Finally, 112 papers are reviewed in the literature review section of Essay 
Two, with an overwhelming majority of the studies examining the consequences of APTS. I 
conclude that firms trade-off the expected benefits against potential costs when making APTS-
related decisions. Regarding the consequences of APTS, I find that a large number of studies, 
especially those in the U.S. setting, support the knowledge spillover effects of APTS. 
Motivated by Essay Two’s finding that only a small number of prior studies examined the 
determinants of APTS and none of them used multi-country data, Essay Three investigates how 
country-level tax system characteristics (i.e., the required levels of book-tax conformity) affect 
the demand for APTS in EU countries. Although firms listed in the EU markets prepare the 
consolidated financial statements using the same accounting standards (i.e., IFRS), the lack of 
a common consolidated corporate tax base leads to differences in the levels of BTC across the 
EU. I posit that such differences affect the audit clients’ decision to purchase APTS from their 
incumbent auditors. I, indeed, find that the audit clients’ demand for APTS decreases as the 
levels of BTC increase. However, this negative association is mitigated by the recent audit 
reforms in the EU. 
 
5.2 Research Contribution and Implications 
This thesis contributes to the fast-growing literature on cross-country auditing research in 
several ways. First, in this thesis, I find that the country-level institutional factors play a vital 
role in moderating the relationships between audit fees and their determinants. Although certain 
country-level factors could affect auditors’ behaviour directly, they might have indirect effects 
as well. Therefore, I suggest future researchers to consider both direct and indirect effects of 
institutional factors when conducting cross-country auditing research. 
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Second, this thesis sheds new light on debates over the provision of APTS. The majority 
of surveyed papers in this thesis support the knowledge spillover effects of APTS in the U.S., 
whereas there are still some prior studies that find that the provision of APTS impairs auditor 
independence in other countries. The question as to what country-level factors drive such 
findings requires further empirical investigation. For example, are the findings affected by the 
different enforcement environments for regulating APTS in different countries? Moreover, the 
extant literature suggests that the disclosure of detailed NAS, including APTS information, does 
affect capital market participants’ evaluations of auditor independence. A mandatory and/or a 
finer disclosure of APTS information worldwide could help to improve the effectiveness of 
capital markets. 
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first to investigate how country-level 
factors affect the audit clients’ demand for APTS beyond the effects of firm-level determinants. 
The variations in country-level factors are found to influence audit clients’ incentive to purchase 
APTS, and may lead to distinct consequences for APTS. My study calls for more research on 
this topic to enrich our understandings of APTS. Notably, the European markets are good 
settings for this line of research for reasons explained in Chapter 4. Overall, this thesis suggests 
that international regulators and standard setters should consider the differences in contextual 
factors when making regulations for both audit and non-audit services. Such a focus on context 
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Components of Workforce Environment Index – ESSAY ONE 
 




1 Does the company have a policy to drive diversity and equal 
opportunity? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
71.71% 
2 Has the company set targets or objectives to be achieved on 
diversity and equal opportunity? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
12.90% 
3 Does the company claim to provide flexible working hours or 
working hours that promote a work-life balance? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
27.65% 
4 Does the company have a policy to improve employee health & 
safety within the company and its supply chain? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
75.71% 
5 Does the company have an employee health & safety team? P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
47.78% 
6 Does the company have health and safety management systems 
in place like the OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health & Safety 
Management System)? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
38.26% 
7 Does the company claim to provide day care services for its 
employees? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
13.24% 
8 Does the company report on policies or programs on HIV/AIDS 
for the workplace or beyond? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
13.18% 
9 Does the company have a policy to improve the skills training of 
its employees? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
62.86% 
10 Does the company train its executives or key employees on 
health & safety? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
62.89% 
11 Does the company train its executives or key employees on 
employee health & safety in the supply chain? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
9.22% 
12 Does the company have a policy to improve the career 
development paths of its employees? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
60.05% 
13 Does the company claim to favor promotion from within? P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
32.32% 
14 Does the company claim to provide regular staff and business 
management training for its managers? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
49.01% 
15 Does the company provide training in environmental, social or 
governance factors for its suppliers? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
15.13% 
16 Does the company have a policy to support the skills training or 
career development of its employees? 
P: 1 for Yes, 0 
for No 
68.76% 
17 Is the company under the spotlight of the media because of a 
controversy linked to the company's employees, contractors or 
suppliers due to wage, layoff disputes or working conditions? 
N: 1 for No, 0 
for Yes 
96.69% 
18 Has there have been a strike or an industrial dispute that led to 
lost working days? 
N: 1 for No, 0 
for Yes 
97.49% 
19 Has an important executive management team member or a key 
team member announced a voluntary departure (other than for 
retirement) or has been ousted? 
N: 1 for No, 0 
for Yes 
94.20% 
20 Total number of announced lay-offs by the company divided by 
the total number of employees. 
N: 1 for no 
layoffs, 0 for 
having lay-offs 
89.84% 
Note: The qualitative measures provide binary information on whether a firm has a particular attribute, while 
the quantitative measure gives information about actual lay-off activities. For qualitative measures with 
positive attributes, I assign a score of 1 to a firm that has the attribute, and zero otherwise. For example, a firm 
will receive a score of 1 if it has an employee health and safety team, and zero otherwise. For qualitative 
measures with negative attributes, I apply a score of 1 to a firm that lacks the attribute, and zero otherwise. For 
instance, I give a score of 1 to a firm that has no strikes or industrial disputes during the current year, and zero 






Variable Definitions – ESSAY ONE 
 
Variable Definition Sources 
Dependent variable 
LNAF Natural logarithm of audit and audit-related fees. Thomson Reuters 
(TR) Fundamentals 
Independent variable 
WEI Workforce environment index, measured by 20 firm-level qualitative and 
quantitative workforce-related indicators, which measures the overall 




WS Thomson Reuters ESG workforce score, which measures “a company’s 
effectiveness towards job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities, and development 
opportunities for its workforce.” 
TR ESG database 
WS_A4 The equal weighted workforce score (WS_A4) as the average of 
employment quality (SOEQ), health and safety (SOHS), training and 
development (SOTD), and diversity and opportunities scores (SODO). 
ASSET4; Authors’ 
calculation 
Firm-level control variable 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. TR Fundamentals 
LEV The leverage ratio, defined as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided 
by total assets. 
TR Fundamentals 
INVREC The sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets. TR Fundamentals 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. TR Fundamentals 
NBS Natural logarithm of the number of business segments. WorldScope 
NGS Natural logarithm of the number of geographic segments. WorldScope 
LOSS Dummy variable coded as 1 for firms reporting negative income before 
extraordinary items, 0 otherwise. 
TR Fundamentals 
SPECIAL Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms reporting special items, 0 otherwise. TR Fundamentals 
CROSS Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms cross-listing in the US, 0 otherwise. WorldScope 
MTB Market to book ratio, defined as the firm market value divided by common 
shareholder equity. 
TR Fundamentals 
CURRENT Current ratio, defined as current assets divided by current liabilities. TR Fundamentals 
TURN Turnover ratio, defined as net sales divided by total assets. TR Fundamentals 
INTS International operation, coded as 1 for firms that have at least 10% 
international sales to total sales, 0 otherwise. 
WorldScope 
ISSUE Dummy variable, coded as 1 when the following conditions apply: long-
term debt increased by at least 20%, or the number of common shares 
increased by at least 10% after controlling for stock splits; 0 otherwise. 
WorldScope 
CSR Corporate social responsibility score, which ranges from 0 to 100. TR ESG database 
BIGN Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms audited by one of the Big 4 firms 
(i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG, and 
Ernst & Young), 0 otherwise. 
TR Eikon 
AO Audit opinion, coded as 1 for firms receiving qualified opinions for the 
current year, 0 otherwise. 
WorldScope 
BUSY Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms for which the fiscal year-end comes 
during an auditor busy season, 0 otherwise. 
WorldScope 
Firm-level governance control variable 
BSIZE The total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. TR ESG database 
BIND The percentage of independent members on the board of directors. TR ESG database 
ACM Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms with an audit committee, 0 otherwise. TR ESG database 
ACMIND The percentage of independent members on the audit committee.  TR ESG database 
ACMEXP Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms that have an audit committee with at 
least three members and at least one financial expert, 0 otherwise. 
TR ESG database 
CEODUAL Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms where the CEO and chair of the board 
are the same person, 0 otherwise. 
TR ESG database 
Country-level control variable 
LAW Legal origin. Dummy variable, coded as 1 for common law countries, 0 for 
code law countries. 








FDI Foreign direct investment divided by GDP.  World Bank 
DISCL CIFAR disclosure developed by Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research. CIFAR (1995) creates a country-specific index by rating the 
annual reports of at least three firms in every country for the inclusion or 
omission of 85 specific items. These 85 items include specific disclosures 
in the following seven categories: general information (8 items), income 
statement (11 items), balance sheet (14 items), funds flow statement (5 
items), accounting policy disclosure (20 items), shareholder information 
(17 items) and other supplementary information (10 items). Each country 
is given a score that ranges from 0 to 85, with higher scores indicating 
greater disclosure.   
CIFAR 
CORRUP Perceived corruption index, ranging from 0 to 10. For convenient 
interpretation, I use 10 minus the actual values. Thus, the higher the index, 
the higher the perceived corruption level. 
Transparency 
International  
EPL Employment protection legislation index. It consists of three category 
scores: individual dismissal of regular workers (EPR), additional costs of 
collective dismissals (EPC), and regulation of temporary contracts (EPT). 
EPL is measured as the equally weighted score of EPR, EPC, and EPT. I 
multiply EPL by -1 for ease of interpretation.  
OECD website 
EFW Labor market regulations including hiring regulations and minimum wage 
(5Bi), hiring and firing regulations (5Bii), centralized collective bargaining 
(5Biii), hours regulations (5Biv), mandated cost of worker dismissal (5Bv), 
and conscription (5Bvi). I use the average of these six components to 




of the World  
Mediation variable 
|DAC| The absolute value of discretionary accruals (DAC), generated from the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). I estimate the model for all 
firms in the same country and industry (using the GICS industry group 
code) with at least eight observations in an industry-year-country pair using 






) + 𝛾1 [
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] + 𝛾2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,          (A1)                             
where ACC is the total accruals calculated as earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations, minus operating cash flows. ΔSALES is 
the change in sales revenue in year t; ΔRECEIVABLE is the change in 
accounts receivable in year t; and PPE is the gross value of property, plant, 
and equipment at the end of year t. All variables, including the intercept, 
are deflated by lagged total assets. Non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) is 
the predicted value from the above equation, with DAC representing the 




CONTRO Media coverage of workforce controversies, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of controversies published in the media 
related to workforce plus one. The total number of controversies published 
in the media related to workforce includes “Number of controversies 
published in the media linked to workforce diversity and opportunity (e.g., 
wages, promotion, discrimination and harassment),” “Number of 
controversies published in the media linked to the workforce health and 
safety,” and “Number of controversies published in the media linked to the 
company’s relations with employees or relating to wage or wage disputes.”  






Variable Definitions -ESSAY THREE 
 
Variable Definition Sources 
Dependent variable 
APTS_D An indicator coded one if clients purchased tax services from incumbent 
auditors, and zero otherwise 
Hand collection 
APTS_FEE APTS fees scaled by the square root of total assets at the beginning of 




BTC1 Book-tax conformity index, which measures the level of required book-
tax conformity in each country and in each year as developed by Atwood 
et al. (2010). I calculate BTC1 as the scaled ranking of the root mean 
squared errors obtained from country-year estimates of Equation (4.1). 
WorldScope 
BTC2 Alternative book-tax conformity index, which is developed by Tang 
(2015). I calculate BTC2 as the scaled ranking of the root mean squared 
errors obtained from country-year estimates of Equation (4.2). 
WorldScope 
Variables to calculate BTC 
BTD Book-tax differences (PTBI times STR minus CTE) scaled by average 
total assets. 
WorldScope 
CTE Current tax expense scaled by average total assets. When the current tax 
expense is missing, I calculate it using total tax expense minus deferred 
tax expense, if available. 
WorldScope 
CETR Current effective tax rate, defined as CTE divided by operating cash 
flow. 
WorldScope 
DACC Signed discretionary accruals, generated from the modified Jones model 
with lagged return-on-assets (Kothari et al., 2005). I estimate the model 
for all firms in the same country and industry (using the SIC two-digit 
industry code) with at least twelve observations in an industry-country 
pair using the following equation:  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛾2 [
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
] + 𝛾3 (
𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛾4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (A2)  
where ACC is the total accruals calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items, minus operating cash flows. ΔSALES is the change 
in net sales or revenues in year t; ΔRECEIVABLE is the change in 
accounts receivable in year t; GPPE is the gross value of property, plant, 
and equipment at the end of year t; and ROA is return on assets, 
measured as net income before extraordinary items for the preceding 
year divided by total assets for the same year. DACC is the residual from 
above model. 
WorldScope 
DIV Total dividends scaled by average total assets. WorldScope 
ForPTBI The estimated foreign pre-tax book income [(foreign tax expense / total 
tax expense) * PTBI] scaled by average total assets.  
WorldScope 
PTBI Pre-tax book income scaled by average total assets. WorldScope 
STR Statutory tax rate for each country KPMG Corporate 
Tax Rates Table 
TP Tax avoidance measure, defined as STR minus CETR WorldScope 
Firm-level control variable 
AFEE Total audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets at the beginning 
of the year, following Kinney et al. (2004) 
Hand collection, 
WorldScope 
NAS_AF Auditor independence, defined as other non-tax NAS fees divided by 
total audit fees received from the client. 
Hand collection 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year. TR Fundamentals 
MERGER Dummy variable coded as 1 for firms participating in M&A activities 
during the year, 0 otherwise. 
TR Fundamentals 
LOSS Dummy variable coded as 1 for firms reporting negative pre-tax income, 
0 otherwise. 
TR Fundamentals 
ROA Pre-tax income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. TR Fundamentals 





R&D Research and development expenses divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
TR Fundamentals 
LEV The leverage ratio, defined as the long-term debt divided by total assets 
at the beginning of the year. 
TR Fundamentals 
NPPE Net PPE divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. TR Fundamentals 
INTANG Net intangible assets divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. TR Fundamentals 
CASH The sum of cash and cash equivalent divided by total asset at the 
beginning of the year.  
TR Fundamentals 
ACC Total accruals divided by pre-tax income. Total accruals are calculated 
as net income before extraordinary items, minus operating cash flows.   
TR Fundamentals 
NBS Natural logarithm of the number of business segments. WorldScope 
BTM Book to market ratio, defined as the book value of common shareholder 
equity divided by the firm market value. 
WorldScope 
SALES_G The current year changes in sales. TR Fundamentals 
ASSET_G The current year changes in total assets. TR Fundamentals 
BIG4 Dummy variable, coded as 1 for firms audited by one of the Big 4 firms 
(i.e., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG, and 
Ernst & Young), 0 otherwise. 
TR Eikon 
PROTECT Investor protection index, defined as the mean of four World Bank 
Indices. They are the Extent of Director Liability Index (EDL), the Ease 
of Shareholder Suits Index (ESS), the Rule of Law Index (RL), and the 
Control of Corruption Index (CC). Since EDL and ESS range from 0-10 
while RL and CC range from 0 to 100, I divide the latter two by ten to 
make scales consistent across four indices. 
World Bank 
 
 



